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ABSTRACT 
The thesis traces Coetzee's career-long interest in confessional narrative in order to 
deepen and expand understanding of the scope of his engagement with the form. This 
involves mapping the reach of his engagement with confession across his career as 
writer, translator and teacher, and drawing on previously unexplored archive material 
from the National English Literary Museum in Grahamstown, South Africa. In a 
series of chapters which cover his writing up to the autobiographical volumes 
Boyhood and Youth, as well as the recent Diary of a Bad Year, the thesis explores 
Coetzee's relationship to the literary history within which he self-consciously 
positions himself, the extent to which his relationship to the context in which he was 
writing is mediated through confessional narrative, and the intimate connection 
between the dynamics of confession and the writing process itself. 
The thesis argues that there is a fundamental discontinuity in Coetzee's 
thinking on confession as the conditions, rituals, forms, genres and conventions 
through which confession must proceed - and which he describes and stages in great 
detail in his essays, fiction and memoirs - cannot by definition deliver the truth and 
absolution that is the ideal end for all confession. Instead, we have repeated and 
varied attempts to stage successful confessions or indeed to make successful 
confessions, almost all of which fail. 
Confessional narrative is normally taken to represent a potentially shameful 
truth avowed in the presence of another person which will lead to absolution, 
forgiveness or transformation - and it represents all of these things in Coetzee. 
However, the desire for successful confession also lends itself to a goal-oriented, 
instrumental narrative that is characterised by self-interest. This is irreconcilable with 
the secular versions of absolution and forgiveness which Coetzee describes in terms 
of grace and which seem to indicate an ethical orientation toward the other. So while 
confession is described as part of a teleology leading from transgression to 
absolution, there is a fundamental discontinuity in this teleology suggesting that the 
desire or will for truth cannot in itself lead to a successful confession. 
This discontinuity resonates with the reconception of speech act theory that 
takes place across a range of texts by Jacques Derrida. In 'Composing 
Circumfession, ' Derrida admits that while he had always been sceptical about the 
processes of speech act theory, his interest in the field emerged from a belief that 
performative speech acts can produce events. But his parallel thinking on the 
aneconomic gift is a reconception of this model, to the extent that confession shifts 
from being emblematic of a certain kind of performative utterance to being structured 
along the lines of the gift - with the aleatory, contingent qualities that this implies. 
But if the event of a successful confession cannot by definition be brought about by 
the conditions governing performative utterances, similar to the discontinuity in 
Coetzee's thinking on confession, the rituals of confession - the avowal of 
responsibility and expression of remorse - remain the only way to prepare oneself 
and open oneself to the possibility of the event. 
This discontinuity translates in Coetzee's fiction into a desire for forgiveness 
and transformation enacted through repeated willed encounters with marginalised 
figures, which are very often failed confessions. These repeated, failed 
transformations indicate the desire for truth, absolution and forgiveness - the end of 
the episode of confession - but also the inadequacy or the disingenuousness of the 
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desire for truth in the face of powerful competing interests. This has particular 
repercussions for Coetzee the writer: if confession is inherently self-interested, then it 
brings his interests as a writer into direct conflict with the seemingly ethical demands 
of the confession. 
Few places have experienced the need for performative speech acts to produce 
events more keenly than South Africa and the urgency of this need informs Coetzee's 
engagement with confession - both the desire for truth and absolution and the 
scepticism about this desire that is evident in his work. The thesis traces the way in 
which Coetzee's engagement with confession responds to the changing demands of 
this context. It describes Coetzee's influential 1985 essay 'Confession and Double 
Thoughts' as an 'interregnum' text and its teleology of confession as an attempt to 
navigate through the constraints of a current crisis to the promise of an imagined 
future; its scepticism reflects the difficulties of such a task. But in the post-apartheid 
context, when 'transformation' is a matter of government policy, attempts to engineer 
reconciliation by limiting the scope of what justice is available - while continuous 
with the always instrumental bent of confessional discourse - are the focus of critique 
by Coetzee. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Approaching "the idea of the truth": Coetzee and Confession 
I 
In the closing interview of Doubling the Point, J. M. Coetzee describes his 1985 
essay 'Confession and Double Thoughts: Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky'l as 
'pivotal' insofar as it marks 'the beginning of a more broadly philosophical 
engagement with a situation in the world' (394). Suggesting that the essay be read 
alongside Waitingfor the Barbarians (1980), Coetzee comments: 
The novel asks the question: Why does one choose the side of justice when it is not 
in one's material interest to do so? The Magistrate gives the rather Platonic answer: 
because we are born with the idea of justice. The essay, if only implicitly, asks the 
question: Why should I be interested in the truth about myself when the truth may not 
be in my interest? To which, I suppose, I continue to give a Platonic answer: because 
we are born with the idea of the truth. (394-95) 
In setting transcendent notions of justice and truth against self-interest, Coetzee is 
pointing to a certain idealism in his work. Yet in spite of the rhetoric of conversion 
evident in the above comments, Coetzee's idealism, such as it is, is not underpinned 
by the illumination of the converted self. In the interview, the opposing positions are 
identified with Tikhon and Stavrogin, confessor and confessant in the excluded 
chapter of Dostoevsky's ne Possessed, which is central to 'Double Thoughts. '2 As 
1 From here I will refer to the essay as 'Double Thoughts' and to Doubling the Point as Doubling, I 
will also abbreviate the titles of some of the novels, referring to In the Heart of the Country as Heart, 
Waitingfor the Barbarians as Barbarians, Life & Times ofMichael K as Michael K, The Master of 
Petersburg as Petersburg and Diary ofa Bad Year as Diary. 
21 follow Coetzee in using the term confessor for the person hearing the confession and confessant for 
the person confessing. 
6 
Coetzee sees it: 'One is a person I desired to be and was feeling my way toward. The 
other is more shadowy: let us call him the person I then was, though he may be the 
person I still am' (392). In other words, though 'pivotal, ' the essay is not quite 
transformative. The route from cynicism to grace, to use the terms that he associates 
with Stavrogin and Tikhon respectively, is not a direct one. 
Considered in its Christian context, grace may be associated with the authority 
and finality of divine intervention, but the relationship that Coetzee describes 
between cynicism and grace in this essay and, implicitly, in his work, is not subject to 
conversion or transformation, neither position can be spoken of with certainty or 
authority and the dialogue set in motion between them has no obvious endpoint. 
Following Coetzee's lead, critics have taken up these terms in their reading of his 
fiction, pointing to the terminal scepticism of his attitude to confessional narrative, 
for example, or to the way in which grace comes to act in his novels. But few manage 
to account for the uneasy and uneven dialogue between the two. To be more precise, 
while critics have retained the concept of grace as the ideal end of confession, to the 
extent that this teleology has come to structure their understanding of Coetzee's 
fiction more generally, they cannot and have not attempted to account for his 
simultaneous and persisting interest in the form and conventions of the confessional 
narrative itself. This thesis is an attempt to do so by describing the relationship 
between cynicism and grace, or confession and absolution, in terms of a fundamental 
discontinuity. The relationship between the terms, I will argue, is not transformative, 
but iterative, and I will show how this is played out time and again in Coetzee's 
repeated staging of and acts of confession across the oeuvre. 
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ii 
According to the interview cited above, the dialogue initiated in 'Double Thoughts' 
between cynicism and grace, or Stavrogin and Tikhon, is an ongoing one. The debate 
is over the existence and availability of truth to the autobiographical or confessing 
subject. According to the position identified with Stavrogin: 'the only sure truth in 
autobiography is that one's self-interest will be located at one's blind spot' (392). The 
position associated with Tikhon is closer to 'the idea of the truth' mentioned above 
but, crucially, stands for the availability of that truth. Coetzee comes to define this 
position as 'Grace: a condition in which the truth can be told clearly, without 
blindness' (392). 
The 'double thought' of the title which Coetzee takes from Dostoevsky's Yhe 
Idiot, and which he further describes as the 'doubling back of thought, ' the 
characteristic motion of self-consciousness, captures the paradoxical coexistence of 
these two positions as it describes the simultaneous desire for truth and doubt about 
the stability of any one truth that he finds in the texts by Tolstoy, Rousseau and 
Dostoevsky, and which also characterises the essay. As the essay is devoted almost 
entirely to exposing the self-interest that lies between the desire for truth and the 
achievement of it, such that the truth comes to seem unattainable through 
confessional narrative, it is more readily identifiable with the scepticism of Stavrogin 
than the grace of Tikhon. This has led most critics to conclude that Coetzee's attitude 
to confessional narrative is marked by scepticism alone. 3 Indeed, it would appear that 
the essay's only concession to the position represented by Tikhon is that it undertakes 
such an analysis in the first place. But in this way the position of Tikhon, like the idea 
3 Among the critics who find Coetzee's engagement with confession marked by scepticism are 
Boehmer, Hayes, Lawlan and Sanders. 
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of the truth, functions as a kind of horizon of possibility in the essay, a position 
towards which one might strive, aware that one cannot reach this position through 
will alone, and which must finally remain unarticulated so that, unlike so many of the 
other limits described in the essay, it cannot be taken into account in the calculations 
of rational self-interest that motivate the exploration of truth. Of course, the limit 
against which the position of Tikhon can be brought into focus is the Christian faith 
of his creator, Dostoevsky, but Coetzee's insistence on the secular nature of his 
inquiry in the essay, and in the encounter between Tikhon and Stavrogin in particular, 
means that Tikhon becomes a more powerfully symbolic figure than even 
Dostoevsky would allow. 4 
In the terms of the essay, the horizon offered by Tikhon, and by confession, is 
not just identified with truth but with absolution. 'Double Thoughts' sets up 
confession as part of a teleology, one element of the sequence 'transgression, 
confession, penitence, and absolution' (251). The question that Coetzee poses in the 
essay, and in its earlier incamation as 'Truth in Autobiography, ' his inaugural lecture 
at the University of Cape Town, is how to tell the truth in autobiography. But in the 
context of this teleology, the question is gradually reframed as a question about 
completion: how does one emerge from confession to the true end of confession, 
which is absolution. Absolution, of course, belongs to a religious register, but it is 
refigured in 'Double Thoughts' in a secular and, indeed, literary context: 'Absolution 
means the end of the episode, the closing of the chapter, liberation from the 
oppression of the memory. Absolution in this sense is the indispensable goal of all 
4 In the essay Coetzee claims: 'Dostoevsky takes his next, and last, steps in the exploration of the 
limits of secular confession in The Possessed (1871-72)' (287). This might explain the omission of 
Crime and Punishment and The Brothers Karamazov from the essay, as confession in these novels is 
arguably no longer secular. 
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confession, sacramental or secular' (252). This is described in more secular terms 
towards the end of the essay as self-forgiveness, which also means 'the closing of the 
chapter, the end of the downward spiral of self-accusation whose depths can never be 
plumbed' (290). 
The position represented by Tikhon, the possibility of self-forgiveness, is as 
close as one gets to the secular equivalent of absolution sought in 'Double Thoughts. ' 
For this reason, he is usually thought of as resolving the problem of the end of 
confession, albeit without prescription or explanation. His significance is as an 
interlocutor, but while the reader of 'Stavrogin's Confession' is privy to their 
encounter, the precise mechanism which allows the confession to come to a close for 
so cynical and self-interested a confessant as Stavrogin remains mysterious. Indeed, 
this is the crucial point: if absolution is only available through grace (represented by 
Tikhon), then it is not reducible to or achievable by prescription, calculation or will. 
Grace, as defined by the OED, is 'a matter of favour not of right. ' But if absolution is 
'the indispensable goal of all confession, ' then the horizon offered by Tikhon - the 
possibility of absolution and self-forgiveness, the end of the episode - is the condition 
of possibility for all confessional narrative. It is a limit which offers not just an end to 
confession but which allows the search for truth to begin, that is to say, it allows 
writing to begin - even if it necessarily leaves the question of the ending in abeyance. 
To the extent that absolution, grace or Tikhon offer a kind of illimitable limit, 
they provide an unspoken and unknowable horizon that gives meaning and purpose to 
confessional narrative. But while this provides a goal for confessional narrative, the 
act of confessing does not necessarily achieve it. Indeed, its orientation towards this 
goal is potentially an obstacle to successful confession, structuring the confession to 
achieve the goal of absolution. Coetzee's analysis of the fictional and 
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autobiographical confessions in the essay points to various conventions and 
conditions which have evolved in an attempt to guarantee the truthfulness and hence 
the completion of the confession. 
Rousseau's Confessions open with an attempt to guarantee their truth: 'I am 
commencing an undertaking, hitherto without precedent, and which will never find an 
imitator. I desire to set before my fellows the likeness of a man in all the truth of 
nature, and that man myself (3). Rousseau's authority as a confessant rests on his 
claim to sincerity and authenticity. But most of the confessants discussed in 'Double 
Thoughts' attempt to put in place a guarantee of truthfulness that does not merely 
involve taking them at their word; in fact, the guarantees generally take the form of 
creating conditions that appear to circumvent the self-interestedness of the 
confession. In Tolstoy, this is evident in the illumination of the converted self in Ae 
Kreutzer Sonata and the spiritual crisis and conversion of A Confession. In 
Dostoevsky, the absence of an audience functions as a guarantee of truthfulness in 
Notes from Underground and both Ae Idiot and Yhe Possessed are marked by 
attempts to install death itself as the guarantee of truth. And across the range of works 
by all three authors, the very shamefulness of the transgression confessed - and, 
significantly, of the confession - presents itself as a guarantee of sincerity. One after 
another, however, Coetzee finds that these confessions fail to meet the standards they 
have set down as guarantees of truth, often occasioning more confession, and by the 
time he reaches The Possessed, the final text under discussion, he finds that the 
attempt to create the conditions in which the truth can be told is a kind of game: 
'Stavrogin's confession becomes a game whose essence is that certain limits will not 
be transgressed, though the contestants will pretend to each other and to themselves 
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that there are no limits. It is thus a game of deception and self-deception, a game of 
limited truth. Tikhon ends the game by breaking the rules' (289). 
The idea of observing certain limits is not unique to these confessions. 
Coetzee himself is careful to observe the limits of the kind of analysis he can pursue, 
rejecting, for example, Paul de Man's claim to find moments of inauthenticity in 
Rousseau's text, instead pursuing the confessants in the gaps and inconsistencies in 
their narratives. 5 As a result, his analysis keeps alive the possibility that, in the 
absence of such inconsistencies, a confession which observes the conditions that 
appear to circumvent self-interest might be successful. At the same time, he is 
adamant that his 'second readings' do not constitute a final 'truth'; rather, his 
readings serve to undermine the claim to a final truth in the cases in question, itself a 
devastating critique for those authors and characters whose identity has come to be 
defined by the authority of their confessions. As he points out: 'the possibility of 
reading the truth 'behind' a true confession has implications peculiar to the genre of 
confession' (273). 
Interestingly, this statement too is framed in terms of the limits on what a 
given discourse can know about its own motives. In 'Truth in Autobiography' he 
questions the presumption of literary criticism itself to tell the truth about literary 
texts, pointing out that critical discourse cannot afford to fully understand its 
relationship to literary texts. He concludes that 'all discourses may have secrets, of no 
great consequence, which they nonetheless cannot afford to reveal' (6). In other 
words, the primary interest served by confessional narrative might be narrative itself. 
This includes, in the case of autobiography, texts that proceed beyond what they can, 
strictly speaking, afford to reveal, but in these cases the principle of risk or excess 
5 He is referring here to Paul de Man's 'Excuses (Confessions)' which I will discuss in chapter one. 
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enhances the confessional currency, and therefore serves the interest of the narrative. 
Also, because confession depends on the presence of an interlocutor there is a lot at 
stake in how confession is read, giving rise to anxieties about reading and being read 
in the essay and across Coetzee's fictional treatment of confession. 
If 'the idea of the truth' and grace, the condition in which it can be told 
clearly, are at odds with the sceptical questioning of the motives behind the desire for 
truth that we find in the essay, then Coetzee's observation of certain limits in the 
pursuit of that truth, underpinned by the suggestion that not all secrets should be 
revealed, represents a further complication of his position on confession. The essay 
analyses and enacts in this analysis precisely the kind of instrumentalism and 
calculation that is set aside in the operation of grace. True absolution might rely on 
the unwilled operation of grace in the sacrament of confession, but if it is sought - 
and in Coetzee's novels it invariably is - then it is through the kind of narrative to 
which he devotes most of his attention in the confession essay and which he stages 
time and again in his own work. So while confessional narrative never seems to be 
capable of producing the ideal end of confession and might not be adequate to certain 
kinds of truth, Coetzee still devotes his considerable creative resources to staging and 
restaging the conditions in which confession can supposedly be successfully 
performed and we also, occasionally, find him negotiating these conditions and limits 
in the act of confession. But this negotiation of conditions and limits goes hand in 
hand with the suggestion that for confession to take place, certain conditions and 
limits might have to be transgressed and exceeded. 
III 
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Since the appearance of Doubling the Point in 1992, which collects most of Coetzee's 
early academic writing, including 'Double Thoughts, ' and is punctuated by a series of 
revealing interviews with David Attwell, among them the interview in which he 
places the confession essay as the (not quite) turning point in his intellectual 
autobiography, the model of confession that emerges in the essay has increasingly 
been a lens through which his work has been read. This has resulted in greater 
attention to the role of confession in Coetzee's fiction, but more frequently has seen 
critics take the prominent terms of the essay - cynicism and grace, its concern with 
closure - and read them back into the fiction. This is not to say that critics are in 
agreement on the significance of the essay. Rather, the discontinuity that I describe at 
the centre of Coetzee's writing on confession has given rise to distinct approaches to 
confession in his work: those critics who demonstrate that aspects of the novel in 
question meet the conditions and limits required for successful confession or those 
who, accepting the terminal scepticism of Coetzee's attitude to confession, illustrate 
that grace (and therefore absolution) is available in some other register. 
Critical responses to confession in Age of Iron are typical in this regard; 
taking the form of Mrs Curren's letter to her daughter to be delivered by Verceuil 
after her death, the novel is frequently described in confessional terms. Sheila 
Collingwood-Whittick takes up Coetzee's chosen definition of confession as 'a 
motive to tell an essential truth about the self' (252), highlighting Mrs Curren's 
$explicit commitment to truth-telling' which is accompanied by 'the author's 
"underwriting" of the credibility of that intention by placing it within the context of 
Mrs. Curren's imminent death' ('In the Shadow of Last Things' 44). Dominic Head 
reiterates the significance of the limit imposed by her imminent death, pointing out 
that it 'makes self-interest irrelevant' (138-9). But for Head it is the role of Verceuil 
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as the confessor figure that allows Age of Iron to satisfy the requirements of a 'true 
confession': 'Mrs. Curren's is true because it is not directly heard: the truth, the self- 
knowledge, is produced by Verceuil's uselessness as a confessor and his likely 
unreliability as a messenger' (140). Michael Neill, on the other hand, proposes that 
absolution and grace are not achievable through confession but that Mrs Curren's 
salvation lies in the novel's play with the Christian virtue of charity and particularly 
with her own ability to experience gratitude, a cognate of grace: 'it is, I think, through 
a secular version of Calvinist grace that Coetzee imagines Elizabeth Curren's release 
from the "state of ugliness" and the endless labyrinth of confession without 
absolution' (34). It is clear that in each case the critics are working within the 
confessional paradigm outlined in 'Double Thoughts, ' and readings of confession in 
the other novels follow a similar pattern: Dick Penner finds that double thought is 
transcended in Barbarians by the magistrate's 'overriding will to the truth' (38) and 
Elke D'hoker claims that the end of confession is available through acceptance and 
authority in Foe and the memoirs (3 7-3 8). 
Notably, most critical discussions of confession in Coetzee's fiction focus on 
the later novels, in part because in chronological terms they lend themselves more 
obviously to comparison with the confession essay and in part because in these 
novels, as Coetzee says of Dostoevsky, 'one can no longer think of confession as a 
mere expository device: confession itself, with all its attendant psychological, moral, 
epistemological, and finally metaphysical problems, moves to the centre of the stage' 
(275). But part of my claim will be that Coetzee's engagement with confessional 
narrative is in evidence much earlier than this; 'Double Thoughts' is the culmination 
of years of engagement with confession in translations, teaching, research and 
writing. 
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Ironically, given the prominence of confessional models in the later novels, 
most critics have adopted Coetzee's presumed scepticism towards the form and 
turned away from confession itself as offering the desired end of closure or 
completion. This has serious implications for how Coetzee is read. In the case of 
Disgrace, which perhaps amounts to the most exacting critique of confessional 
narrative in the Coetzee oeuvre, critics point to the novel's concerns with artistic 
creativity in the form of David Lurie's opera and the care and attention given to dogs 
as offering the possibility of absolution and closure. Jane Poyner, for example, 
describes the end of confession in terms of reconciliation and healing and finds that 
this becomes available through what she calls the novel's 'Wordsworthian ethic' and 
its engagement with dogs ('Truth and Reconciliation'). Elleke Boehmer finds that the 
novel offers the possibility of closure and redemption by transcending self- 
consciousness in acts of 'secular atonement' ('Not Saying Sorry'). But Boehmer's 
essay is an excellent example of the dangers of absorbing and applying the teleology 
of confession too closely. The central problem that she addresses becomes the 
equivalence suggested in the novel between the redemption offered to David Lurie by 
4secular atonement' and the physical abjection and humiliation of his daughter Lucy, 
an equivalence that she finds repeated in their respective refusals to confess and to 
testify. To my mind the equivalence Boehmer finds is produced by the dominance of 
the confessional teleology which suggests that Coetzee's novels inevitably tend 
towards grace. But if grace is to remain a useful concept in reading Coetzee, then it 
must be as a condition of possibility rather than the logical endpoint of his fiction 
generally. In J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading, Derek Attridge too finds the 
possibility of grace in Disgrace's concern with creativity and dogs, but grace in this 
reading emerges in tandem with the novel's critique of instrumentalism. Attridge's 
16 
reading of grace suggests that it is not reducible to the reckoning of equivalences that 
Boehmer finds so problematic: 'It's this experience of finding oneself personally 
commanded by an inexplicable, unjustifiable, impractical commitment to an idea of 
the world that has room for the inconvenient, the non-processable, that I'm calling 
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grace' (187). Neill's discussion of confession as 'heart speech' similarly finds the 
operation of grace in the expression of gratitude. As I have pointed out, Neill's 
reading is sceptical about the processes of confession itself, but his essay is helpful in 
foregrounding the recurring relationship in Coetzee's fiction between the desire for 
successful confession and the desire for a kind of unmediated, pure expression that is 
also played out in Disgrace. 7 
It is clear that insofar as critics have engaged with confession in Coetzee and 
taken up the model of confession that comes from 'Double Thoughts, ' the teleology 
of confession has been the most influential aspect of that model, whether in 
emphasising the relentless tendency towards closure or the necessary open-endedncss 
of grace. For this reason, a consideration of confessional narrative in Coetzee can be 
situated in the context of discussions of temporality in his work. Critics like Rachel 
Lawlan and Patrick Hayes who are most sceptical about the role of confession in 
Coetzee's fiction, and about the confession essay in particular, correctly point to the 
obsession with closure as authoritative, stifling and contrary to values upheld in other 
aspects of the fiction. Drawing on readings of temporality in Dostoevsky, Lawlan 
points to the radical contingency and mutability of the human world as opposed to 
what she describes as the apocalyptic closure of grace (142-43). Hayes, on the other 
6 The break with economic exchange that I will describe in chapter three creates a space in which 
something like grace might act. 
7 See Vermeulen on Disgrace in 'Dogged Silences. ' I will explore the tensions in this relationship in 
my analysis of Youth in chapter 6. 
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hand, is dismissive of Coetzee's academic foray into confessional narrative, 
describing 'Double Thoughts' as 'an essay that seems only to chum old ground' 
(276). This ground, according to Hayes, is Lukacs's description of the novel as the 
'affirmation of a dissonance' (276). But Hayes is interested in Coetzee's challenge to 
the form of the novel rather than in the distinctiveness of confessional narrative. This 
is evident in his reading of Foe, which seeks to undermine the closure suggested by 
the teleology of the essay by emphasising the values of 'the novel' that are 
represented by Susan Barton, whose interests are otherwise sacrificed to the 
authoritarian Cruso and the immanence of Friday in the closing section (282). But, 
like Boehmer's essay on Disgrace, this risks setting in motion a reckoning of interests 
and equivalences that is fundamentally at odds with the possibility that grace seems 
to offer Coctzee. 
While these critiques of 'grace' offer a certain freshness to the way 'Double 
Thoughts' has been read, it is in the work of critics who question the logic of closure 
and propose more radical temporal models that, paradoxically, the possibility offered 
by the potential closure of grace becomes clearer. In J. M, Coetzee: South Africa and 
the Politics of Writing, Attwell correctly identifies the problem of the final section of 
Foe with the problem of the end of confession, but his study more generally focuses 
on Coetzee's radical disorganization of historical time (86). 8 Attridge, similarly, 
describing the role of trust in the confessional contract that emerges in Age of Iron, 
notes that trust involves 'a relation to the future that is based on no rational grounds' 
(98); in other words, this is no ordinary contract. His relation of Derrida's arrivant to 
The Master of Petersburg emphasises a similar unconditional openness to the future. 
And in contrast to those who find only closure in Disgrace, Zoe Wicomb and Mark 
8 References to Attridge and Attwell are to their books on Coetzee, unless specified otherwise. 
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Sanders note its insistence on repetition and incompletion ('Translations' and 
Ambiguifies). 9 For Wicomb repetition takes the form of a problematic escalation of 
violence but Sanders emphasises the necessity of a kind of 'traumatic repetition' 
(184). This lack offinality, I believe, is not contrary to confession but produced by 
confession. 
As is evident in many considerations of confession in psychoanalytic and 
literary discourses, Sanders points out that a lack of finality is not necessarily 
something to be celebrated in opposition to the authority of closure: 'an inveterate 
inveighing against the idea of bringing a chapter to a close may, equally, reveal a 
guilt-ridden fear of retribution that one would prefer never to have to acknowledge' 
(184). But against this he says that 'a certain level of traumatic repetition' is 'how 
human beings wounded in history make their time' (184). While Sanders points to 
confession as typical of the instrumental uses of language that Disgrace sets out to 
critique, confession could itself be an example of traumatic repetition: a traumatic 
repetition that is the necessary living-out of a particular kind of. history, a repeated 
search for 'the end of the episode' offered by the possibility of grace, or, as Sanders 
suggests, a more pathological fear of retribution. 
It seems to me that Coetzee's repeated engagement with confession is as alive 
to the psychic implications of repetition as to the potential self-interestedness of the 
enterprise. This, after all, is the nature of double thought. My interest in confession in 
Coetzee is in the relentlessness with which he engages it, notwithstanding its seeming 
impossibility. By placing his repeated engagement with confession in the context of 
Jacques Derrida's rethinking of speech act theory and the aneconomic gift - which I 
will outline in chapter one -I hope to demonstrate that this repetition offers the 
9 References to Sanders are to Ambiguities of Witnessing, unless specified otherwise. 
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possibility of 'the idea of the truth. ' But if confession also occurs in a spirit of risk - 
as I claim in chapters four and six - this might be the risk of engaging and repeating 
the psychic history that Sanders describes. 
IV 
As I have already indicated, the 1985 essay on confession is the fulcrum around 
which the thesis develops. But the unresolved tensions at the heart of the essay and 
the incomplete conversion narrative that it gives rise to some years later, mean that 
the discontinuity that I find characteristic of the essay is evident throughout Coetzee's 
engagement with confession. My intention is to broaden the discussion of confession 
in Coetzee beyond the essay, demonstrating that the concerns of the essay emerged 
from his early engagement with confession in translations and other professional 
activities. Papers held at the National English Literary Museum in Grahamstown 
(NELM) are helpful in providing a fuller (albeit still limited) picture of Coetzee's 
interests as reflected in teaching notes and letters. By describing the essay as an 
'interregnum'10 text I hope to demonstrate the immediate relevance of confessional 
narrative to the South African context, but also to question the usefulness of the 
model of confession provided in the essay, with its emphasis on the irresolvable 
tension between double thought and absolution, to the post-apartheid context. For 
these reasons the thesis will proceed more or less chronologically through the 
Coetzee oeuvre. Pairing Dusklands and In the Heart of the Country allows me to 
relate the problem of confession to Coetzee's early experiments with literary form. I 
examine how Coetzee takes up the history of confessional narrative at a very early 
10 'Interregnum' refers to Nadine Gordimer's use of Grarnsci's tenn in her essay 'Living in the 
Interrcgnum, ' which I will discuss at greater length in chapter 1. 
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stage in his writing career by translating Emants' A Posthumous Confession, and 
demonstrate how the confessional genre came to have a strong determining influence 
on his first two novels. In Waitingfor the Barbarians and Life and Times ofMichael 
K confession emerges as a response to the respective historical crises staged within 
the novels, taking the form of a desire for transformation that foreshadows the 
confessional teleology Coetzee would describe in 1985. In both novels this desired 
transformation is undermined by the vivid material suffering depicted, particularly the 
physical suffering that informs judicial confession in Barbarians. I will argue that the 
limitations of transformation as a model emerge alongside an alternative temporality 
that emphasises the possibility of ethical action in the present. This presents the 
possibility of a confession unmoored from the determining teleology of 
transformation. In chapter four, my attention shifts to the relationship between 
confession and writing as I discuss Coetzee's reirivention of the authorship of Defoe 
and Dostoevsky in Foe and Petersburg. I will argue that confession acts as a figure 
for authorship in both novels, negotiating the boundary between private and public 
life, and exploring the necessity and the risk of transgressing this boundary. In 
chapter five I contrast the apparent availability of confession in Age ofIron - still an 
'interregnum' text - with the drastic critique of confession that emerges in Disgrace. 
In particular, I address the limits and conditions under which the performative speech 
act of confession can take place, and relate it to the material conditions governing 
Mrs Curren's confession in the earlier novel, and the limited legal conditions under 
which confession is possible in Disgrace. 
While my interest is primarily in Coetzee's fictional staging of confession, his 
deployment of confessional forms and his engagement with the history of 
confessional literature, these recurring patterns also clearly invoke the act of 
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confession. As my argument will claim that Coetzee's engagement with confessional 
narrative is to a significant degree the result of the historical context which has 
imposed itself so forcefully on his writing life, I am implicitly claiming that 
engagement with the form of confessional literature is intimately bound up with the 
act of confession. My final chapter, which discusses Coetzee's 'fictionalized 
memoirs, ' Boyhood and Youth, brings these concerns together to address the question 
of whether these texts do more than stage the negotiation of the limits and conditions 
for confession to take place - after all the scepticism and questioning, does Coetzee 
attempt to confess? 
Notably, I omit only Elizabeth Costello (2003) and Slow Man (2005) from my 
survey of confession across the Coetzee oeuvre. While many of the issues that I 
address in my discussion of the other novels are also in evidence here, insofar as they 
display no explicit engagement with the form of the confessional narrative and move 
beyond the South African context that I relate to the confessional teleology of the 
essay, they do not lend themselves to the over-arching framework that I have 
constructed. On the other hand, Diary of a Bad Year, with which I conclude, while 
not overtly confessional, explicitly engages the structural problems and conditions of 
confession that Coetzee has been negotiating since his earliest work: the question of 
speaking in one's own voice in the first person, the problem of reconciling the need 
for an interlocutor with the compromising presence of an audience, the risk of 
transgressing the boundary between private and public life in autobiography, and 
writing in general as a way of positioning oneself between the private and the public. 
But I begin with a brief survey of the history of confession and some key 
interventions in the history of confessional literature in order to position Coetzee's 
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engagement with the form in terms of literary history and the context in which most 
of the works under discussion were produced. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Limits of Confessional Discourse 
To confess, according to the OED, is to acknowledge, own or avow - either a crime, 
fault or weakness, or one's belief that something is the case, an article of faith. This 
confluence of meanings has its origin in the Roman Catholic Church's Fourth Lateran 
Council in 1215 which instituted annual auricular confession and laid out a doctrine 
of orthodox belief for Catholics, accompanied by the establishment of an inquisition 
to investigate heresy, which the offender had to avow in his or her own words even if 
that could only be achieved by torture. In Troubling Confessions, Peter Brooks points 
to this coincidence of factors as the originating moment of the extraordinary power 
confessional discourse has acquired in Western culture: 
When one considers how the requirement of confession intersects with the definition 
of orthodox belief and the war on heresy, it begins to be apparent that confession 
plays a crucial role in moral cleansing and also in moral discipline: it works both to 
console and to police. It offers articulation of hidden acts and thoughts in a form that 
reveals - perhaps in a sense creates - the inwardness of the person confessing, and 
allows the person's punishment, absolution, rehabilitation, reintegration. (2) 
So confession as an avowal of wrong-doing and as an avowal of belief are both in the 
service of some kind of group cohesion, the former facilitating the transgressor's 
reintegration into the community and the latter affirming a collectively held set of 
beliefs. Private auricular confession gradually came to replace public acts of penance 
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as the means of remitting one's sins and being reassimilated into the community. As 
church historian Thomas N. Tender notes: 'From a penance of shame and expiation, 
the church, through centuries of development, had turned to a penance of shame and 
remorse' (cited in Brooks 90-91 (Tentler 52]). But just as the remission of sins had 
been associated with the performance of certain actions, absolution came to be tied to 
the act of confessing, rather than the item confessed; with Lateran IV 'the essential 
transaction of confession becomes verbal' as the sacrament is completed in the 
avowal of wrong-doing by the confessant and the spoken absolution of the confessor 
(Brooks 94). We can therefore understand the sacrament of confession as a kind of 
speech act: 
In the performative quality of confession and absolution, we grasp the continuing 
power, and problematic, of confession: it depends entirely on the confessant's verbal 
act, what issues from his or her lips, in an interlocutory situation in which a response 
is expected from the confessor, a response which acknowledges that the confession 
has taken place, and judges it to have been efficacious. (95)" 
Brooks maps out this history of confession in order to describe in greater 
detail the work that confessions do within the American legal system, a role that has 
its origins in the religious tradition of confession and leads to the 'fiction' of the free 
man in legal discourse. The way in which confession works within the limits of the 
legal system will be important for my argument. But the reach of the confessional 
model has been much wider and more fundamental than this. While the power of 
language and speech to act - to accuse, to plea, to confess, to pass judgement, to 
sentence - is codified within the operations of the law, the idea that language can act, 
that the subject can somehow act through language, can be found in all areas of 
public discourse and in many ways both creates and maintains the distinction between 
Of course, it also depends on one's religious faith. t 
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public and private on which social life depends. Confession is central to Julia 
Kristeva's theory of abjection in Powers of Horror, for example, which explores the 
relationship between bodily acts and speech acts in psychoanalytic terms. She finds 
that 'the practice of confession, upon the whole, does nothing else but weigh down 
discourse with sin. By having it bear that load, which alone grants it the intensity of 
full communication, avowal absolves from sin and, by the same stroke, founds the 
power of discourse' (Powers of Horror 130). The abject, in her account, is a kind of 
bodily intensification of the power of discourse: 'The body's inside, in that case, 
shows up in Qrder to compensate for the collapse of the border between inside and 
outside (53). 
Other accounts single out the move away from auricular confession towards 
the self-examination ushered in by the Reformation as key to the interiority of the 
western subject. In The Decline of the West Oswald Spengler points to this as the key 
development in the history of the western subject, noting that Goethe lamented its 
loss as 'over the lands in which it had died out, a heavy earnestness spread itself' 
(295). 12 Spengler finds that in the move toward self-examination and the increasing 
secularization of the confessional impulse, confession's policing function remains but 
in the absence of a priest its power to absolve is lost: 
No man confesses himself with the inward certainty of absolution. And as the need of 
the soul to be relieved of its past and to be redirected remained as urgent as ever, all 
the higher forms of communication were transmuted, and in Protestant countries 
music and painting, letter-writing and memoirs, from being modes of description 
became modes of self-denunciation, penance, and unbounded confession. (295) 
So while the religious framework whereby confession would lead to absolution falls 
away, confession itself remains, seemingly motivated by a desire for absolution -'the 
12 Attwell notes the significance of Spengler for Dusklands; the title comes from The Decline ofthe 
West (38-39). 
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need of the soul to be relieved of its past' - but now channelled into various cultural 
productions. Spengler's is a compelling account of the development of confessional 
literary forms and an account that has influenced Coetzee's thinking on the form. He 
cites the above passage in a note to 'Double Thoughts' but the passage is also 
recorded in seminar notes for a course on confessional poetry that he taught at 
Buffalo in 1970 (NELM 2002.13.1.8). 
11 
'Western man has become a confessing animal, ' according to Michel Foucault in The 
History of Sexuality (59). Tracing the production of sexuality as truth in the immense 
proliferation of confessional discourse since the eighteenth century, Foucault shifts 
the focus of the debate about confession from the power available to confessional 
discourse, to power exerting itself through confessional discourse in its many 
incarnations: 
... one goes about telling, with the greatest of precision, whatever is most difficult to 
tell. One confesses in public and in private, to one's parents, one's educators, one's 
doctor, to those one loves; one admits to oneself, in pleasure and in pain, things it 
would be impossible to tell anyone else, the things people write books about. One 
confesses - or is forced to confess. When it is not spontaneous or dictated by some 
internal imperative, the confession is wrung from a person by violence or threat; it is 
driven from its hiding place in the soul, or extracted from the body. Since the Middle 
Ages, torture has accompanied it like a shadow, and supported it when it could go no 
further: the dark twins. (59) 
Foucault's analysis allows us to see confession as instituting a culture of disclosure 
which has produced sexuality as a scientific discourse and as truth; in other words, 
that which must be disclosed acquires the status of truth. In this way, what appears to 
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be held back becomes part of the confession, a practice which can accommodate even 
what refuses to be confessed. Confession is 'a ritual in which the truth is corroborated 
by the obstacles and resistances it has had to surmount in order to be formulated' 
(62). Psychoanalysis is in this sense the logical endpoint of many discussions of 
confession, evident in the work of Foucault, Kristeva and Brooks. It is, in Foucault's 
formulation, 'yet another round of whispering on a bed' (5). Freud himself describes 
the similarities between the two: 'In confession the sinner tells what he knows; in 
analysis the neurotic has to tell more' (History ofSexuality 116), though in the pattern 
that Foucault describes the 'sinner' too will always tell more. The similarities are also 
evident in the apparent instrumentalism of both: the commonplace of the 'talking 
cure' places the therapeutic burden on the discourse itself, much like the power of the 
confession to achieve absolution. Though just as secular confession runs the risk of 
endlessness in the absence of guaranteed absolution, a certain anxiety about the 
potential endlessness of psychoanalytic therapy is evident in Freud's 'Analysis 
Terminable and Interminable. ' In this way psychoanalysis is very much the 
contemporary embodiment of the perceived power of confessional discourse: it seems 
to be motivated by the desire for cure, even if the availability of the cure is in doubt, 
as is abundantly clear in the popular confessional culture that it has inspired. 
While the history of confession within the Catholic Church makes clear its 
social function in policing and controlling belief, behaviour and desire - functions 
which were internalised in the post-reformation period - Foucault's attention to the 
'ruse' of repression and disclosure (rather than absolution) as the key dynamic of 
confessional discourse, including psychoanalytic practices, allows us to understand 
confession in a much broader context. In pointing to the continuities between 
discourse and silence, its apparent opposite, as intrinsic to the confessional dynamic, 
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Foucault focuses attention not just on what is confessed, but on the various silences 
around the confession. According to this view, the obligation to confess is so deeply 
ingrained in our society that we no longer experience it as an obligation, but as a 
liberation: 'Confession frees, but power reduces one to silence; truth does not belong 
to the order of power but shares an original affinity with freedom' (60). For Foucault, 
this is the great deception of confessional discourse, but it also allows him to identify 
this dynamic at work in discourse more generally: 
One has to be completely taken in by this internal ruse of confession in order to 
attribute a fundamental role to censorship, to taboos regarding speaking and thinking; 
one has to have an inverted image of power in order to believe that all these voices 
which have spoken so long in our civilization - repeating the formidable injunction 
to tell what one is and what one does, what one recollects and what one has 
forgotten, what one is thinking and what one thinks he is not thinking - are speaking 
to us of freedom. (60) 
The liberation associated with the performative role of confession in delivering 
absolution has become associated more generally with the notion of speaking out as 
an expression of freedom, indeed, as an expression of one's innermost self. This is in 
contrast with the history of confessional discourse which suggests that it has always 
been policing rather than liberating. 13 
This is evident in the treatment of confession within the law itself, In 
describing the traffic between the religious and legal functions and conceptions of 
confession, Brooks describes a persistent suspicion of confessional discourse that 
migrated from the religious context of the inquisition to modem legal discourse. He 
describes how under Elizabethan and Stuart courts the phrase 'nemo tenetur seipsum 
prodere ('no one is required to bear witness against himselff became increasingly 
common, eventually becoming part of the Fifth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution 
13 Foucault finds opportunities for agency in the sheer multiplicity of confessional discourses and also 
in the multiplicity of silences that surround these discourses. 
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which resulted in the famous Miranda warnings that those under arrest have the right 
to remain silent (Brooks, 16). While confession continues to occupy a privileged 
position in legal contexts, it does so on the basis that it is voluntary and uncoerced. 
However, the nature of the truth that must be revealed, a truth that is shameful and 
self-incriminating, places the validity of these categories in doubt: 
Even the most indisputably 'voluntary' confession may arise from a state of 
dependency, shame, and the need for punishment, a condition that casts some doubt 
on the law's language of autonomy and free choice. Thus the act of confessing may 
in its very nature undercut the notion of human agency that the law Urishes to - and 
must - promote. (74) 
Thus the autonomous subject must be protected by mechanisms built into the law, 
though Brooks' book also explores threats to these mechanisms from law 
enforcement and the judiciary. Published in 2000, Brooks' book largely limits itself 
to criminal law in the U. S. but one suspects that it would have had a very different 
focus had it appeared a couple of years later. I will address the suspension of the 
normal rule of law, and hence legal mechanisms to protect confessants, in my 
discussion of Philip Glass's opera adaptation of Barbarians in chapter three. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that wariness about the authority and reliability of 
confession has gone hand in hand with its deployment in legal contexts and is not just 
related to the climate of impunity ushered in by emergency anti-terror measures in the 
U. S. since 200 1. 
Either way, there is a fundamental paradox at the heart of confessional 
discourse: under the guise of a desire for absolution or cure, or for a reduction in 
sentence, a confessant acts as if it is in his or her interest to disclose shameful secrets. 
This means that confession is fundamentally an instrumental use of language. But 
while there are definite limits to the benefits offered by confession, there is no limit to 
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the desire to confess, no inhibiting factor as a result of the shame of confession, and a 
conflation of the potential power of confessional discourse to absolve with the power 
to speak per se. 
III 
The 'metamorphosis in literature' described by Foucault, the move towards 'a 
literature ordered according to the infinite task of extracting from the depths of 
oneself, in between the words, a truth which the very form of the confession holds out 
like a shimmering mirage' (59), is exemplified in the Confessions of Jean Jacques 
Rousseau and the form of secular, literary confession and autobiography that they 
initiated. Undoubtedly influenced by earlier autobiographers like Augustine and 
Montaigne, the innovation of Rousseau's text, as I've already noted, is nonetheless its 
claim to uniqueness: 
I am commencing an undertaking, hitherto without precedent, and whichwill never 
find an imitator. I desire to set before my fellows the likeness of a man in all the truth 
of nature, and that man myself. 
Myself alone! I know that feelings of my heart, and I know men. I am not 
made like any of those I have seen; I venture to believe that I am not made like any 
of those who are in existence. If I am not better, at least I am different. Whether 
Nature has acted rightly or wrongly in destroying the mould in which she cast me, 
can only be decided after I have been read. (3) 
Rousseau's uniqueness, like 'the feelings of my own heart, ' can be verified only by 
his word. While he invites the judgement of the reader, it is judgement as recognition 
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rather than ethical evaluation, and the act of reading itself is the only way one might 
reach such a judgement. 14 
Rousseau's Confessions is a text whose claim to truth rests on its authenticity 
as the word of the author about himself and not on its relation to an external, 
verifiable reality. But while he appears to guarantee the truthfulness of his claims by 
discounting the ethical content of his actions ('If I am not better, at least I am 
different') the account that follows restores ethical criteria in the self-justification 
which attempts to show that he was never really as bad as his actions indicated - his 
intentions, at least, were good. So, not only do we have to take Rousseau at his word 
- accepting his sincerity and authenticity - but we must do so with the suspicion that 
his word is shaped by other interests: justifying unbecoming actions and behaviour, 
appearing better than he is, highlighting his unique character, having a good story to 
tell. For Bernard Williams, the problem for Rousseau and, by implication, the 
problem for his imitators and critics, is the irreconcilable gap between his stated 
intentions and the works he produced: 'He never found a way of reconciling in good 
faith the consequences of his publishing his writings with what he claimed were the 
conditions of his producing them' (178). While Rousseau's stated claim to present 
himself truthfully in the Confessions is superficially at least without any real goal, the 
instrumental tendency of the confession is evident throughout his text and essential to 
any critical evaluation of it. The question of what exactly the Confessions are doing is 
therefore central to many critical considerations of them. 
Sincerity, especially as it is experienced by the writer who must serve the 
interests of narrative, is central to Coetzee's critique of Rousseau in particular and 
confessional discourse generally, a critique that has been in large part mediated 
14 See Starobinski on Rousseau's desire for recognition. 
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through his reading of Dostoevsky and the Russian author's own critique of 
Rousseau. In 'Truth in Autobiography, ' which focuses almost exclusively on 
Rousseau, Coetzee is concerned with 'the cost of telling the truth' in autobiographical 
writing and the possibility that it might be too high a price to bear, that it might not be 
in the interests of the autobiographical subject to tell the truth (1). Sincerity, the 
guarantee of truth in Rousseau's Confessions, is singled out for particular criticism: 
'The questions (sic) that we, as post-Dostoevskians, are entitled to ask of the 
inventors of sincerity is: cul bono? ' (5) 
Confession, in the endless secular form that Coetzee describes in 'Double 
Thoughts, ' is a type of narrative that negotiates between the desire for truth and the 
self-interest that lies behind this desire; confession polices the boundary between 
what can be considered for public airing in the form of confession (disclosure) and 
what must, in the best interests of the confessing self, remain private (withholding). 
This boundary is redrawn with each new revelation in anticipation of further 
confession as the 'best interests of the confessing self' - the subject who confesses, or 
writes - are served by continuing the confession, which gives rise to its potential 
endlessness. This idea, that the primary interest served by the confessional text is the 
text itself, informs 'A Fiction of the Truth, ' a later essay on autobiography. In this 
case sincerity is challenged by the need to publish an interesting book, that is, by the 
need to be different: 'If being different from everyone else is the justification you 
produce for publishing a book about yourself, then does the idea of publishing oneself 
to the world not put pressure on one to be different, or exaggerate one's differencesT 
This suggests that confession might be a uniquely compromising activity for the 
writer. 
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At the beginning of his essay on Rousseau's Confessions, Paul de Man 
focuses on the instrumental dimension of confession by noting that Rousseau singles 
out 'the desire to free' himself from the burden of guilt arising from his bad treatment 
of the servant Marion as one of his main motives in writing the Confessions 
('Excuses (Confessions)' 278). The source of Rousseau's guilt is an incident in which 
he steals a ribbon in the home of Madame de Vercellis but blames Marion, leading to 
her dismissal from her post and, we are to believe, years of regret for the perpetrator 
of the double crime. De Man's essay deals with Rousseau's failure to free himself 
from the guilt generated by the incident, a failure that is evident in his return to the 
same episode in his later Reveries but which de Man also finds in the Confessions 
themselves, as the narrative switches from confession to excuse. In de Man's 
analysis, Rousseau does not stop at the confessional disclosure of the events that 
occurred but seeks to reveal the motives and 'inner sentiments' behind his actions, 
thus attempting to justify or excuse them. For this reason, de Man finds that the text 
shifts from the cognitive (or constative) mode of the confession, with a verifiable 
referent, to the performative dimension of the excuse, which only has a verbal 
referent. In the gap opened up between these two different uses of language, de Man 
finds a fundamental loss of certainty and embarks on alternative readings of 
Rousseau's account. 
In the first set of rercadings, he accounts for the theft by way of desire: a 
displaced desire to possess Marion and a desire for exposure that is intensified and 
prolonged in the act of confessing itself. The latter desire is undoubtedly the more 
shameful, '... for it suggests that Marion was destroyed, not for the sake of 
Rousseau's saving face, nor for the sake of his desire for her, but merely in order to 
provide him with a stage on which to parade his disgrace or, what amounts to the 
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same thing, to furnish him with a good ending for Book If of his Confessions' (286). 
As Coetzee says, Rousseau prioritises being different. 15 De Man's reading bears 
comparison to Foucault's analysis of the dynamics of concealing and revealing as the 
key to confession. Indeed, like Foucault, de Man describes this dynamic as a ruse: 
'The excuse is a ruse which permits exposure in the name of hiding... Or, put 
differently, shame used as excuse permits repression to function as revelation and 
thus to make pleasure and guilt become interchangeable. Guilt is forgiven because it 
allows for the pleasure of revealing its repression. It follows that repression is in fact 
an excuse, one speech act among others' (286). Presented as such, the desire, shame 
and performative excuses of the Confessions are rendered transparent, 
4 epistemologically as well as ethically grounded and therefore available as meaning, 
in the mode of understanding' (287). This apparent transparency, meaning and 
understanding should therefore lead to the 'the restoration of justice' and Rousseau's 
freedom from guilt (288). 
But this is clearly not the case as the episode arises once again in the Reveries. 
Re-examining Rousseau's account of the incident in the Confessions, de Man finds 
another excuse at work - the accidental nature of Rousseau's accusation of Marion, 
illustrated by his admission that 'I excused myself upon the first thing that offered 
itself (cited in de Man, 288). This avowed arbitrariness has the effect of undoing the 
coherence of de Man's earlier explanation: '... if [Marion's] nominal presence is a 
mere coincidence, then we are entering an entirely different system in which such 
terms as desire, shame, guilt, exposure, and repression no longer have any place' 
(289). Instead of offering desire as an excuse, '... the total arbitrariness of the action 
15 1 will discuss a similar dynamic in chapter two with reference to Peter Brooks' Readingfor the Plot 
and A Posthumous Confession. 
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becomes the most effective, the most efficaciously performative excuse of all' (289). 
De Man finds that the contingency this introduces undermines all intentional or 
desiring elements in the text, all autobiographical agency, in fact, in favour of the 
radical machine-like arbitrariness of the performative excuse, of language and of the 
text. In this reading, guilt becomes the effect rather than the cause of the mechanical 
operation of the performative excuse. 
One of the major theoretical points of de Man's essay is an attempt to 
reinforce the disjunction between the constative and performative dimensions of 
language described in speech act theory. For de Man, the 'cognitive' mode of the 
confession is verifiable by empirical means, whereas the performative mode of the 
excuse 'is verbal in its utterance, in its effect and in its authority: its purpose is not to 
state but to convince, itself an "inner" process to which only words can bear witness' 
(281). On this basis he can assert that the Confessions 'are not primarily a 
confessional text' (279). But to my mind, the implication of de Man's argument is not 
that the Confessions are not confessional, but that confession itself is inherently 
performative. 16 
In J. L. Austin's theory of speech acts, a constative utterance is a statement of 
fact, descriptive and potentially verifiable. His solution to the problem of language 
which seems to do other than state or describe is not to sideline it as nonsense (though 
he occasionally does this), but to find a method to describe what language might be 
doing other than stating or describing. To this end he develops the idea of a 
performative speech act, an utterance which does not describe or report, which cannot 
be said to be true or false, and in which 'the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, 
16 This is partly a problem of genre: Rousseau's Confessions have been so influential that texts which 
follow them are confessional to the extent that they follow the Confessions. 
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the doing of an action, ' besides just the action of saying something (How to Do 
Aings with Words 5). To the extent that confession can indeed be said to describe or 
report, and to be true or false, it has all the elements of a constative utterance, and it is 
this understanding of confession which-underpins de Man's distinction. The verbal 
dimension of the excuse, on the other hand, makes it impossible to verify what it 
claims to describe or report, or to ascertain whether it is true or false. For these 
reasons, de Man holds that its purpose is to persuade or convince, and that it is 
therefore a performativc utterance, distinct from the purely cognitive dimension of 
the confession. 
The history of confessional discourse that I have sketched out above, 
however, suggests that the power available to the verbal act of confessing in both a 
religious and legal context, and in the cultural forms that it has given rise to, is not 
just reliant on the verifiability of the statement, but is intimately connected to the act 
of speaking or confessing itself. To follow de Man's analysis, it would be necessary 
to ascribe this power to aspects of language other than confession, but it seems to me 
that these performative dimensions of language are constitutive of confession itself. 
Although Austin does not discuss confession directly, his model of speech 
acts suggests that its successful completion relies on its observance of certain 
conditions, conventions and limits. Indeed, in the paradigmatic examples of the 
operation of confession in religious or legal contexts, a 'good' confession is subject to 
the strict observance of certain rituals and conventions but its successful completion 
is also underpinned by a transcendent authority: God or the authority of the law. 
Austin's theory and method constantly circle around and reassess the conditions and 
limits for successful performative utterances, opening up the possibility of developing 
a formula for the successful completion of the speech act of confession, a felicitously 
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performative confession. Equally, Austin's writings demonstrate - knowingly - that 
this is something of a fool's game; his attempts at exhaustiveness invariably leave 
him pondering the numerous failures that dog performative utterances, which are 
susceptible to infelicities, misfires, abuses, etc. In addition, there is a sense that the 
rigour of Austin's analysis of the felicitous conditions for performative utterances is 
ultimately trumped by the power of convention or authority to bring the performative 
speech act to a successful conclusion. 
Some of Jacques Derrida's writings could be described as conducting a 
sustained critique or at least rethinking of speech act theory as it is described by 
Austin. His discussion of de Man's 'Excuses (Confessions)' in 'Typewriter Ribbon: 
Limited Ink 2' is one example of this strand of his thinking, but it stretches from his 
early essay 'Signature, Event, Context, ' through a polemical exchange with John 
Searle, to his writings on the aneconomic gift in Given Time and Yhe Gift ofDeath, to 
his conception of the event and discussions of speech acts like forgiveness, peýury 
and pardon. Derrida's writings cut to the core problem of speech acts: the demand 
that they are both spontaneous, free-willed expressions of the specific intentions of a 
singular speaking subject and the need for them to be recognisable, verifiable and 
repeatable - iterable, in his terminology. Across the range of texts that I have 
mentioned, he takes the demand for the satisfactory, felicitous completion of the 
speech act and the highly conventional forms that such speech acts must therefore 
take, and subjects the limits within which they operate to a rigorous ethical critique. 
The result is that the apparent loss of agency experienced by the confessing subject in 
the face of a discourse which seems to dominate any attempt to speak through it - as 
evidenced in the immense proliferation of confessional narratives described by 
Foucault or, in a very different vein, the confessing machine that characterises de 
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Man's discussion of Rousseau - paradoxically becomes the condition in which 
confession can take place. 
De Man's essay, with its insistence on the distinction between constative and 
performative speech acts, its attempt to trace the failure of Rousseau's attempt to 
liberate himself from his sense of guilt and its emphasis on the machine-like qualities 
of the performative excuse, provides an excellent point of departure for a further 
development of Derrida's thinking on speech acts and dovetails with his interest in 
the act of forgiveness in particular. Perhaps the crucial distinction between the two is, 
as Derrida points out in 'Limited Ink 2, ' de Man's focus on the excuse whereas 
Derrida's essay is informed by the possibility of forgiveness and pardon that seems to 
go hand in hand with confession. 
Rather than following de Man's distinction between the confession and the 
excuse, Derrida proposes not just that confession is inherently performative, but that 
the constative dimension of language is always to some extent performative. For 
Derrida, confession is an avowal rather than just a statement: 
... I can inform someone that I have killed, stolen, or lied without that being at all an 
admission or a confession. Confession is not of the order of knowledge or making 
known. That is why Augustine wonders why he must confess to God, who already 
knows everything. Answer: confession does not consist in making known, informing, 
apprising the other, but in excusing oneself, repenting, asking forgiveness, converting 
the fault into love, and so forth. For there to be a confessional declaration or avowal, 
it is necessary, indissociably, that I recognize that I am guilty in a mode of 
recognition that is not of the order of cognition, and also that, at least implicitly, I 
begin to accuse myself - and thus to excuse myself or to present my apologies, or 
even to ask for forgiveness. There is doubtless an irreducible element of 'truth' in 
this process but this truth, precisely, is not a truth to be known or, as de Man puts it 
so frequently, revealed. Rather, as Augustine says, it is a truth to be 'made, ' to be 
'verified, ' if you will, and this order of truth is not of a cognitive order. (108-9) 17 
17 In Given Time he describes confession in almost identical terms (168). 
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For this reason he wonders 'if the confession mode is not already, always, an 
apologetic mode' and notes that 'every avowal begins by offering apologies or by 
excusing itself' (110). Indeed, by finding a testimonial aspect in all constative 
utterances, avowals insofar as they rely to some extent on one's word, Derrida 
demonstrates that they are already performative: 'Every theoretical, cognitive 
utterance, every truth to be revealed, and so forth, assumes a testimonial form, an "I 
myself think, " "I myself say .... I myself believe, " or "I myself have the inner feeling 
that, " and so forth; "I have a relation to myself to which you never have immediate 
access and for which you must believe me by taking my word for it"' (I 11). In this 
context every utterance must, to a greater or lesser degree, be taken on trust. There is 
always the possibility of lying and therefore always the need to ask forgiveness: 
It is also the only possibility of speaking to the other, of blessing, saying, or making 
the truth. Since I can always lie and since the other can always be the victim of this 
lie, since he or she never has the same access that I do to what I myself think or mean 
to say, I always begin, at least implicitly, by confessing a possible fault, abuse, or 
violence, an elementary peýury, an originary betrayal. I always begin by asking 
forgiveness when I address myself to the other and precisely this equivocal mode, 
even if it is in order to say to him or her things that are as constative as, for example: 
"You know, it's raining. " (112) 
In the case of confession, one is not just taken at one's word, but one's final 
word; confession, when it is successful, brings an end to narrative: 'forgiveness or 
pardon, the excuse, and the remission of sin, absolute absolution, are always proposed 
in the figure, so to speak, of the "last word"' (100). For Derrida, forgiveness in this 
sense is an event: V forgive you has the structure of the last word, hence its 
apocalyptic and millenarian aura; hence the sign it makes in the direction of the end 
of time and the end of history' (100). In this way Derrida addresses the fundamental 
problem of the repetition of confession, the problem of de Man's excusing machine 
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which cannot be reconciled with the necessity of confession as a last word: 'This 
machinelike operation of the excuse divides and multiplies at the same time. A 
calculating machine, a multiplication - and division - table, it leads into error and 
drags the guilty one into the repetition of the "last word. "' Does not eschatology then 
become a genre, an inexhaustible eschatology of final words, a last word, a litany? ' 
(98) 
But Derrida is interested in confession as the last word, in the possibility of 
forgiveness and pardon (as event). 18 The central concept of the essay, therefore, 
emerges from this problem: how to think of the performative both as a machine and 
as an event. But the machine comes into direct conflict with the performative as 
described by Austin: 
But a machine as such, howeverperformante it may be, could never, according to the 
strict Austinian orthodoxy of speech acts, produce an event of the perfibmative type. 
Performativity will never be reduced to technical performance. Pure performativity 
implies the presence of a living being, and of a living being speaking one time only, 
in its own name, in the first person. And speaking in a marmer that is at once 
spontaneous, intentional, free, and irreplaceable. Performativity, therefore, excludes 
in principle, in its own moment, any machinelike [machinale] technicity. (74) 
In this context, the machine-like operation of the excuse threatens the very possibility 
of a performative speech act: 
If, then, some machinality (repetition, calculability, inorganic matter of the body) 
intervenes in a performative event, it is always as an accidental, extrinsic, and 
parasitical element, in truth a pathological, mutilating, or even mortal element. Here 
again, to think both machine and the performative event together remains a 
monstrosity to come, an impossible event. Therefore the only possible event. (74) 
13A subtext of the essay is an attempt to understand why de Man did not address the question of 
forgiveness and pardon more directly-, it is an attempt to read a confession - or the absence of a 
confession - in de Man's essay, given the information about his wartime writings that came to light in 
the intervening period. Even writings on confession (and I include Derrida's among these) invite 
questions about motives and truthfulness characteristic of the genre. 
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What Derrida is attempting to think through in this idea of the machine-event is 
something which inadvertently 'allies chance to necessity, contingency to obligation, 
machinelike association to the internal, intentional, organic link' (76). The necessity 
for such an unimaginable hybrid is evident in the curTent appetite for public 
apologies: 'their present-day mutation on a geo-juridico-political scale in a world 
where scenes of public repentance happen more and more frequently' (75). In this 
context the problem of the machine-event becomes a problem of the law and its 
ability to mediate between the particular and the universal, which is also the unique 
quality of the first person, T: 'Nothing is in fact more irreducibly singular than 1, " 
and yet nothing is more universal, anonymous, and substitutable' (125). But the 
problem remains, as forgiveness cannot be reduced to a question of law: 
A terrifying aporia because this fatal necessity engenders automatically a situation in 
which forgiveness and excuse are both automatic (they cannot not take place, in some 
way independently of the presumed living 'subjects' that they are supposed to 
involve) and therefore null and void, since they are in contradiction with what we, as 
inheritors of these values, either Abrahamic or not, think about forgiveness and 
excuse: automatic and mechanical pardons or excuses cannot have the value of 
pardon and excuse. (134) 
In clarifying the nature of the aporia, the idea of the confession or excuse as a 
performative speech act is no longer entirely useful, particularly in Austin's 
formulation of performative utterances: 
It is often said, quite rightly, that a performative utterance produces the event of 
which it speaks. But one should also know that wherever there is some performative, 
that is, in the strict Austinian sense of the term, the mastery in the first person present 
of an 'I can, ' 'I may' guaranteed and legitimated by conventions, well, then, all pure 
eventness is neutralized, muffled, suspended. What happens, by definition, what 
comes about in an unforeseeable and singular manner, couldn't care less about the 
performative. [ ... ] The vulnerability, the finitude of a body and of a corpus is 
precisely the limit of all performative power, thus of all assurance. (146-47) 
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Here we reach the limitations of the goal-oriented conventions of performative speech 
acts as formulated by Austin. Confession conceived on this model - confession 
designed to bring about absolution, reconciliation or redemption - is subject to a 
calculation, which takes the form of the conditions for a performative speech act. But 
if the successful completion of the confession is to be possible - resulting in the event 
of forgiveness or pardon - then it cannot be subject to such a calculation. In this way 
confession in Derrida's writings comes to have a similar structure to the aneconomic 
gift: somehow, the event of forgiveness or pardon comes about (perhaps through the 
operation of the machine of the performative speech act), but those elements 
conventionally associated with performative utterances are fundamentally 
incompatible with the event. So while Derrida's thinking about confession emerges 
from his interest in speech act theory and particularly his insistence on the 
coexistence of the constative and performative dimensions of language in 
performative utterances, confession, pardon or forgiveness cannot be conditioned by 
the conventions of speech act theory. Rather they are events which defy all attempts 
at calculation, even if they are necessarily conceived in instrumental terms. 
In the Foreword to a collection of papers discussing Circumfession, a text that 
might be considered Derrida's own confession, he notes the change that has occurred 
in his thinking on performative speech acts: '... I assumed for a long time, despite a 
number of reservations I had about Austin's theory of constative and performative 
speech acts, that the performative speech act was a way of producing an event. I now 
think that the performative is in fact a subtle way of neutralizing the event' (20). The 
confession is rather much closer to the structure of the gift: 
A confession must remain meaningless. If a confession is meaningful, it's nothing. It 
means that it's a confession in order to reconcile, to reach some reconciliation, some 
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redemption, to improve myself, to change myself, so there's a teleology of 
confession. If confession is guided by a teleology, it is not confession. It's just an 
economy, it's a therapy, it's whatever you want' (25). 
This meaninglessness and unveriflability might be the condition of possibility of the 
confession but confession on this model is terrible rather than consoling: 'What is 
terrible in confession is that I'm not sure that I am the one who can claim the mastery 
of or the responsibility for what has been done, and I am not the one who can claim to 
be improving and to be good enough to repent' (25). 
IV 
Derrida's admission (confession? ) that his critique of speech act theory was 
nonetheless informed by the idea that performative speech acts could produce events 
is helpful in analysing Coetzee's engagement with confession for two reasons. In the 
context of an essay on Circumfession, it seems to me to be an attempt to explain - 
and perhaps excuse - his recurring interest in the confessional form, a form whose 
repetition (and calculation), as he notes, has a neutralizing effect on any event that it 
might produce. To this extent, there is a radical discontinuity in Derrida's thinking on 
confession between confession as performative utterance and confession as event 
which is comparable to the irreconcilable desire for confession and scepticism about 
its availability that we find in Coetzee. Of particular significance is the fact that in the 
case of both writers confession proceeds in spite of this discontinuity. But Derrida's 
admission also betrays a more common desire for speech acts to produce events, that 
is to say, for the speaking subject to somehow influence the circumstances in which 
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he or she finds himself or herself. In 'Composing Circum/ession' he notes (but 
doesn't endorse) that: 'The interest we are taking in speech act theory in the academy 
perhaps has to do with the illusion that, by using performative utterances, we produce 
events, that we are mastering history' (21 emphasis added). The critique of speech 
act theory and of confession in particular places this ability in doubt, underlining the 
extent to which the speaking subject - the confessing subject - is susceptible to 
external factors, to the words and acts of the other and, indeed, to his or her own 
conflicting desires and interests (the other in oneself). In what follows I outline the 
significance of this desire for speech acts to produce events to the form confession 
takes in Coetzee's fiction and non-fiction. 
Few places have experienced the need for performative speech acts to produce 
events more keenly than South Africa. Indeed, this is evident even in Derrida's 
thinking on the subject: his paper 'On Forgiveness' was first delivered in South 
Affica in 1998 and much of his writing on the issue of confession and forgiveness 
occurs in the context of global trends towards public rituals of truth-telling and 
reconciliation. 19 But in Derrida's thinking this need is matched by the impossibility of 
such a demand: 'One cannot, or should not, forgive; there is only the forgiveness, if 
there is any, where there is the unforgivable. That is to say that forgiveness must 
announce itself as impossibility itself' (33). In Coetzee's work we find the structural 
impossibility of confession that he finds in the history of confessional narrative 
amplified by the limits imposed by the historical and political situation in which he 
writes. In this context the desire for confession, absolution and forgiveness is 
intensified because politically, socially and economically there is so much at stake, 
19 'Typewriter Ribbon' was also first delivered at a conference in 1998 (see Peggy Kamurs Preface to 
Without Alihi). 
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and it is undermined by conditions which seem to place its meaning and successful 
completion in doubt. 
Coetzee's engagement with confessional narrative, informed both by the need 
for confession and an awareness of its impossibility, occurs in the context of the 
changing demands of the historical and political situation in South Africa and 
globally. If the challenge to make a successful confession in apartheid South Africa 
seemed to offer the promise of future absolution in an imagined community (and, 
therefore, a possible route out of the present), the work of negotiating the conditions 
in which this imagined future might take place seemed to be a worthwhile enterprise, 
even if it was impossible in the short term. But in the post-apartheid period, when 
'transformation' is a matter of government policy, speech acts acquire a renewed 
urgency with the result that the emphasis is now understandably on their successful 
and quantifiable completion rather than on altering and perfecting the form they 
might take. While Coetzee's non-fiction writing is helpful in mapping out the 
territory of confession, it is in his fiction that he has responded most powerfully to the 
changing demands of these circumstances. 
David Attwell describes Barbarians and Michael K, published in 1980 and 
1983, as variations on the 'interregnum' novel (Coetzee 70-71). Barbarians, like 
Nadine Gordimer's July's People, examines the present 'through the perspectives 
made possible by imagining the future, ' whereas in Michael K, Coetzee is 'not 
projecting a future so much as examining the present as it is lived by many of those 
who anticipate its imminent collapse' (70,71). Either way, both novels deal with a 
present conditioned by future events. With this in mind, it seems to me that 'Double 
Thoughts' is the quintessential 'interregnum' text in the Coetzee oeuvre. Published in 
1985, three years after Gordimer's 'Living in the Interregnum, ' Coetzee's essay, like 
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Gordimer's, is an attempt to be 'free of the past' by imagining a future. Gordimer 
imagines an explicitly political route to the future though this is elaborated in the 
context of a confessional narrative; Coetzee's essay posits a route to the future 
through confession but analyses in painstaking detail the difficulties that must be 
overcome to achieve this, to the extent that it seems to be desirable but impossible. 
The structural impossibility of confession that Coctzee describes as double thought is 
staged repeatedly in his fiction of this period and comes to seem emblematic of the 
historical condition described in Gordimer's essay. 
Gordimer follows Gramsci's description of a state in which 'the old is dying, 
and the new cannot be born' (263). The condition she describes is one 'imposed by 
history' (268), 'a place of shifting ground' (280), a state which exists 'not only 
between two social orders but also between two identities, one known and discarded, 
the other unknown and undetermined' (269-70). But the desire to shake off the past 
and be born into the future drives the essay; its power derives from Gordimer's 
dedication to: a 'new collective life within new structures' (264). She identifies 
herself with a segment of white society concerned with having 'something to offer the 
future. How to offer it is our preoccupation' (264). This is nothing less than the 
question of 'how to offer one's sey' (264). 
For all the political urgency of Gordimer's essay, however, it is also a self- 
consciously autobiographical text. Her emphasis is on forging a new collective 
identity but in order to do this she must embark on a kind of confession (and a 
renunciation of an old identity): 'Now I am going to break the inhibition or destroy 
the privilege of privacy, whichever way you look at it. I have to offer you myself as 
my most closely observed specimen from the interregnum; yet I remain a writer, not a 
public speaker: nothing I say here will be as true as my fiction' (264). This 
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autobiographical interlude is central to the essay as she addresses the unique demands 
the future makes on the writer, particularly the white writer: 'He has to try to find a 
way to reconcile the irreconcilable within himself, establish his relation to the culture 
of a new kind of posited community, non-racial but conceived with and led by 
blacks' (278). Gordimer's essay is not just a confession of the personal challenges 
and compromises she believes she faces in bringing this new state into being, but a 
demand that others make similar compromises, and even a suggestion that what is 
required is a kind of confessional renunciation of one community in order to be 
assimilated into a 'new collective life'. 
The confessional teleology rehearsed in 'Double Thoughts' - transgression, 
confession, penitence, absolution - is a future-directed progression concerned with 
breaking out of a current impasse to reach 'the end of the episode, the closing of the 
chapter, liberation from the oppression of the memory' (252). But if Gordimer's 
essay conveys the urgency of preparing for an imagined future in order to progress 
through the current crisis and move beyond the injustices of the past (which is at this 
point not quite past), Coetzee's essay stages the difficulty of achieving this. This 
difficulty, more than anything else, seems the defining condition of the interregnum. 
In analYsing the flawed confessions of Tolstoy, Rousseau and Dostoevsky, 
Coetzee inadvertently posits a set of conditions in which confession can successfully 
take place. These are not conditions invented by Coetzee, but a set of conventions 
that emerge from the way in which these influential confessional texts attempt to 
guarantee their truth, conventions that derive from the discourses on which 
confessional narratives draw, such as the death bed apologia. In this way the 
confessions fail to meet the conditions within which they operate, though the essay 
also posits a broader horizon of truth which these conditions can never meet. But the 
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seriousness of Coctzee's approach to confession in the essay indicates that this 
structural impossibility is not reason enough not to confess. Among the conditions 
required for confession to occur, the essay focuses on the issue of address (who does 
one confess to and how does this impact on the confession), the issue of how to know 
if or when one is telling the truth (and is not merely self-deceived) and whether or not 
there are situations which compel the truth to emerge (for example, imminent death). 
So, for example, installing death as a limit to guarantee that a confession is indeed a 
'last word' and therefore true, could disguise a desire to postpone one's death by 
confessing or a desire to live on beyond one's death. An attempt to confess without 
an auditor or confessor in order to avoid the distorting influence of an audience might 
just be a self-serving lie. And the impulse to reevaluate one's confession, replacing it 
with a more sincere truth or getting behind one's motive in confessing, might just be 
a way of spinning the confession out endlessly, telling a good story, creating an 
interesting persona for one's self. What Coetzee finds in Dostoevsky's Underground 
Man, for example, is the 'helplessness of confession before the desire of the self to 
construct its own truth' ('Double Thoughts' 279). The scepticism of the essay 
emerges from the sense that attempts to meet or orchestrate these conditions are 
calculated to do something other than confess the truth, but Coetzee's writing on 
confession also offers the hope that if one can meet these conditions and avoid such 
calculation, confession might be possible. 
What Coetzee describes as double thought, the simultaneous will to confess 
and doubt about the validity of the confession, is similar to the in-between place 
described by Gordimer, but at odds with the political prescriptions that she proposes 
to overcome the crisis and perhaps implicitly with the confidence of her confession 
and her claim that such a position is available to the white writer. The desire for some 
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kind of transformation is equally strong in both essays, but the seeming inevitability 
of double thought seems to condemn Coetzee's would-be confessant to terminal bad 
faith. 
This is brought into sharper focus by the perspective afforded by the end of 
apartheid and the 'shifting ground' of the interregnum. The demands of the future that 
are articulated so clearly by Gordimer and Coetzee lose the quality that structures the 
experience of the interregnum - its future-directedness. Instead, the demands acquire 
greater urgency as they are so clearly the needs of the present and articulated now by 
a new constituency. In this context Gordimer's idealism and Coetzee's scepticism are 
superseded by political expediency. Political discourse is full of the terminology of 
change - transition, interim, transformation - with efforts directed at creating the 
conditions in which this change can be facilitated, but also managed and quantified. 
So, to focus on Coetzee's essay, the promise offered in the most general sense by the 
desire for absolution becomes a state that must be negotiated in the present. And the 
conditions which had seemed to make this goal unattainable must be subject to even 
greater limitations because of the urgent need to reach 'the end of the episode, the 
closing of the chapter, liberation from the oppression of the memory' (252). 
'Double Thoughts' maps the conditions for a successful confession by 
exploring the failures of various literary texts to meet them, but variations on these 
conditions take on a certain particularity in Coetzee's fiction, both in the apartheid 
and post-apartheid period, that marks his engagement with confession as uniquely 
South African. I will briefly outline the impact of the historical context on three key 
elements of confessional narrative: address, judicial confession and public 
repentance. 
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From his earliest fiction Coetzee has staged the problem of address as central 
to confessional narrative. The creation of a 'new collective' that motivates 
Gordimer's thinking through the interregnum presents a specific set of problems in 
the case of confession. If confession, as Brooks says, expresses a desire to be 
rehabilitated into the community, then the South African context necessitates the 
creation of a community to be rehabilitated into. One of the elementary problems of 
confession in Coetzee's fiction comes to be the problem of a suitable addressee or 
confessor. Coetzee explores these problems in relation to the Dutch poet, Gerrit 
Achterberg, in his essay about the sonnet sequence 'Ballade van de Gasfitter, ' but the 
struggle to find an adequate mode of address is played out time and again in the 
fiction and can be seen as fundamental to any understanding of confession as an 
expression of a desire for the future. The problem of address becomes a problem of 
how to create the conditions in which one can address the other, confess to the other, 
and in which the other will have the power to grant absolution - all factors that are 
fundamental to any understanding of confession as an expression of desire for the 
future. 
The repressive security measures deployed by the apartheid state against 
opponents, particularly during the 1970s and 80s, brought the actions of the police, 
military, judicial, prison and state officials under scrutiny for their brutality and 
willingness to act in excess of due process in their treatment of detainees. Police 
brutality was a factor in the deaths and disappearances of numerous individuals but 
also seemed to indicate a systemic disregard for the law they claimed to uphold. 
Coetzee's 1986 essay 'Into the Dark Chamber' gives some indication of the manner 
in which these circumstances imposed themselves on the imagination of writers and 
ordinary individuals (as well as the attempts to disguise endemic state repression and 
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lawlessness) but it is without doubt most vividly portrayed in the disruption of normal 
modes of signification in Barbarians. In this novel the power of violence to 
determine the outcome of an interrogation redefines the significance of confession in 
the face of death that is a commonplace of confessional discourse and installs pain as 
the final determinant of truth. This terrible limit, represented through the recurring 
image of the tortured body, imposes itself on all other attempts at confession in the 
novel, undermining claims to authority and unravclling meaning to the extent that 
even time and place have lost the ability to signify. Pain (and the threat of death) as 
the limit against which confession occurs recurs throughout Coetzee's engagement 
with confessional discourse, undermining the authority of confession and testimony 
and establishing the desperately high stakes that attach to confessional discourse in 
his work. 
The practice of torture in extracting judicial confessions makes the 
terminology of speech act theory redundant in the face of violent acts. If speech acts 
can be described as an instrumental use of language - focused relentlessly on the 
successful completion of certain actions - then judicial confession is the ultimate in 
instrumental language as it is produced with the single aim of bringing the 
interrogation to an end. One of the major casualties of this terrible standard that the 
realities of apartheid South Africa impose on confessional narrative, therefore, is the 
desire for absolution and transformation that is expressed through the willingness to 
confess. If the repression exercised by the state intensifies the need for Gordimer's 
'segment' of the population to distance themselves from the actions of the state, it 
also undermines confessional narrative as a vehicle with which to achieve this. In 
spite of the most sincere intentions, the 'man of conscience, ' like Coetzee's 
magistrate, seems to act only in bad faith. Confession comes to seem like a strategy to 
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legitimise the structures of the past rather than inventing a community for the future. 
What is required instead is an understanding of the limits - physical and otherwise - 
within which confession can take place. 
While confession can be seen to relate generally to the problem of how to 
transcend the coerced separation of apartheid, this takes on a startling specificity in 
the post-apartheid period as the confession and testimony solicited by the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was conceived, and described in a Constitutional Court 
Judgement, as a bridge between apartheid and the democracy (Dugard 90). 
Established by a clause in the Interim Constitution, the promise of the TRC was first 
and foremost a political one - it enabled the political process to advance to the first 
democratic elections in 1994. It aimed to do this not by installing the successful 
completion of the speech acts of confession and testimony in their most general sense 
as the standard for reparative justice, but by placing specific limits on the kind of 
confession and testimony that would be required, thereby limiting the scope of the 
justice that was on offer and allowing 'reconciliation' to take place within these 
limited conditions. Literary stagings of confession and enactments of confession in 
autobiographical writing obviously take place in the shadow of this national 
institution of confession and testimony, which inadvertently imposes itself as the 
standard which confessions must meet or exceed. The enormous critical response to 
the TRC, across a range of disciplines, reflects an attempt to balance its role in the 
political transition with its claim to be an agent of truth and reconciliation (which are 
of course not necessarily the same thing). At its best, this response is also an attempt 
to understand the nature of the limitations of the commission and therefore develop 
strategies to maximise its performative effects within these conditions and explore 
methods of exceeding them. 
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As I have pointed out, Coetzee's writings on confession are particularly 
concerned with limits - the limited conditions in which confession might take place, 
the limitations of his own critical discourse, the notion of a pact that might limit the 
kind of reading and the kind of truth that a reader would look for in a confessional 
text. But this concern with the limitations of confession occurs against the horizon 
offered by 'the idea of the truth' that acknowledges no limits, is not subject to 
calculation or interests, offers the hope of a successful completion to confession and 
therefore allows confession to begin. If the history of confessional literature as 
analysed in 'Double Thoughts' provides ample evidence of the difficulties that beset 
the attempt to 'tell the truth clearly, without blindness, ' then the context in which 
Coetzee was writing (and, arguably, continues to write) intensifies both the demand 
for successful confession and the limitations within which it must take place. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
'Character is fate': The Confessional Genre in Dusklands and In the Heart of the 
Country 
I 
In the closing pages of In the Heart of the Country Magda weighs up the options 
available to her: 'To die an enigma with a full soul or to die emptied of my secrets, 
that is how I picturesquely put the question to myself' (138). Magda conceives of her 
options in terms of narrative and in the terms of the confessional dynamic of 
disclosure and concealment in particular. But while this narrative is figured as the 
disclosure of inner secrets, or the potential expression of a 'full soul, ' it is also 
artfully - 'picturesquely' - constructed. The options she describes are two ways of 
categorising her monologue: the narrative of the female hysteric on the one hand and 
the confessional narrative on the other. They are distinguished on the basis of their 
relation to reason: 'Will I find the courage to die a crazy old queen in the middle of 
nowhere, unexplained by and inexplicable to the archaeologists, her tomb full of naif 
whitewash paintings of sky-gods; or am I going to yield to the spectre of reason and 
explain myself to myself in the only kind of confession we protestants know? ' (138) 
The narrative of the female hysteric would cast her outside the boundaries of normal 
society and consign her acts to the domain of delusion or insanity. Confession, on the 
other hand, is an instrument to rehabilitate the confessant into society. Brooks, for 
example, opens his book on confession by noting: 'Confession of wrong-doing is 
considered fundamental to morality because it constitutes a verbal act of self- 
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recognition as wrongdoer and hence provides the basis of rehabilitation. It is the 
precondition of the end to ostracism, reentry into one's desired place in the human 
community' (2). Brooks is describing the social function of confession, exemplified 
by its role in religion and the law. Confessional narrative, however, is a kind of story 
in which this is the main conceit. To the extent that confession creates some 
continuity between the 'soul' and society it might be, as Magda intimates, 
reasonable. But, approaching Heart as a confessional narrative, it is precisely her 
failure to achieve such continuity that marks out her confession as unreasonable: 'To 
explain is to forgive, to be explained is to be forgiven, but I, I hope and fear, am 
inexplicable, unforgivable' (5). 
Dusklands teems with explanations, some of which are more reasonable than 
others. Structurally, both novellas juxtapose narratives that function to explain one 
another: Eugene Dawn's attack on his son is placed in the context of the military 
research we read in his report; the historical import of Jacobus Coetzee's adventures 
is explained by scholarly material framing his narratives, especially S. J. Coetzee's 
Afterword which is made available by the translation of his son, J. M. Coetzee. 20 
Dawn's report, addressed to his supervisor, Coetzee, presents a 'mythographic' 
rationale for ongoing U. S. military actions in Vietnam and he seeks a psychological 
explanation for his own violent actions by way of the therapy offered in the mental 
institution in which he ends the novella. While there is little in the account of Jacobus 
Coetzee to explain the motives and intentions behind his actions, the historical 
significance of the account is borne out in S. J. 's project to 'restore' it to the historical 
20 For clarity I will risk over-familiarity and refer to the various Coetzees of the second part of 
Dusklands (which I will refer to as 'Narrative') by their first names: Jacobus, S. J. and J. M. I will refer 
to their author as simply Coetzee, distinguishing him from Eugene Dawn's supervisor (also Coetzee) 
where necessary. 
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record. According to S. J. 's Afterword - supposedly the 1970s English translation of 
an Afrikaans edition published in 1951 - Jacobus's narrative is 'a work which offers 
the evidence of history to correct certain of the anti-heroic distortions that have been 
creeping into our conception of the great age of exploration' (108). S. J. offers nothing 
to explain the especially violent and disturbing 'Second journey into the land of the 
Great Namaqua. ' He merely asserts its insignificance, dismissing it as 'an historical 
irrelevance' which 'belongs to anecdote, the evening by the hearthfire' (12 1). 
By rearticulating the violence of these episodes in terms of myth, psychology 
and history - by allowing them to appear to be conditioned by myth, psychology and 
history - they seem to be brought inside rational discourse and made acceptable to 
their respective audiences. To this end, Coetzee goes to considerable lengths to 
differentiate the occasions of writing and, therefore, the imagined reader in each case. 
In this way they are similar to the model of confession described by Brooks - 
explaining deviant behaviour to a specific community - which is clearly an 
instrument of rational discourse. The fact remains, however, that the transgressions of 
Eugene Dawn and Jacobus Coetzee - which, like confessions, have the air of hidden 
truths exposed - are not easily accommodated to any historical moment. The two 
novellas have all the trappings of rational discourse - scholarly research, reports, 
commentaries, footnotes - but this is not a rational discourse that can adequately 
account for the transgressions avowed. In fact, rational discourse comes to seem more 
like disavowal than avowal. 
Both Heart and Dusklands are poised between the discourse of reason - 
which would explain away" the transgressions of the characters and facilitate their 
reintegration into the community - and a discourse that is less tractable, which cannot 
21 Attwell uses this phrase to describe how the violence of 'Narrative' cannot be explained away, 
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be marginalised as mad but is nonetheless unreasonable in the contexts in which it is 
articulated. The genre of confessional literature is unique in staging the negotiation of 
this boundary, establishing a relationship between the individual who confesses and 
society but structuring this relationship as oppositional unless certain conditions can 
be met. These conditions are primarily a question of appropriate address: making 
one's case in the appropriate terminology to the appropriate person. Writing about 
Heart, Attwell comments on the apparent absence of 'action' in the novel: 'For the 
most part, what happens is an act of consciousness and an act of language; what 
historicizes this act, however, is that it is deeply transgressive' (60). In 'Double 
Thoughts' Coetzee would go on to describe the pattern to which confession belongs 
as 'transgression, confession, penitence, absolution. ' If Magda's acts can be 
historicized by way of their transgressiveness, then perhaps her narrative, and the 
narrative of Dusklands, can be historicized to the extent that they meet - or fail to 
meet - the conditions of confession. 
Taking as my model of the confessional novel Marccllus Emants's A 
Posthumous Confession, which was translated into English by Coetzee in the early 
1970s, I will describe some of the generic conventions of confessional narrative and 
point to the ways in which Dusklands and Heart engage with these conventions. 
Specifically, taking up Magda's claim that 'character is fate, ' I will explore the 
implications Of reading these novels within the confessional paradigm. Although 
confession in these early novels has not acquired the full force of the desire for 
absolution that emerges in the later work and relies for its force on its proximity to 
different discourses of rationality, their engagement with confession as a set of 
generic conventions provides a useful way to introduce the idea of confession as a 
speech act that occurs within particular limits and conditions. In addition, by 
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exploring the determining effect of these generic conventions I hope to introduce 
several threads in my consideration of confessional narrative that will be carried 
throughout the thesis: confession as unmediated expression, the agency available to 
the confessing subject, and the determining effect of the confessional teleology that 
Coetzee describes in 'Double Thoughts. ' Drawing on Coetzee's early interest in 
confession in his professional activities as a translator and professor of literature, I 
will also show how these early writings lay the ground for the intense engagement 
with confession in the later novels. 
11 
Coetzee's translation of Marcellus Emants's Een nagelaten bekentenis (1894), A 
Posthumous Confession, first appeared in 1975 between the publication of Dusklands 
(1974) and Heart (1977). 22 In his introduction to a UK edition published ten years 
later in 1986 - roughly contemporaneous with his other major essays on confession - 
Coetzee places the novel in the tradition of Rousseau, describing it as a 'singularly 
pure example' of the genre of the confessional novel. The introduction is deeply 
informed by Coetzee's research and writing on confession in the intervening period, 
emphasising as it does both the debt to Rousseau and the essentially Rousseauean 
nature of the problems the novel struggles to overcome, problems that by that stage 
Coetzee finds resolved only in the later Dostoevsky. 23 
The translation of the novel however marks an earlier stage in Coetzee's 
interest in confessional discourse. It is the product of a period of engagement with 
22 Coetzee's translation first appeared in a US edition under the same title (Boston: Twayne, 1975) and 
introduced by Egbert Krispyn. 
23 There are no page numbers in the Introduction to the Quartet edition. 
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Dutch literature in the early 1970s in which, Coetzee admits, he might have been 
considered 'a translator of professional standard' (Doubling 57). Yet, by his own 
account his two most significant projects - translating Emants' novel and Gerrit 
Achterberg's sonnet sequence, 'Ballade van de gasfitter' - were undertaken without 
prior publishing arrangements (Doubling 58). The translations are therefore better 
seen as an extension of his literary and academic projects than mere publishing 
opportunism. 24 Coetzee's 1977 essay on Achterberg reenacts in some detail the 
hermeneutic struggle from which the translation of 'Ballade van de gasfitter' 
emerged. In an interview in Doubling he admits 'I began to translate it into English 
sonnets in 1969 in an effort to understand it, then found that I couldn't translate it till 
I had understood it' (58). One may speculate that his interest in Emants can be 
attributed to a similar intellectual engagement which would eventually find fruition in 
the essays on confession ten years later. Given the timescale indicated in Doubling, it 
seems likely that his translation of Emants' novel dates from the period in the early 
70s when he was writing Dusklands. As I will show, the impact of Coetzee's choice 
of material for his first major translation is already evident in the novels he was 
writing in this period. 25 
A Posthumous Confession is Willem Termeer's account of the circumstances 
leading to the murder of his wife, Anna. Termeer's crime is revealed approximately 
half way through a portentous autobiographical account of his misspent youth and 
miserable marriage: 'In this house I killed Anna and in this house I am now sitting 
and writing' (86). The confession is therefore the occasion for writing. This has the 
24 Coetzee's is the only translation of Een nagelaten bekentenis or any other work by Ernants listed on 
either the British Library or the Library of Congress catalogue. 
23 While my focus in this section is on A Posthumous Confession, I also see Coetzee's essay on 
Achterberg as continuous with his interest in confession, particularly in its concern with pronouns and 
scenes of address. 
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effect of making the murder appear to be the culminating act of a doomed man after a 
lifetime of frustration and allows the novel to tend inevitably towards this act. In 
other words, the novel is plotted around the violent acts of Anna's murder. In this 
way, the casual cruelty with which Termeer conducted himself in his youth becomes 
a symptom of the more profound criminal nature that would reveal itself in his 
murderous acts. But equally central to the plot of A Posthumous Confession is the act 
of confessing itself, the confession is a calculated intervention in Termeer's most 
recent love affair with a prostitute called Caroline and the culmination of his literary 
ambitions, frustrated until now because of the 'trivial' nature of his subject. 
Termeer's ideas about art and specifically about writing are inseparable from his own 
autobiogrAphy. The reading experience he describes is a quest to find a reflection of 
his own temperament in the work before him (60) and in his earlier attempts at 
writing he had created 'a faithful counterfeit of myself. The story had become an 
unadorned revelation of my most secret feelings' (55). The story was of course a 
failure, the necessity to 'make the facts of my shoddy history much more interesting' 
proved more difficult than he thought (53-54). Yet Termeer (and Emants) is clearly 
revisiting the motifs of his confessional precursors, Augustine and Rousseau. In an 
early meditation on the value of lying and stealing Termeer comments: 'a marble 
doubled its value to me if it was stolen... what enticed me was the stimulation of 
sudden illogical aggrandizement' (11). This echoes the unaccounted for thefts in 
Augustine and Rousseau (pears and a ribbon respectively). Later, his insistence on 
ruthless self-scrutiny echoes the equally confident Rousseau: 'My gaze inward soon 
cleared again: in myself I had my severest, most pitiless judge' (39). 
Confessional narrative is central to Peter Brooks's Reading for the Plot; 
indeed, he goes so far as to describe Rousseau of the Confessions as 'symbolically the 
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incipit of modem narrative' (33). Developing his theory in relation to Great 
Expectations he claims to have uncovered a narratological law - 'the true plot will be 
the most deviant' - and he explains why: 'Deviance is the very condition for life to be 
'narratable': the state of normality is devoid of interest, energy, and the possibility for 
narration' (130,139). Emants' book is informed by this principle, but so is 
Termeer's. Indeed this discovery in itself might be the most deviant plot of A 
Posthumous Confession as it seems that Termeer has killed his wife not out of mere 
malice but as a narrative strategy. In addition, he wonders if, by confessing his wife's 
murder to Caroline, his new female companion, he might not possess her completely: 
'If I were to admit everything to her, and at the same time offer her the disposition 
over my entire fortune [ ... ] would she not ... not find it in her to ... love me? '(193) 
For these reasons, confession and writing become another way of acting. It is not 
difficult, therefore, to understand the importance of confession as a plot device, a set 
of generic conventions that amount to 'a powerful narrative machine' (Brooks, 33). 
But it is not just the requirements of genre that determine Termeer's criminal 
propensities. A Posthumous Confession is also freighted with the sociological, 
biological and psychological determinants of Termeer's actions, which he asks the 
reader to accept in mitigation: 'How senseless, after all, to condemn a person for 
physical and spiritual failings for which he is not at all responsible! '(10) Termeer 
considers himself to be a degenerate and his actions to be the inevitable consequences 
of his pathology: 
I do not know how many generations of forebears had to have lived exclusively for 
their egotistical pleasure before a being like myself could see the light of day, but I 
do know that in each and every case they would have done better not to have 
propagated the species long enough to have a creature eventually spring from it 
which would recognize its ineradicable misery and thereby pay the price for one and 
all. (81) 
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Emants's interest in the sciences of heredity and psychopathology has led to his 
association with the naturalism of Zola. 26 As Coetzee sees it in 1986, however, 
Emants is interested less in the descriptive force of these new sciences than in the 
manner in which the individual experiences them. His emphasis, according to 
Coetzee, is on 'the powerlessness of the individual before unconscious inner forces' 
and the disappointment of realising how far these forces take one from one's ideal 
self. In the context of A Posthumous Confession the loss of the ideal self forms the 
substance of the confessional narrative, with the 'unconscious inner forces' acting to 
excuse the deviancy and brutality Termeer describes. For these reasons Coetzee 
places the novel in the tradition of Rousseau: 'Quite as much as it is a piece of self- 
rending analysis and sly exhibitionism, his confession is an agonized plea for pity. ' 
To this extent we can also reconceive the perceived naturalism of the novel in the 
light of the instrumentalism of the confession: if Termeer's deviancy is no more than 
an intensification of the values of his society then he can surely be accepted back into 
that society. The fact that he articulates his confession in the terms of the scientific 
discourses of his time indicates that he is seeking the understanding (and absolution? ) 
of a specific audience. 
But in emphasising the forces that determined his actions Termeer makes an 
even more compelling appeal to his imagined reader: 'Respected, honoured, decent, 
high-minded reader, if you think you have become so excellent by free will, why then 
are you not even better? Is it because you have not wanted to be, or because you 
could not' (157)? In his appeal to 'free will' Termeer acknowledges the extent to 
26 Zola is also central to Coctzee's 1974 essay 'Man's Fate in the Novels of Alex La Gurna' 
(Doubling). 
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which the factors that determine his behaviour deprive him of agency and 
consequently of responsibility. In other words, they function as an excuse. But if, as 
the novel suggests, confession is another way of acting, then it too is determined by 
the forces acting on the individual subject. If this is the case, with what authority can 
Termeer be considered to confess? 
In truth, Termecr possesses little authority as a confessant. He is so repellent a 
character - uncaring, misogynistic, self-obsessed, violent - that one fails to be 
convinced his actions are recuperable within the narrative or, indeed, that he wishes 
them to be. The confession is an opportunity to plead mitigating factors for his 
actions, but it is also (quite self-consciously) a narrative performance of deviancy. 
Coetzee notes in his introduction that Emants defended the novel on the basis that it 
allows an insight into what is hidden from view in normal life because the deviant 'is 
characterized above all by an inability to censor and repress the forces at work within 
him. ' This uncensored quality is described by Coetzee as Termeer's 'gabble': 'so 
frank, so perceptive, yet so mad. ' This is part of the conceit of confession as 
unmediated expression, a mark of its sincerity and authenticity, but because this is a 
fictional staging of confession, the irony should allow us to measure the distance 
between Termeer and Emants. The difficulty for the reader, however, lies in 
reconciling the highly self-conscious and strategic deployment of confessional tropes 
by Termeer (and Emants) with the exposure of true deviancy claimed by the latter. In 
a surprising move that implicates the author in the confessional spiral of the novel, 
Coetzee notes: 'Marcellus Emants is not disjunct from Willem Termeer: the author is 
implicated in his creature's devious project to transmute the base metal of his self into 
gold. ' Emants' novel comes to resemble Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground, 
where the relentless self-unmasking of confession is a 'self-serving fiction' driven not 
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by 'a desire for the truth but a desire to be a particular way' ('Double Thoughts' 
27 280). Coetzee's disappointment with Emants is that, in spite of his claims to the 
contrary, his fictional confession is finally just another performance of deviancy. For 
those writers who have followed in the tracks of Rousseau - Emants, Dostoevsky, 
Coetzee - sincerity is the first casualty of his model of confession and this alone is 
reason enough to confess. 
In A Posthumous Confession many of the problems of confessional narrative 
that come to prominence in Coetzee's later writings are already in evidence. The 
tension between the apparently uncensored qualities of Termeer's 'gabble' and the 
self-conscious plotting of the confessional form point to the competing demands that 
confession be a sincere expression of culpability and remorse and yet take a 
recognisable and highly conventional form. While the confessional form instituted by 
Rousseau privileges the notion of difference and the singularity of the confessant, the 
fact that Emants' novel follows this form and attempts to explain this difference with 
reference to the determining social discourses of the day makes Termeer seem more 
representative than exceptional. In order to retain its social function confession must 
be articulated in a rational language that will facilitate rehabilitation into the 
community and it must be addressed to that community. But this too is at odds with 
the supposed transgressiveness and deviancy that it describes. These problems are not 
articulated explicitly until the later introduction to the UK edition of the novel, at 
which point they seem to be utterly of a piece with Coetzee's writings on Tolstoy, 
Rousseau and Dostoevsky. But they are already being played out in the early fiction. 
The novels I discuss in this chapter engage with the generic conventions of the 
27 In Coetzee's introduction to A Posthumous Confession Emants is compared unfavourably with 
Dostoevsky- 'Emants, a lesser thinker, a lesser artist a lesser psychologist (and who is not? ), remains 
bound in Rousseau's toils. ' 
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confessional narrative in a highly self-conscious manner. Sincerity, in these novels, is 
replaced by a lack of prudent self-censorship that would be virtually indistinguishable 
from madness were it not framed within a highly self-conscious confessional 
narrative. But if anything it is the relentlessly ironic deployment of confession in 
these novels that marks them out as early novels. Although Magda's longing for 
reciprocal relations shapes Heart, it is not until later that Coetzee's engagement with 
confession comes to be structured more seriously by the goal of absolution. 
In 'The Politics of Translation' Spivak's claims for the act of translating go 
much further than the hermeneutic concerns expressed by Coetzee in Doubling. She 
comments that 'one of the ways to get around the confines of one's "identity" as one 
produces expository prose is to work at someone else's title, as one works with a 
language that belongs to many others. This, after all, is one of the seductions of 
translating. It is a simple miming of the responsibility to the trace of the other in the 
self' (Outside 179). Translating A Posthumous Confession afforded Coetzee an 
opportunity to inhabit, briefly, the Rousseauean confession that would preoccupy him 
for at least the next ten years. This early interest in confession is also evident in 
Coetzee's other professional activities of the period. Papers held at NELM show that 
confessional poetry was a significant part of a course he taught on Contemporary 
American Poetry at the State University of New York, Buffalo in summer 1970. 
Preparatory notes for the course show him ruminating on the significance of the 
writer's biography to the work of T. S. Eliot, a subject he approaches by way of 
Eliot's 'London Letter' on Dostoevsky from The Dial in 1922 . 
28 Elsewhere the notes 
record his interest in Spengler's writings on the significance of the reformation to the 
28 1 will return to Eliot's consideration of Dostoevsky in chapter 4. Eliot - and Eliot's life - is also 
important for John, the aspiring author of Youth, which I discuss in chapter 6. 
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development of confessional literary forms and mentioned among the notes on 
confessional poetry is John Berryman's Treamsong 29, ' phrases from which are 
quoted almost verbatim in 'The Vietnam Project. ' It is possible that his interest in 
other confessional literary forms emerged from his translation of Emants' novel but, 
one way or another, Coetzee's writing and professional activities of the early 1970s 
point to a concern with the form and history of confession that is earlier, more 
consistent and more rigorous than has previously been recognised. 
Jumping forward thirty years, one finds similar concerns with the 
distinctiveness and singularity of the confessant in Coetzee's memoirs Boyhood and 
Youth. Youth in particular contains echoes of the self-lacerating ironies and sharne- 
filled encounters with women evident in Emants' novel, all the more noticeable as it 
prepares the ground for John to write the novel with the 'aura of truth' that would 
become Dusklands. 
III 
The genre of the confessional narrative, at least according to the 'singular example' 
of A Posthumous Confession, requires first and foremost an avowal of guilt for a 
serious crime: 'a crime is a crime: I am not ashamed to name things by their names' 
('Vietnam Project' 44). This in turn provides the impetus for a ready-made plot - 'I 
have broken a commandment, and the guilty cannot be bored' (Heart 11) -a 
compelling performance of deviancy - 'I screamed with rage, snapped my teeth, and 
heaved erect with a mouth full of hair and a human ear ('Narrative' 90) - and the 
excuse of powerful determining forces: 'I am a tool in the hands of history, 
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('Narrative' 106). As these quotations indicate, Dusklands and Heart are perhaps the 
clearest examples of the genre of the confessional novel within the Coetzee oeuvre. 
The two novels together present three first person narratives recounting the events 
and fallout from violent crimes: Eugene Dawn's attack on his son, Jacobus Coetzee's 
vicious treatment of the members of the indigenous Southern African population, 
particularly the 'Second journey, ' and Magda's patricide. Unlike the confessants in 
Coetzee's later novels, all three unambiguously avow their intention to act and the 
violence of their actions. Equally, they all acknowledge the potentially transgressive 
qualities of their actions and are to some degree conscious of its value as narrative. 
While they all manifest qualities of the confessional narrative it is clear from the 
quotations juxtaposed above that the conventions of the genre are deployed and 
framed in very different ways in each case. 
But what is at stake in refracting Dusklands and Heart - novels that self- 
consciously move between genres - through the specific lens of the confessional 
novel? Much has been written about the specific generic qualities of these novels: 
adventure stories, travel narratives, quests, pastoral, farm novel, domestic novel, 
narrative of hysteria. In her book on Coetzee, Teresa Dovey adopts Magda's 
metaphor of the hermit crab to describe her sense of Coetzee inhabiting different 
genres. She likens his shifting between genres in different novels to the crab 'that as it 
grows migrates from one empty shell to another. ' Indeed this is the epigraph of her 
book and Dovey gives a compelling account of the various examples. Magda, 
however, goes on to describe the shells of the hermit crab in terms of a disguise, or 
even an excuse - an explanation that doesn't so much have to be true, as serve a 
particular purpose at a given moment: 'Whose shell I presently skulk in does not 
matter, it is the shell of a dead creature. What matters is that my anxious soft-bodied 
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self should have a refuge from the predators of the deep, the squid, the shark, the 
baleen whale, and whatever else it is that preys on the hermit crab... ' (43-44). The 
metaphor of the hermit crab, as Dovey uses it, suggests that there is some quality of 
narrative, 'my anxious soft-bodied self, ' that wilfully chooses and moves between 
shells and between genres, that is to say, it is a kind of narrative that is independent of 
genre. But in 'The Law of Genre' Derrida asserts that there is no genreless text 
anymore than there is a text that belongs to only one genre. Genre, in his account 'is 
precisely a principle of contamination, a law of impurity, a parasitical economy' 
(227). As he sees it: 'Every text participates in one or several genres, there is no 
genreless text, there is always a genre and genres, yet such participation never 
amounts to belonging' (230). In this context, it is conceivable that the illusion of 
selecting and choosing that Dovey takes from the metaphor of the crab is simply 
another arm of the 'law of genre. ' 
To my mind, a far more powerful and apposite metaphor for the operation of 
genre runs through Heart as Magda imagines her body playing host to a range of 
figures, most notably, the law through which she is spoken: 
The law has gripped my throat, I say and do not say, it invades my larynx, its 
one hand on my tongue, its other hand on my lips. How can I say, I say, that 
these are not the eyes of the law that stare from behind my eyes, or that the 
mind of the law does not occupy my skull, leaving me only enough 
intellection to utter these doubting words, if it is I uttering them, and see their 
fallaciousness? How can I say that the law does not stand fullgrown inside 
my shell, its feet in my feet, its hands in my hands, its sex drooping through 
my hole; or that when I have had my chance to make this utterance, the lips 
and teeth of the law will not begin to gnaw their way out of this shell, until 
there it stands before you, the law grinning and triumphant again, its soft skin 
hardening in the air, while I lie sloughed, crumpled, abandoned on the floor? 
(84) 
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If we adapt Magda's invasion by the law to invasion by the 'law of genre, ' we have a 
clearer picture of how Magda (and the characters in Dusklands) are spoken through 
by genre rather than selecting and choosing which genre to disguise themselves in. 
Yet this model of genre has implications particular to confessional narrative. 
Confession as I have described it is an avowal of guilt in the first person by someone 
in full possession of themselves and the facts. The genre of confession, according to 
the model of A Posthumous Confession, is a carefully plotted and highly self- 
conscious performance of deviancy mitigated by a set of convenient determining 
circumstances. As I outlined above, both Dusklands and Heart in many ways fulfil 
these requirements, yet both novels also present specific threats to the apparent self- 
possession of the protagonists. In Dusklands the danger to the protagonists is 
primarily the threat posed by writing. In 'The Vietnam Project' Eugene Dawn's 
narrative is threatened by the report that he writes for his supervisor Coetzee and the 
negative response he receives. His highly self-conscious confession also risks being 
undermined by the confessional discourses of psychology and psychoanalysis that he 
believes himself to be manipulating. 'Narrative, ' on the other hand, is structured by 
the threat of textual instability and mutilation as each participant is acutely aware of 
the changing and varied demands of readers in different contexts, thus manipulating 
the narrative to these ends. And in Heart, Magda's assumption of narrative control in 
choosing whether or not to confess ('to die an enigma with a full soul or to die 
emptied of my secrets... ') is undermined by the apparent determining power of genre, 
especially as it is figured through metaphors of invasion and possession. So while 
these early novels explicitly engage with the genre of confessional narrative, to the 
extent that the crimes perpetrated by Eugene Dawn and Magda, at least, seem to be 
calculated to facilitate a confessional narrative, the integrity and authority of the 
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confessing subjects is undermined by the very form of the confessional genre. It 
would appear that the form of the confessional genre stages confession as a struggle 
between the desire for narrative control - or confessional agency - and the highly 
conventional, ritualised form through which it must proceed. 
IV 
Eugene Dawn's narrative in 'The Vietnam Project' is deeply informed by the 
compulsion to reveal and expose, whether it is the sordid details of his dysfunctional 
marriage, his adolescent poetry, the true intentions behind US military actions in 
Vietnam, his attack on his son or even his dreams: 
I have merely told the truth. I am not afraid to tell the truth. I have never been a 
coward. All my life, I have found, I have been prepared to expose myself where other 
people would not. As a younger man I exposed myself in poetry, derivative, but not 
shamefully bad. Then I moved nearer the centres of power and found other ways of 
expressing myself. (31) 
Nothing is left to the imagination with Eugene Dawn, but neither is anything 
disclosed that might contradict his self-presentation as dedicated to self-revelation 
and the victim of powerful determining forces that will be explicated by this process. 
In contrast to Magda's image of being possessed and spoken through by the law, 
Dawn believes that he can distinguish the forces that determine and explain his 
actions from the form of his highly self-conscious confession. He does not deny that 
he attacked his son, but neither does he accept final responsibility for his actions: 
I know longer knew what I was doing. How else can one explain injuring one's own 
child, one's own flesh and blood? I was not myself, In the profoundest of senses, it 
was not the real I who stabbed Martin. My doctors, I think, agree with me, or can be 
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brought to agree with me; but their argument is that my treatment ought to start at my 
beginnings far in the past and work up gradually toward the present. I can see the 
reasonableness of this argument. All faults of character are faults of upbringing. (44) 
The echoes of Emants's shameless disavowal of culpability are unmistakeable -'But 
whose was the fault, the original faulff (139) Indeed, the novella (and consequently 
the novel) opens with a disavowal: 'My name is Eugene Dawn. I cannot help that' 
(1). Dawn rather cynically subscribes to the therapeutic framework of the novella: 
'Before I can be allowed to leave I must come to terms with my crime' (44). But this 
is merely a question of displacing responsibility for his actions elsewhere as 'The 
Vietnam Project' ends inconclusively with his intention to pursue the confessional 
project: 'I have high hopes of finding whose fault I am' (49). 
Behind the echoes of Emants that are evident in 'The Vietnam Project' the 
novella clearly has another important confessional model in Dostoevsky's Notesfrom 
Underground. The similarities can be seen in the metaphor of the labyrinth (one of 
the metaphors that gives continuity to the two novellas and allows them to be read as 
a novel), the arbitrary drawing to a close of the narrative and Dawn's bookish 
assurance to himself of the similarity: 'There is no doubt that I am a sick man' (32) 
echoing the opening lines of Dostoevsky's novel: 'I am a sick man ... I am a wicked 
man' (3). While Notesfrom Underground is taken to be a critique of the 'sickness' of 
nihilism in nineteenth century Russia, and Termeer's sickness a version of the theory 
of degeneration, 'The Vietnam Project' is addressed to the crisis of the Vietnam War 
and the twentieth century popularisation of psychotherapy which in purporting to 
provide a cure seems to diagnose an illness. 
As the institutional and psychotherapeutic context indicates, the most 
powerful of the determining forces experienced by Dawn are psychic forces. He 
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ridicules Marilyn's need for therapy, describing it as just another product on the 
shelves of American consumerism: 'I do not disapprove and gladly pay. If she will 
return to being a smiling honey-blonde with long brown legs, I do not mind by what 
unsound route she gets there' (11). But despite his obvious scepticism about the 
possibility of a cure Dawn submits himself to the readings and narratives of 
psychologists. Indeed, such is the power of the psychoanalytic paradigm to elicit 
confession and stage revelations that he conspires in his own institutionalisation: 'so 
if, as we pick our slow way through the labyrinth of my history, I spy an alley with all 
the signs of light, freedom, and glory at the end of it, I stifle my eager doubts and 
plod on after the good blind doctors' (47). Like the readers of his confessional 
narrative, the psychologists are interested in him as long as there remains something 
to expose: 'My secret is what makes me desirable to you, my secret is what makes me 
strong' (48). Eugene Dawn is clearly more interested in talking than in cure, a 
problem that Freud acknowledged as inherent to psychoanalysis (see chapter 1), or as 
Coetzee sees it in 'Confession', the problem of bringing the confession and the novel 
to an end. 
Yet, while the novella is framed by the highly conventional narrative of 
Eugene Dawn's confession of the crime against his son, one has the impression that 
this is merely a subplot to the more serious though less easily quantifiable crime of 
his role as military strategist for the US army in Vietnam. Unlike the lucid description 
of the knife entering his son's body, Dawn can find no evidence of transgression in 
his professional life. But this disavowal takes an interestingly allusive form as Dawn 
refers to Huffy Henry, John Berryman's confessing subject in Dreamsongs, citing 
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'Drearrisong 29% 'But the truth is that like Huffy Henry I never did hack anyone up: I 
often reckon, in the dawn, them up: nobody is ever missing' (10). 29 
In contrast to the highly strategic revelations of the framing material so typical 
of the confessional genre, Dawn's report on US military strategy in Vietnam displays 
an uncensored and shameless quality in its advocacy of violence and brutality against 
the Vietnamese with no acknowledged psychic or legal repercussions for him or other 
Americans involved in the campaign. He is insistent on the necessity to expose 
military strategy for what it is -a campaign of murder and humiliation designed to 
subdue the Vietnamese at any cost - devoid of the comforting fictions and statistics 
of justification because such consolations betray feelings of guilt: 'Until we reveal to 
ourselves and revel in the true meaning of our acts we will go on suffering the double 
penalty of guilt and ineffectualness' (29). This is not revelation as expiation of guilt 
that we have come to associate with confession; it is not about confronting the worst 
in oneself but confronting oneself with no moral or ethical barometer whatsoever. In 
addition, his 'mythographic' science purports to analyse the structures of Vietnamese 
society with the implication that the US military can exploit and undermine these 
structures. But as Attwell points out, this mythography relies to a large extent on 
psychoanalytic models of social relations like the primal horde myth of Freud's 
Totem and Taboo. This is of course part of the same psychoanalytic discourse that 
Dawn attempts to manipulate later in the novella. In other words, Dawn the academic 
has embraced Freud's founding myth as the scientific underpinning of his military 
propaganda in Vietnam, but in his strategic confession and renunciation of 'atavistic 
29 This is an almost direct quotation from John Berryman's Treamsong 29, ' first published in 1964: 
'But never did Henry, as he thought he did) end anyone and hacks her body up/ and hide the pieces, 
where they may be foundJ He knows: he went over everyone, & nobody's missing. / Often he reckons, 
in the dawn, them up. Nobody is ever missing. ' As I note earlier, Treamsong 29' was listed among 
material for a course on confessional poetry that Coetzee taught at Buffalo in summer 1970. 
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guilt' ('guilt is a black poison' [48]) he somehow believes that he - and other 
Americans - are not subject to the same psychic laws. 
Dawn's tendency to conflate knowledge of psychology with control of his 
own psyche is apparent from an episode early in the novella. Concerned about his 
habit of clenching his fist, particularly as it is described as a symptom of depression 
in a book called The Psychology of Gesture, Dawn addresses the problem by 
attempting to control the gesture, which of course is simply displaced into other parts 
of his body (4-5). Likewise, his insistent renunciation of guilt is undermined by the 
language of disease and invasion that seems to describe an out-of-control super-ego: 
I know and I know and I know what it is that has eaten away at my manhood from 
inside, devoured the food that should have nourished me. It is a thing, a child not 
mine, once a baby squat and yellow whelmed in the dead center of my body, sucldng 
my blood, growing by my waste, now, 1973, a hideous mongol boy who stretches his 
limbs inside my hollow bones, gnaws my liver with his smiling teeth, voids his 
bilious filth into my systems, and will not go. (38-39) 
The similarities to Magda's image of possession by the law are pointed, but Dawn's 
narrative is not marked by the uncertainties that destabilise Magda's narrative ('how 
can I say, I say... '). Instead of the image of the law, we have the image of the war 
internalised as a parasite, feeding on him and strengthening its hold over him -a 
more vivid embodiment of the super-ego than even Freud could come up with, yet 
Dawn believes that he retains control ('I know... '). But while psychoanalysis clearly 
has great descriptive power in Dusklands, description alone does not account for or 
ameliorate what is most disturbing in the novel. Psychoanalysis appears to be 
productive in descriptive and narrative terms for Dawn, but it has no ethical weight as 
he retains the illusion of narrative control. 'The Vietnam Project' clearly works 
within the generic conventions of the confessional narrative as I described them in the 
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case of A Posthumous Confession, particularly in its deployment of the excuse of 
powerful detennining forces. 
As I have mentioned, the sincerity that guaranteed the truthfulness of 
Rousseau's Confessions is replaced in Dusklands by an absence of prudent self- 
censorship (with respect to everything except confession, though this could be 
another symptom), so that in its apparent lack of shame and blindness with respect to 
its own motives Eugene Dawn's highly rational narrative comes to seem deeply 
unreasonable and unamenable to rehabilitation into the community. While the 
discourse of popular psychology, which is after all a variety of confession, allows the 
America of 'The Vietnam Project' to 'contain its deviants 30 as deviant because... it 
can only account for Eugene Dawn's report if we accept it as another symptom of his 
madness. 
V 
The issue of how a society accounts for deviant behaviour, or decides what 
constitutes deviant behaviour, is the central preoccupation of 'The Narrative of 
Jacobus Coetzee, ' the companion story to 'The Vietnam Project' in Dusklands. The 
deviant in question is the eighteenth century hunter/explorer Jacobus Coetzee whose 
supposedly autobiographical account of his adventures in southern Africa constitutes 
the major part of the novella. In the course of his narrative Jacobus openly avows his 
part in numerous murders, most notably a brutal raid on a camp in the Great 
Namaquas. However, while he accepts responsibility for the deaths in the manner 
required of a confession, his narrative displays no hint of remorse or fear of censure: 
30 'In my cell in the heart of America, with my private toilet in the comer, I ponder and ponder' (49). 
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'No more than any other man do I enjoy killing; but I have taken it upon myself to be 
the one to pull the trigger' (106). 
'The Narrative of Jacobus Coetzee' - the first person account which makes up 
the greater part of the novella and the accompanying paratextual material - purports 
to recreate the dissemination and reception of Jacobus's account of his travels. For 
this reason we have three different versions of his adventures - the autobiographical 
account, a scholarly Afterword by S. J. Coetzee and an appendix claiming to be the 
deposition of Jacobus Coetzee to an official of the Dutch East India Company in 
1760. These different versions reinvent the historical Jacobus Coets6 Jansz, whose 
journal was published by the Van Riebeeck Society in Cape Town in 1935,3 1 for 
different readerships in different historical moments: the bureaucrats of the Dutch 
East India Company in Cape Town in 1760, readers of scholarly Afrikaans texts in 
South Africa in the 1930s and 40s, and readers of English translations of those texts 
in South Africa in the 1970s. Not to mention readers of South Afflcan literature 
written in English since the 1970s. The consensus of the latter - by far the easiest to 
establish! - is that in Jacobus J. M. Coetzee has created a character of true savagery, 
equal to the brutal devastation wrought on indigenous populations in the name of 
colonial expansion. 'Second journey, ' a description of Jacobus's revenge attack on 
his servants, is singled out for its brutality. Attridge notes that the attack is carried out 
with 'the utmost savagery' (15); for Castillo it is an 'unleashed homicidal frenzy' 
(116); Dovey calls it 'a pornography of violence' (114) while Peter Knox-Shaw 
intensifies his general disapproval at the novel, commenting that 'the writing itself 
furthers the claims of true savagery' (114). Attwell has no doubt that the novella is 
31 The 'Appendix: Deposition of Jacobus Coetzee' follows this document quite closely though, as 
Attwell points outý it deviates in some crucial respects. 
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calculated to provoke the reader: 'Such writing is surely transgressive, not in a 
theoretical manner that enables one to explain it away, but in an aggressive mode that 
is aimed at readers' sensibilities' (55 emphasis added). 
If the violence and the writing of 'Narrative' cannot be explained away, as 
these readings attest, how is it possible to consider the manner in which the novel 
accounts for the deviancy of Jacobus, or indeed, how might it be read, alongside 'The 
Vietnam Project, ' as a confessional text? The idea of being able to 'explain it away' 
is crucial: as an instrument of rational discourse, this is essentially the function of 
confessional narrative; the significance of the confessions of Dusklands and Heart is 
the failure to 'explain away' their respective transgressions, and the reasons for this 
failure. 
In 'The Vietnam Project' the causal relationship between Dawn's report and 
his confession is clearly marked for the reader in his move from library to mental 
institution and in the change of (fictional) addressee from military strategist to 
psychiatrist. In 'Narrative' what explanation comes to us is a result of the narrative 
being located in three different subjects addressing different audiences at different 
times. The travel accounts of Jacobus take up the greater part of the narrative and 
contain the most shocking avowals of violent conduct but S. J. 's 'Afterword' is also 
deeply disturbing in its attempt to efface the violence of the earlier account, and one 
must subscribe to the fiction that the final authority to present and position the 
material lies with J. M. as translator. So where in the cracks between these three 
potential confessing subjects might a confessional narrative emerge? And what kind 
of confessional narrative might it be if it fails to explain away the transgressions? 
The model of the confessional genre that I have taken from Emants and 
applied to 'The Vietnam Project' is only remotely applicable to Jacobus's first-person 
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account of his adventures. It is unquestionably a performance of deviancy, as critics 
of Dusklands acknowledge, but to my mind it lacks the self-conscious quality of the 
confessional narratives of Termeer or Dostoevsky's underground man that mark their 
deviancy first and foremost as performance. Jacobus's account of his transgressions 
does not give rise to the kind of gratuitous self-reproach we have come to associate 
with confession, but instead lapses into an utterly unconvincing performance of the 
sentimental but macho code of honour between foes, soldiers or hunters. For 
example, Jacobus describes the botched killing of Plaatje: 'I fired and lowered my 
gun. Plaatje was still standing. "Fall, damn you! " I said. Plaatje took two steps 
forward. "You, kill him, he's not dead! " I shouted, pointing at the Griqua who stood 
nearest him. "Yes, yes you: use your sword: in the neck! " I slashed the air with [the] 
edge of my hand' (104-5). We are told that Scheffer, his accomplice, walks away 
before Plaatje dies but Jacobus, supposedly observing a more noble code between 
foes, muses on best practice when killing a bird and then turns his attention to Plaatje: 
'I cuddled his head and shoulders and raised him a little. My arms were lapped in 
blood. ... He was dying fast. "Courage", I said, "we admire you"' (105). The 
'narrative machine' of the confession is driven by relentless self-unveiling, self- 
reproach and excuses but insofar as there is a gratuitous quality to Jacobus's account 
it is in the gruesome detail of the violent acts he commits and the awkward shift of 
32 register to a thoroughly unconvincing display of sentimentality mired in clich6. This 
is not inflected with any hint of regret; rather, in its self-affirmation it is continuous 
with the violence of the episode. 
32 This is what Atuidge tenns Toetzee's 'modernism': 'a different literary practice, willing to reveal 
its own dependence on convention and its own part in the exercise of power' (17). 
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There is some attempt to explain the crimes committed by Jacobus, albeit a 
half-hearted one. To justify the vengeful nature of his mission in 'Second journey' 
Jacobus invokes the story of the sparrow: 'There are acts of justice I tell them (I told 
them), and acts of injustice, and all bear their place in the economy of the whole. 
Have faith, be comforted, like the sparrow you are not forgotten' (101). Jacobus, 
however, fails to notice that the sparrow is not remembered in a spirit of vengeance, 
but of charity and love. Following the gruesome descriptions of the deaths of his 
servants, as illustrated in the above example, Jacobus speculates about the need to 
provide an explanation: 'if any expiation, explanation, palinode be needed' (106). 
Needless to say, he offers little by way of consolation for his actions, attributing the 
deaths to the 'economy of the whole' with which he patronised his victims: 'I have 
taken it upon myself to be the one to pull the trigger ... committing upon the dark 
folk the murders we have all wished. All are guilty, without exception. I include the 
Hottentots. Who knows for what unimaginable crimes of the spirit they died, through 
me? God's judgement is just, irreprehensible, and incomprehensible. His mercy pays 
no heed to merit. I am a tool in the hands of history. '(101 & 106) In imagining 
himself as the agent of greater forces - God, history - Jacobus is disavowing his role 
in the violent events he records. At the same time, in the 'desolate infinity' of his 
power Jacobus is inventing and enacting 'God's judgement, ' creating the 'evidence of 
history. ' God and history may be presented as determining forces, but they can be 
made to determine everything and anything. 
Eugene Dawn's report in 'The Vietnam Project, ' unhinged as it is, is 
nominally addressed to his supervisor Coetzee and its sense of disclosure is informed 
by a refusal to be contained by the consoling fictions of rational discourse (though 
paradoxically in the name of rational discourse). Taken as a whole 'Narrative' is also 
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informed by such an ethic of disclosure, but in Jacobus's account of his adventures no 
inhibiting factors seem to apply. Jacobus's first person account - whether 
autobiographical or the product of S. J. 's imagination - has no discernable addressee, 
no awareness of itself as transgressive and no apparent obstacles that needed to be 
overcome in order for it to be articulated. Taken in isolation from the rest of 
'Narrative' it is not a confession but a display of violence and deviancy without 
shame. 
Dovey has shown how the gruesome details which drive Jacobus's account 
belong to the adventure story or exploration narrative (I 11) but the gratuitous detail 
in which the violence is recorded can only be understood in the context of the framing 
material. S. J. 's 'Afterword' purports to 'restore' these elements as the 'truth' of 
colonial exploration: 'Mere circumstances, notably the truncated account of 
Coetzee's explorations hitherto current, have conspired to maintain the stereotype 
['credulous hunter'] and hide from us the true stature of the man' (108). So in S. J. 's 
'Afterword' we finally have those elements of the confession absent from Jacobus's 
account: information to reveal, an audience to persuade, obstacles to be overcome and 
the overall necessity for disclosure. The startling omission from S. J. 's account, 
however, is the element of transgression; there is no overt acknowledgement in the 
afterword of the brutality and aggression which Attwell calls 'a social fact' of the 
reader's experience of Dusklands (55). In fact, what occurs in the afterword is 
completely at odds with the declared intention to 'present a more complete and 
therefore more just view of Jacobus Coetzee' (108). It is not simply a disavowal of 
the violence of Jacobus's account, but an effacement of the gratuitous detail that is so 
painstakingly, and painfully, recorded: 'His journey and sojourn north of the Great 
River, his retum, his second expedition with Hendrik Hop, full of incident though 
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they are, are nevertheless somewhat of an historical irrelevance' (121). Implicit in 
this omission is an acknowledgement of the inconvenient nature of this aspect of the 
material for the story, or history, that he is attempting to restore to 'the annals of 
exploration' as they stand in the early twentieth century. There is of course much at 
stake in the history and historiography of this period and 'Narrative' inserts itself into 
this historiography. The Journals ofJacobus Coetse Jansz were published by the Van 
Riebeeck Society in Cape Town in 1935; within the fiction of Dusklands, S. J. 
delivered the lectures that form the substance of the afterword at the University of 
Stellenbosch between 1934 and 1948, that is, until the coming to power of the 
National Party; his Afrikaans edition of the text would be published in 1951. As 
Attwell has pointed out in this novella Coetzee is 'largely concerned with the 
discursive resources and the legacy of that achievement' (44). 
In this context, S. J. 's repackaging of the exploration narrative is a confession 
of the most disingenuous kind. In erasing from his historical evaluation the violence 
and excess of Jacobus's actions in 'second journey' (an historical irrelevance') he is 
acknowledging the shocking and deviant nature of Jacobus's actions. At the same 
time, in allowing them to be published under his editorship he is clearly satisfying his 
readers' desire for the performance of deviancy we find in the account. His 
disingenuousness is underlined in his treatment of hunting. In the 'Afterword' he 
laments the absence of hunting adventures in Jacobus's narrative: 'Hunting 
adventures lend excitement, however spurious, to history. Their structure is 
dramatically satisfying: complacency (I have a gun), discomfiture (my gun is not 
loaded, you have teetb/tusks/homs), relief (you jump the wrong one and/or I shoot 
you despite all)' (116). To compensate for this omission S. J. presumes to augment the 
passing detail that Jacobus managed to kill two elephants with a vivid account of his 
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struggle to kill an elephant cow, concluding: 'I trust you have enjoyed this adventure' 
(117). In spite of the confused and blurred metaphorical framework whereby the 
Bushman (San) is described as a beast and must be treated like one - 'Heartless as 
baboons they are, and the only way to treat them is like beasts' (58) - S. J. chooses not 
to read Jacobus's three-page account of hunting the Bushman as a 'hunting 
adventure' (58-60). The basic elements of the hunting adventure that account for the 
narrative pleasure that S. J. describes - complacency, discomfiture, relief - are glossed 
over in his description of the threat posed by Bushmen to the farmers of the frontier 
(113 -14). He admits that the farmers implemented a campaign of terror in order to 
protect the land they seized from the Bushmen from revenge attacks, but carefully 
notes: 'The commando expeditions were thus in no sense genocidal' (114). If, as 
Attwell claims of Magda's acts in Heart, they are historicized by being deeply 
transgressive, then S. J. 's acts are historicized by their complete effacement of 
transgression. 33 
By this account, we must assume that the acts of J. M. as translator and editor 
of the 1970s edition can similarly be accounted for by the period (and language) in 
which he worked. If this is the case, then J. M. alone carries the entire confessional 
burden of the novella. This is a significant problem given that our potential 
confessant speaks in his own voice only to introduce the three accounts of Jacobus's 
adventures, claiming responsibility solely for the translations from Dutch and 
Afrikaans and the minor detail of restoring 'two or three brief passages omitted from 
my father's edition' (55). It is of course entirely possible to read this admission as 
33 In his essay on Geoffrey Cronj6, Coetzee finds a covert warning to the reader that the text has been 
self-cenSOTed: 'To read Cronj6 fully, then, tojoin those of his readers who are in the know, the aspirant 
reader must put back into the text the hostility whose overt expression has been euphernized or elided' 
(Giving Offense 170). Coetzee also remarks on the way in which Cronj6 himself was eventually 
written out of the history of the Broederbond, speculating that it was 'perhaps because his language 
was too crude by the standards of the ethnic-pluralist Newspeak of the late 1970s' (26 1 n9). 
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less than ingenuous. There are many problematic details in the three accounts of 
Jacobus's adventures that might be explained by the intervention of a malicious 
translator, among them, the anomalous accounts of Klawer's death, anachronisms like 
Jacobus's citation of Blake, the interpolation of surreal lists of bodily matter at the 
end of S. J. 's afterword, described as 'Scripta manent' (119) and the subtle deviations 
of the 'Deposition' from the original Journals of Jacobus Coets6 Jansz. As author, 
J. M. Coetzee's exploitation of actual historical documents and published materials 
which are parodied, amplified and rewritten for inclusion in Dusklands creates a 
traceable material archive beyond the novel against which his reworkings can be 
measured and analysed (setting in motion a critique that has far-reaching 
consequences for these materials). However, no such archive or original exists against 
which the potentially devious translation of J. M. can be measured. So is it possible to 
apply the model of the confessional genre - with its guilt, plotting, deviancy and 
excuses - to 'Narrative? ' 
Taken as a whole, 'Narrative' supplies all the elements of a confessional 
narrative, but not in the form that we might expect: the avowals of Jacobus and S. J. 
are remorseless and unapologetic, the narrative is plotted around gross acts of 
violence but in the name of adventure rather than self-reproach, the deviancy is 
attested by readers if ignored by the narrating subjects, and the excuses - 'history' for 
Jacobus and 'anecdote' for S. J. - ring particularly hollow. In spite of S. J. 's claims to 
present a 'complete' picture of Jacobus - which he does insofar as he makes 
Jacobus's narrative available - he disavows the most objectionable aspects of the 
narrative. If disavowal is the characteristic motion of the confession, then S. J. is an 
apologist of sorts for Jacobus. J. M., on the other hand, makes no claims except to 
translate and restore; he makes no comment, gives no excuses and takes no obvious 
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pleasure (or displeasure) in the task at hand. He is, historically, in a comparable 
position to some of Coetzee's later confessants, but if he experiences this as guilt or 
complicity it remains unarticulated. 
The rebellion of the son, J. M., against the father, S. J., would fit very nicely 
into Eugene Dawn's primal horde myth. But is it asking too much of the force of 
South African history in the 1970s that it might have provided the conditions where 
the son must rebel against the father? That is to say, is J. M. 's translation 
historicizable as a confession? Dusklands opens with the compulsive revelations of 
Eugene Dawn in 'The Vietnam Project, ' neatly setting up the framework of the 
confessional genre at the beginning of the novel and foregrounding its status as an 
essentially self-serving tool of rational discourse. Following this, the first person 
narratives of 'Narrative' have a relentlessly shameless quality that defies 
categorisation as confession. However, the most complete act of disclosure staged in 
Dusklands is undoubtedly J. M. 's act of translating, publishing and disseminating his 
father's edition of Het relaas van Jacobus Coetzee, Janszoon into English to a 
potentially unsympathetic readership in the 1970s. It brings to mind the dedication of 
John's Aunt Annie to her father's manuscript in Boyhood, which appears to be carried 
out in a spirit of unyielding loyalty but which is recounted alongside figures and 
accounts of mutilation in the memoir. J. M. 's actions reflect that 'the challenge was to 
undergo the history' (105, see Attwell 57) And not alone that. J. M. 's act of disclosure 
is an act of filiation which acknowledges complicity in the colonial project that 
continues to play itself out in South Africa in the 1970S. He is assuming the shame of 
his ancestors' actions and omissions without recourse to the performance or excuse 
typical of the confessional genre. Making no pleas on behalf of Jacobus or S. J., 
neither is he expressing the desire to be rehabilitated into the community typical of 
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the confession in a legal or religious context. If it is a confession, it is a confession of 
complicity rather than a confession that seeks to 'explain away' the transgressions it 
recounts. 
V 
In Heart Magda murders her father, twice: 
The axe sweeps up over my shoulder. All kinds of people have done this before me, 
wives, sons, lovers, heirs, rivals, I am not alone. Like a ball on a string it floats down 
at the end of my arm, sinks into the throat below me, and all is suddenly tumult. (11) 
I slide the barrel of the rifle between the curtains. Resting the stock on the windowsill 
I elevate the gun until it points very definitely toward the far ceiling of the room and, 
closing my eyes, pull the trigger. [ ... ] there is simply the jerk of the butt against my 
shoulder, the concussion, flat, unremarkable, and then a moment of silence before the 
first of the screams. (61) 
The descriptions are realistic even if the effect (death) is somewhat estranged from 
the cause (axe, gun) and from the action (Magda's action) in both cases. Yet the 
combined effect of these descriptions is to place both accounts in doubt. At the very 
least, the second version of events annuls the first in a movement that in one sense is 
characteristic of the dynamic of reassessment one finds in confession. But there is no 
real suggestion of a revised position or 'truer' version of events in the novel, thereby 
forcing the reader to reassess the nature of the narrative itself - it may not be the 
account of an unreliable narrator (already established in the opening lines), or even a 
delusional narrator, but a sign of a fundamental rupture between T and the reality of 
the events described. 34 As long as there is T there can be anything. 
"' For a discussion of the kinds of reading such passages invite see Attridge (23-29). 
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The continuity of the 'I' creates the fiction of immersion in Magda's first 
person narration, so there is no point of view external to Magda's from which to 
verify that either murder actually took place. 'I' grants a continuity and coherence to 
In the Heart of the Country that is at odds with the events described. Emile 
Benveniste defines 'I' as: 'the individual who utters the present instance of discourse 
containing the linguistic instance I, ' thus explaining the continuity achieved by 
Coetzee's use of the first person throughout the novel (218). But one might argue that 
Coetzee's decision to break the narrative into 266 numbered sections undermines the 
coherence of the T by fragmenting the 'instance of discourse. ' This incoherence is 
not a symptom of madness but a property of narrative. But while this might provide 
some logical force to the otherwise irreconcilable confessions, like the confessional 
discourses of 'The Vietnam Project, ' the threat of textual mutilation in 'The Narrative 
of Jacobus Coetzee' and the determining effects of genre, the fragmented T 
undermines the authority and self-possession of the confessing subject. 
But such is the power of the narrative machine of transgression and 
confession that the novel is nonetheless sustained by the aftermath of both crimes. 
Murder provides an immediate (if short-lived) resolution to the problems of inactivity 
and torpor that Magda may have bad to face in other genres: 
For no longer need I fret about how to fill my days. I have broken a commandment, 
and the guilty cannot be bored. I have two full-grown bodies to get rid of besides 
many other traces of my violence. I have a face to compose, a story to invent, and all 
before dawn when Hendrik comes for the milking-pail! (I 1- 12) 
The crime sets in motion a whole array of activities that drive the novel forward from 
tending the wound and moving the body to the logistics of burial. Equally significant 
for the ongoing viability of the narrative is the introspection that it occasions: 'Is it 
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possible that there is an explanation for all the things I do, and that that explanation 
lies inside me, like a key rattling in a can, waiting to be taken out and used to unlock 
the mystery' (62)? The confession that the crime occasions both creates the 'interior' 
that must be expressed and situates it within rational discourse. 
Yet, Magda's is not just any crime. Patricide is singularly transgressive, the 
breaking of a fundamental taboo and, like the other crimes in the novel (incest, 
miscegenation), it has been chosen because of the specific nature of the transgression. 
As already indicated, Attwell notes that Magda's actions are historicized by their 
transgressiveness. The Ravan Press archive at NELM contains several letters from 
Coetzee to his publisher Peter Randall, written while he would have been working on 
Heart, inquiring about Ravan's position on publishing books that might be banned 
(NELM 98.8.1.87). The letters show that Coetzee was making these inquiries as early 
as 1975, demonstrating the presence of the censorship apparatus in the consciousness 
of writers and publishers in South Africa in the 1970s and perhaps indicating his 
awareness that the book he was writing posed a specific challenge to the 1974 Act. 
Closer to publication, Coetzee suggested to Randall that in the event of banning the 
book might be published with certain sections blanked out. Transgressive as it is, 
Coetzee was not concerned with Magda's patricide, but with the passages describing 
Magda's rape by Hendrik (sections 206,209 and 221). Peter D. McDonald's research 
in the archive of the Publications Control Board shows that Coetzee was correct in his 
assessment of potentially offensive material as all three readers of the embargoed 
novel drew attention to sections 206-211 as 'potentially undesirable' (YLS Online). 
What Coetzee could not have foreseen, however, is the manner in which all three 
readers manage to explain away material that they deem potentially offensive. 
According to McDonald one reader 'all but ignored it, ' another was more matter of 
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fact but optimistic about it and the third found it continuous with Magda's role as 
tragic heroine. The unlikely outcome of McDonald's research - which also takes into 
account readers' reports on Barbarians and Michael K- is to point to the individuals 
who sat on censorship committees -a source of great anxiety and speculation in 
Coetzee's letters to Randall and other writers - as his allies. So while Magda's 
actions seem to be selected for their uniquely transgressive status, which in my 
reading initiates a confessional narrative, it is clear that, in keeping with Attwell's 
assertion, transgressiveness is not universal or ahistorical as psychoanalysis, for 
example, might claim but, like the censors' own guidelines, it depends for its effect 
on its average or likely reception. 
As a result of the specific nature of her crime, the introspection initiated by 
the murder is bound up with Magda's self-presentation as a transgressor: 'I ask 
myself. What is it in me that lures me into forbidden bedrooms and makes me 
commit forbidden acts' (12)? And she reaches for the same drawer to explain these 
highly determined violations, echoing Emants: 'Original sin, degeneracy of the line: 
there are two fine, bold hypotheses for my ugly face and my dark desires, and for my 
disinclination to leap out of bed this instant and cure myself (23). After the second 
murder, she feels similar determining pressures: 'A crime has been committed. There 
must be a criminal. Who is the guilty one? I am at a terrible disadvantage. Forces 
within me belonging to the psychology I so abhor will take possession of me and 
drive me to believe that I willed the crime, that I desired my father's death' (70). 
Heart quickly establishes itself within the conventions of the confessional genre and 
Magda, self-conscious narrator that she is, proceeds through the characteristics of this 
genre (and others) with the certainty of one who has read the books and knows the 
formula. Yet, like Dawn's knowledge of psychology, this does not grant her control 
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of events. Magda is working from the script of a confessional novel but attempting to 
alter the narrative in crucial ways. Also, if the reception of the novel outlined above is 
a reminder of the specific limits within which actions are transgressive, we come to 
realise that Magda's confession also has a very specific focus. 
The trigger for Magda's murderous rage toward her father on both occasions 
is the entry into his life of another woman: in the first instance, 'the new wife' who is 
introduced in the opening line and secondly the new wife of Hendrik, one of the 
workers on the farm, who is quickly installed in her father's bed as mistress. We 
might say that Magda's rebellion is a typical oedipal conflict, but it is more accurately 
described as a rebellion against the social order precipitated by both unions. The new 
wife promises to reinstate the ideal farm family: "'I want to make a happy 
household, " she croons, circling, "the three of us together. I want you to think of me 
as a sister, not an enemy. "' (4) Accordingly, the seemingly transgressive union with 
Klein-Anna is the other side of this happy family: a desire all the more intense and all 
the more satisfying for being prohibited but facilitated utterly by the social structures 
that obtain on the farm: 'The truth is that he needs our opposition, our several 
oppositions, to hold the girl away from him, to confirm his desire for her, as much as 
he needs our opposition to be powerless against that desire. It is not privacy that he 
truly wants, but the helpless complicity of watchers' (34). In both cases, a social order 
is instigated and maintained by the father for his pleasure and with the intention of 
consolidating his position of authority. Magda's patricide is therefore an ambitious 
attack on this social order that seeks not merely to change it but to replace it. After 
the first murder she must calm herself 'in preparation for what must be a whole new 
phase of my life' (11). 
90 
But acts alone are not sufficient to rebuild the social order. The narrative 
precipitated by her violent acts is to be the means whereby a social order is 
constructed which will offer her real reciprocal relations. This must be a narrative that 
observes the rituals of confession and penitence, atonement and reparation, 
reconciliation. It is the Idnd of confession that is made, according to Susan Van 
Zanten Gallagher in Truth and Reconciliation, 'in order to construct, or reconstruct, a 
'self' within a particular community' (17). But just as transgression requires certain 
limits, here the specificity of confession becomes visible. The problem for Magda is 
that she does not wish to be reintegrated into her existing community - the typical 
family of the South African farm novel and the wider rural community of neighbours 
- she wishes to construct for herself a social unit with the servants, 35 'the brown 
people' among whom she has always lived: 
I grew up with the servants' children. I spoke like one of them before I learned to 
speak like this. I played their stick and stone games before I knew I could have a 
dolls' house with Father and Mother and Peter and Jane asleep in their own beds and 
clean clothes ready in the chest whose drawers slid in and out while Nan the dog and 
Felix the cat snoozed before the kitchen coals. [ ... ] How am I to endure the ache of 
whatever it is that is lost without a dream of a pristine age, tinged perhaps with the 
violet of melancholy, and a myth of expulsion to interpret my ache to me? (6-7) 
For this reason she renounces the tendency of the confessional narrative to explain, to 
place her crimes in a context that will make them comprehensible and consequently 
forgivable which is the basic premise of the rehabilitative model of confession 
described by Gallagher. Instead Magda wishes to remain isolated and ostracized from 
the old social order: 'To explain is to forgive, to be explained is to be forgiven, but 1, 
I hope and fear, am inexplicable, unforgivable' (5). 
35 Attwell notes that Magda is 'to the very end seeking transfiguration through recognition' (68). 1 am 
to some extent TeaTticulating this in terms of confessional narrative. 
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However, two problems immediately present themselves: the inadequacy of 
the confession to this kind of project and, moreover, the absence of any other kind of 
narrative that might achieve it. Firstly, she is restricted by the laws and conventions 
of her chosen medium, the confessional narrative, so that as soon as she declares her 
'true' intention to resist 'explanation' the next logical step, according to the 
conventions of the genre, is to undermine this intention: 
(Yet what is it in me that shrinks from the light? Do I really have a secret or is this 
bafflement before myself only a way of mystifying my better, questing half? Do I 
truly believe that stuffed in a crack between my soft mother and my baby self lies the 
key to this black bored spinster? Prolong yourself, prolong yourself, that is the 
whisper I hear in my inmost. ) (5) 
This is an early example in Coetzee of the classic motion of confessional narrative, 
what he would go on to call 'double thought. ' Located in parentheses and built from 
interrogatives, it undermines the previous sentiments in a devastating fashion and all, 
finally, in the name of narrative. If, as Magda comments a couple of paragraphs 
earlier, 'character is fate' then her fate as a character in a confessional narrative is for 
her consciousness to circle continuously back upon itself In this way we can see that 
Magda's intentions of finding release from the existing social order through 
transgression and then confession might be defeated by the limits of the confessional 
narrative itself. 'What automatism is this, what liberation is it going to bring me, and 
without liberation what is the point of my storyT (4) The problems that Magda 
encounters are those presented by the form of the confessional narrative - its 
conventionality, its machine-like qualities and its failure to deliver a satisfactory 
resolution. But while the liberation Magda seeks is clearly a foreshadowing of the 
importance of absolution in Coetzee's later writings on confession, this liberation 
points to a key quality of Coetzee's later fictional confessions and the kind of 
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absolution they seek. Confession in Coetzee is almost always addressed to a figure 
that might be described as marginal, disadvantaged or other. Where confession is 
addressed to figures of authority or the confessant's peers (the magistrate addressing 
Joll, Mrs Curren addressing the police, David Lurie addressing the university 
committee) it is in a spirit of outrage or deliberate refusal to participate in the 
conventions of the encounter. Starting with Magda, therefore, and continuing through 
his writings on confession in the mid-80s, confession in Coetzee is always made with 
the desire to be accepted into a new community rather than rehabilitated into the 
existing one. This is structurally an impossible task and leads to confession that 
seems only to excuse and exonerate and propagate itself But what other means are 
available to Magda to construct an alternative social order based on reciprocal 
relations? 
If deterministic master narratives have been at the heart of the confessional 
narratives that I have discussed so far - heredity, psychology, history - genre itself 
becomes the determining force in Heart. Magda is, in a sense, locked in a struggle 
between the determining power of the confessional narrative and the pastoral. At the 
same time, this struggle allows us to measure the distance between Magda and, say, 
Eugene Dawn: she does not capitulate easily to either genre. In the final lines she 
claims to have resisted the pastoral (as a hymn) 'because (I thought) it was too easy' 
(139) as well as the lure of explanations typical of the confession: 'Have I ever fully 
explained to myself why I do not run away from the farm and die in civilization in 
one of the asylums I am sure must abound there... ' (138) The novel is full of such 
assertions of defiance and she demonstrates a similar perseverance in trying to create 
her ideal community in spite of the overwhelming forces that determine social 
relations. 
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Although Magda's crime, strictly speaking, transgresses the laws that single 
her out as part of a community, as I have already pointed out, her reparative actions 
are largely directed at Hendrik and Klein-Anna, who are excluded from Magda's 
community by those same laws. Indeed, at least in the case of the second murder, 
there is a sense that Magda is acting on behalf of Hendrik and Klein-Anna who have 
been the victims of her father's desires. However such acting-on-bchalf-of implicates 
rather than exonerates Hendrik. Her unapologetic refusal to hide her murderous 
intentions from Hendriký which is one way of confessing, also implicates him deeply 
in the crime. In this way Magda's community-forming strategy has two aspects: 
constructing a community through transgression and confession and constructing a 
community through complicity. These two strategies coincide in Magda's obsession 
with cleaning, a task performed by servants but the territory on which Magda will 
attempt to demonstrate her good intentions. After the first murder she recognises the 
necessity of purification, cleaning up her bloody mess and avoiding the defilement of 
the dead body: 'How fortunate at times like these that there is only one problem, a 
problem of cleanliness. Until this bloody afterbirth is gone there can be no new life 
for me' (15). The shooting gives rise to a similar crisis of hygiene. In the immediate 
aftermath Magda tries to enlist Hendrik's help to dispose of the body in her imagined 
spirit of companionship or complicity. Hendrik is less than compliant, however, so 
she must resort to violence and finally ends up threatening him with a gun: 'Hendrik, 
get up at once or I shoot' (66,68). The basis on which Hendrik will 'help' Magda is 
not what she had envisaged. But carrying out the task, Hendrik's role as servant and 
accomplice diverge even further: he will help to prepare the ground but he stops short 
of burying his master in spite of Magda's pleas. 
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In the days and weeks after the murder Magda occupies herself increasingly 
with domestic chores. On the one hand she imagines this as penitence for her crime: 
'With the dark subtle figures of Hendrik and Klein-Anna wagging their fingers 
behind me I shall find my days turned into a round of penitence. I shall find myself 
licking my father's wounds, bathing Klein-Anna and bringing her to his bed, serving 
Hendrik hand and foot' (70). But as she invites them to stay with her in the house and 
shares the domestic chores with them, she is trying to create a new domestic order. As 
part of this fantasy of harmonious life between them she attempts to cultivate a 
sisterly bond with Klein-Anna and enters into sexual relations with Hendrik. But in 
spite of her momentous act of rebellion in killing her father, and the apparent power 
deficit as a result of his absence, the conditions in which she might form a community 
with Hendrik and Klein-Anna do not prevail. Her attempts at sisterly bonding with 
Klein-Anna falter on the unavailability of a language of sisterhood and the sexual 
relations she imagined with Hendrik come unstuck on another determining literary 
motif. the rape of the white woman by the black man. 
The narrative of 'life on the farm' disintegrates completely as the novel 
progresses: Hendrik and Klein-Anna leave, the sheep become wild, the farm ceases to 
be a source of income (a process which has always been mysterious to Magda) and 
Magda comes closer to the role of hysteric. Her mania for cleaning and purification 
persists: 'the dust of ages ... has been swept out of 
doors' but her fastidiousness does 
not stretch to the farm (95). Her irrationality is underlined in the complete absence of 
economic self-interest with respect to the farm. She seems to subsist but turns her 
back on the farm as an economic enterprise: 'For the rest, the rye can die, the luceme 
can die. The cow is drying up, the cow can die' (96). Her bizarre communications 
with the sky-gods seems to seal her fate as insane. In the sky-gods she has invented a 
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divinity to confess to and improvised a language in which to do it. Her impression 
that she possesses innate knowledge of Spanish is not all that far removed from her 
myths of self-invention elsewhere in the novel or, indeed, the notion of confession as 
unmediated expression. She understands their universal meanings by 'mechanisms I 
cannot detect, so deeply embedded in me do they lie' (124). 
If genre itself is the determining force in Heart, Magda is, in a sense, locked 
in a struggle between the determining power of the confessional narrative (the 
narrative of the female hysteric being a variation on this) and the pastoral. In the 
context of a discussion about Heart as a pastoral novel in Doubling, Coetzee seems to 
suggest an explanation for Magda's much-touted madness. Magda, he says, 'is an 
anomalous figure' because 'her passion doesn't belong in the genre in which she 
finds herself' (62). But is there any more a place for Magda's passion in the 
confessional genre than in the pastoral? In addition to satisfying generic conventions, 
confession must meet certain performative conditions in order to attain its presumed 
goal of absolution or rehabilitation into the community, the most important of which 
is that it be addressed to someone, a confessor, with the power to in some way 
validate the confession (by absolving, by passing sentence). Confession is therefore 
fundamentally a problem of address, that is, appropriate address. In the staged 
confession of 'The Vietnam Project' Eugene Dawn is ostensibly addressing his 
supervisor and psychologists. Much of 'The Narrative of Jacobus Coetzee' is 
similarly structured by an awareness of a particular readership. Magda's madness in 
Heart, much like that of Eugene Dawn, arises in her failure to obsme the 
conventions of address appropriate to her society. This can be seen in her relations 
with her father and stepmother, with the servants, her neighbours, even in her struggle 
to communicate with the sky gods. But this merely highlights that there is no 
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available mode of address for the kinds of social relations Magda wishes to form. 
Coetzee has recreated some of the restraining forces that act on Magda in the form of 
the generic conventions both she and the reader struggle to negotiate, which is once 
more a question of appropriate address within a shared code. But while the restraining 
forces and limits become visible in Heart, there seems to be no position from which 
they might be transcended. 
Magda's struggle to find an appropriate mode of address to initiate new social 
relations is, as I pointed out at the start of this section, an effect of the coherence of 
the first person pronoun 'I. ' In his 1977 essay on Gerrit Achterberg Coetzee draws on 
work by Benveniste and Buber on pronouns to demonstrate the interdependence of 'F 
and 'you. ' In spite of all her assertions to the contrary, there is more than a hint of 
desperation in Magda's 'P 'F is an assertion of agency and freedom but by a subject 
that is spoken and acted through to the end of the novel: 'I have uttered my life in my 
own voice throughout (what a consolation that is), I have chosen at every moment my 
own destiny, which is to die here in the petrified garden... ' (139). The 'I' of these 
closing lines is the 'I' of the confession, an avowal of agency and culpability undercut 
only slightly by doubting voice interpolated in parentheses. These lines equally seem 
to lapse into a kind of Coetzeean pastoral, but it seems to me that pastoral itself 
becomes the subject of confession: 'I am corrupted to the bone with the beauty of this 




6 ... anything was possible': Transformation, Repetition and Contingency in Waiting for the Barbarians and Life & Times of Michael K 
I 
Waitingfor the Barbarians and Life & Times of Michael K unfold in times of such 
profound upheaval and violence as to be considered moments of historical crisis. The 
first person narrative of the magistrate in Barbarians records his bewildered response 
to the present in which he is immersed and the 'times' of Michael K impress 
themselves on the life of the protagonist in vivid material suffering and deprivation. 
For Attwell both are 'interregnum novels, ' which is to say, they represent a kind of 
fiction that aims 'to analyse the hidden propensities of the present from the 
perspective of an imagined future' (91). 36 The descent into chaos and violence 
depicted in both novels brings with it a desire for an alternative temporality distinct 
from the current crisis. The magistrate's confusion in the present is informed by his 
sense of a past in which activities such as agriculture, labour, hunting and cultural 
pursuits brought meaning and fullness to one's existence in time. His actions 
throughout the novel are more or less informed by the wish to restore this imagined 
stability by attempting to overcome the degradations of the present through a kind of 
willed ethical transformation. 
36 Attwell is referring to Stephen Clingman writing about the novels of Nadine Gordimer. 
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The attempt to recuperate an alternative to the present is enacted in both 
novels through direct and often willed encounters with the other, most notably 
through the respective interactions between the magistrate and the girl and the 
medical officer and K. Both examples are in a sense reparative - attempts to heal the 
damaged body of the other - but, like Magda's confession in Heart, it is ultimately a 
strategy that is invested in a route to the future through narrative and specifically 
testimony and confession. In soliciting testimony, it is an attempt to know or 
apprehend the other. But as a response to and an address to the figure of 'otherness', 
it represents the attempted staging of a confession, like Heart, in circumstances of 
extreme inequality. This confessional impulse is evident in the written accounts 
staged within the novels - the magistrate's attempted histories and the medical 
officer's diary (and within that, his imaginary letter to K) - but the conviction that 
narrative can have a transforming effect on the present characterises their interactions 
more generally. 
In chapter 1,1 described Coetzee's 1985 essay 'Double Tlioughts' as a 
quintessential interregnum text and the teleological model that it adopts as a future- 
directed progression concerned with breaking out of a current impasse to reach 'the 
end of the episode, the closing of the chapter, liberation from the oppression of the 
memory' (252). It is this teleology that drives the desire for - transformation in 
Barbarians and Michael K. But just as the essay is distinguished by its scepticism 
about the possibility of attaining absolution, the novels frustrate the desire for 
transformation; instead it is characterised, as Attwell points out, by a 'withholding of 
resolutions' (71). In both novels, the limitations of the desire for transformation 
emerge in the face of suffering so extreme that it challenges and undoes the teleology 
of transformation and economy of exchange that it exploits. 
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In Barbarians the challenge to the desire for transformation - and the 
teleology of confession - is mediated through the novel's thorough-going critique of 
practices of torture and judicial confession. As the limits normally imposed by the 
rule of law are suspended under the emergency powers that prevail for most of the 
novel, the only limit against which confession can produce 'truth' is the limit of pain 
and even death. What progress the magistrate makes in the novel is therefore not 
down to transformation, absolution or even self-awareness, but an awareness of the 
conditions under which these acquire meaning. While the novel repeatedly stages the 
magistrate's self-awareness as a kind of double thought, in keeping with the critique 
of transformation, this is shown to be an unprogressive state without any necessary 
ethical content. But I will suggest that the limits imposed byjudicial torture lead to a 
critique of confession as exchange, and that an alternative to this emerges by 
collapsing the chronology on which the exchange economy relies. 
In Michael K the desire for transfon-nation and the economy of exchange that 
underpins it are focused on the marked, suffering body of the protagonist and yet 
dissolve on this same starving body. I will describe how, against the almost parodic 
desire for transformation and absolution that we find in the medical officer, the 
temporality of exchange is fundamentally ruptured by K's immersion in the present, 
introducing an element of radical contingency into his repeated encounters with other 
characters in the novel. Immersed in their respective crises, Barbarians and Michael 
K privilege the present as the moment in which ethical action is possible - not to 
usher in a new ethical order in the manner of transformation, but so that one can 
proceed to the next moment in which an ethical response will be demanded. 
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In 'Dostoevsky's Estrangement', Nancy Ruttenburg describes how the Russian 
writer's Siberian exile, and especially the mock execution which he endured after 
months of solitary confinement, initiated a spiritual and moral conversion that could 
not be realised or consummated. Contrary to the narrative of rebirth which is the 
critical orthodoxy on this period, Ruttenburg describes an experience which opened 
up an abyss between Dostoevsky the nobleman and the peasants he wished to 
champion that could only be approached through intensified and sustained 
estrangement: 'Before the recuperation of perception can occur ... one must see how 
very blind one is' (722). This gives rise to the 'obsessively self-referential mode' of 
the unconsummated state: 'the impasse before which the writer/narrator is compelled 
to turn back (upon himself). ' This is Dostoevsky's response to the central aesthetic 
and ethical challenge as she presents it: 'the representation of peasant culture as that 
which could not be fully seen because it had not yet become fully culturally visible to 
a reform-minded elite' (748). Ruttenburg's metaphorics of sight and seeing are 
particularly relevant to Barbarians as the magistrate's tendency to conflate the 
apparent irrefutability of visual evidence with ethical action, that is to say, equating 
epistemology and ethics, is subject to persistent critique. It is clear from Coetzee and 
Ruttenburg that merely looking does not enable one to see. 
The idea of the unconsummated conversion resonates with Michael Holquist's 
view of the dominant pattern of Yhe Idiot as 'an inspired moment that subsequently 
fails to change anything, that fails to usher in an expected new order, ' an idea that is 
embodied most forcefully in the recurring image of the unresurrected Christ of 
Holbein's painting (104). In what is presumably a reference to Cavafy's poem, 
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Holquist contends: 'The horror consists ... in the discovery that there are no ends that 
give meaning, just as there are no beginnings. The terror is not that the Barbarians 
will come, but that they will not' (113). Where Holquist finds an artistic impasse - 
resolved only in the very late novels - Ruttenburg finds an ethical impasse, that in her 
reading Dostoevsky approaches through aesthetic estrangement. 
Of the limits and conditions within which confession can occur according to 
'Double Thoughts, ' imminent death is by far the most powerfully evoked. Coetzee's 
discussion focuses on The Idiot and this will be helpful in describing the limit of 
death in Barbarians and eventually inAge of1ron. For Coetzee, 'the pervading sense 
that there is a limit to time' informs The Idiot, a novel about 'last things. ' The 
prospect of impending death imposes a singular focus on the unfolding events and on 
confessional narrative in particular, an urgency that is paralleled in the moments of 
clarity before the epileptic seizures experienced by Myshkin, moments in which the 
words 'there shall be time no more' take on particular resonance. In spite of the 
apparent clarity of these moments, the false death of the seizure passes and normal 
life is restored until, that is, another seizure occurs. 
The intensity of the temporal experience of an imminent end is established 
early in the novel by the vividly imagined execution stories told by Myshkin. The 
story of one man who was granted a last-minute reprieve, with its echoes of 
Dostoevsky's own experience, recreates the special status of the time preceding death 
only to underscore its failure to usher in a new way of life. Elsewhere in the novel, 
Ippolit Terentyev seeks the authority of death for his 'Explanation' as he attempts to 
guarantee the sincerity of his confession with a vow to commit suicide. As Coetzee 
sees Ippolit's reasoning: 'The moment before death belongs to a different kind of 
time in which truth has at last the power to appear in the form of revelation' (284). 
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But this means that Ippolit's planned suicide might be an elaborate ploy to guarantee 
the sincerity of his confession. What emerges from these examples is the ability of the 
discursive economy to co-opt, assimilate and then cast aside even a powerful signifier 
such as death. The only indisputable transformation is the transformation of death, 
embodied as Holquist points out in Holbein's unresurrected Christ, which circulates 
in The Idiot with an irrefutable power similar to the recurring image of the 
grandfather's corpse in Barbarians or Anna K's ashes in Michael K. 
Ruttenburg's unconsurnmated conversion is a helpful way to approach the 
problematic figure of the magistrate, who Coetzee describes as 'a man of conscience' 
but whose subjection to sceptical questioning and self-questioning places the ethical 
content of conscience under scrutiny. The unconsummated conversion is comparable 
to the initiated but frustrated teleology of confession that emerges from 'Double 
Thoughts' and that informs the desire of the magistrate (and the medical officer) for a 
transformative experience. 
III 
The term barbarian means 'a rude, wild, uncivilized person' or, in the original Greek 
sense of barbarous, a speaker of a language other than Greek (OED). Its semantic 
journey from 'not Greek' to wild and uncivilized points to the manner in which 
cultural difference is inscribed through language and negotiated by translation and 
raises the possibility of multiple ironies in Coetzee's adoption of the title of C. P. 
Cavafy's Greek poem for his novel. In both poem and novel barbarian facilitates the 
Empire's self-definition as civilized while itself being subject to vague speculation, or 
'arbitrariness and indeterminacy' in Attwell's terms (71), which is inscribed in the 
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novel through the problem of language and translation in interrogation, commerce 
and sexual relations. In a pattern that is reflected in his interactions with the 
barbarians generally, the magistrate is distinguished by his awareness of language as 
an obstacle to understanding and his conviction early in the novel that he has resolved 
it. 
If indeterminacy attaches to the term barbarian, this is intensified in the 
novel's setting, an effect that is achieved not by a complete refusal of external 
referents but paradoxically through a multiplication of incompatible referents. This 
emerges as a conscious strategy on Coetzee's part in 'Speaking in Tongues': 'I did 
intend that enough of an association with imperial China should be evoked to balance 
and complicate, for instance, the association with imperial Russia evoked elsewhere 
in the book by the phrase Third Bureau. ' 37 Coetzee describes how his efforts to 
frustrate a strictly referential reading were complicated by their very specificity (the 
sack of the Summer Palace) in the process of being translated into Chinese. 
Attridge points out that the indeterminacy of the novel has allowed readers to 
substitute their own allegorical readings - specific or universal - for the unspecific 
setting Coetzee deliberately draws (41-43). This occurs in spite of the novel's ability 
to disrupt the process of meaning-making, focusing on the production and value of 
meaning itself. Yet even this process can be accommodated to a highly specific 
context. What Attwell calls the novel's 'strategic refusal of specificity' is also 
particular to the context from which it emerged: 'its very remoteness, its deliberate 
anachronisms, and its denial of historical plausibility resonate with the somewhat 
phantasmagoric quality of the state's projections and vocabulary at this time' (73 & 
74). 
31 Coetzee's strategies are, in a sense, hallmarks of a bad translation. 
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To follow this line of thinking, one can relate the indeterminacy of the novel 
to the absence or suspension of the rule of law for its duration. This is one way to 
accommodate the confusion of the magistrate, known only by his role in the 
administration of law, but redundant in this capacity for the duration of the novel 
because of the effective suspension of law by Empire's emergency powers. Though 
Coetzee's essay points to the resulting difficulties of translating Barbarians, Philip 
Glass's recent opera adaptation suggests that its indeterminacy actually contributes to 
its translatability, but the opera's staging suggests otherwise, as it introduces the now 
iconic orange jumpsuits associated with detainees at the Guantanamo Bay detention 
38 camp into the matrix of incompatible referents in the novel. So, it would appear that 
it is indeterminacy more narrowly conceived as an absence of the rule of law that 
allows Coetzee's 1980 novel to be translated into a twerity-first century context in 
which jurisdiction - conceived both geographically and in terms of the reach of 
national and international law - is disavowed and time and place are denied the 
power to determine the administration ofjustice. 39 
Although confession in a legal context is, at least in theory, held to be a 
statement of verifiable fact, the violent conditions facilitated by the suspension of the 
rule of law in Barbarians undermines this status. The random nature of Joll's and 
Mandel's interrogations renders the confessions that bring them to an end equally 
arbitrary. In the context of judicial torture, confession is no longer a potentially 
verifiable statement but an item of exchange in a transaction with shifting rules. 
38 The opera is not 'set' in Guantanamo Bay, but at the performance I saw in Amsterdam in September 
2006 its staging undoubtedly invoked this context. 
39 This apparent absence of law and disavowal ofjurisdiction is made possible only through the law. In 
Diary, JC recalls a public event where he made connections between 'his novel' Barbarians and 
Australian anti-terror laws: 'I used to think that the people who created these laws [apartheid laws] that 
effectively suspended the rule of law were moral barbarians. Now I know they werejust pioneers, 
ahead of their time' (Diary 171). 
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Strictly speaking it has no epistemological function; what power it has derives from 
its power to bring the torture to an end, but this relies entirely on the torturer's 
authority to determine its status as final truth. Confession that is uttered in such 
circumstances is therefore the ultimate in instrumental uses of language, as it is 
calculated entirely to bring the interrogation and torture to an end. But the calculation 
is not informed by a knowable horizon; the end is either completely random (the 
torturer decides that the confessant is telling the truth) or entirely predictable (the 
confessant confesses [rightly or wrongly] to the crime that he or she is accused of, 
thus fulfilling the pre-existing expectations of the torturer. Early in the novel the 
magistrate questions Joll about the authority of the torturer: 
"Imagine: to be prepared to yield, to yield, to have nothing more to yield, to be 
broken, yet to be pressed to yield more! And what a responsibility for the 
interrogator! How do you ever know when a man has told you the truth? " 
"There is a certain tone, " Joll says. "A certain tone enters the voice of a man 
who is telling the truth. Training and experience teach us to recognize that tone. " 
"The tone of truth! Can you pick up this tone in every day speech? Can you 
hear whether I am telling the truth? " 
This is the most intimate moment we have yet had, which he brushes off with 
a little wave of the hand. "No, you misunderstand me. I am speaking only of a special 
situation now, I am speaking of a situation in which I am probing for the truth, in 
which I have to exert pressure to find it. First I get lies, you see - this is what 
happens - first lies, then pressure, then more lies, then more pressure, then the break, 
then more pressure, then the truth. That is how you get the truth. " (5) 
In spite of the careful description of his method, Joll's words merely reinforce the 
apparent arbitrariness of the relationship between truth and torture. The magistrate 
leams that: 'Pain is truth, all else is subject to doubt' and this is vindicated in the 
random acts of violence inflicted on him later in the novel (5). 
In a general sense, the torturer's authority is one way to guarantee the 
successful completion of a confession, the declared aim of confession in 'Double 
Thoughts, ' but the violence that underwrites this authority represents a perversion of 
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the completion offered by divine grace. For the secular confessant, to whom divine 
authority is not available, the end of confession is frequently pre-empted by recourse 
to some external authority. But it is more frequently the shadow of the interrogator 
that appears to stalk the secular confessant. 
The high stakes that confessional narrative accrues in Coetzee's work 
generally, and in this period in particular, emerges from the outrageous activities of 
the security services in South Africa at the time. Those held in police custody were 
subject to judicial torture sufficiently extreme in some instances to result in the death 
of the prisoner, as in the notorious case of Steve Biko in 1977.40 Coetzee has written 
about the 'dark fascination' exerted by the torture chamber on the South African 
writer's imagination, describing Barbarians as a novel 'about the impact of the 
torture chamber on the life of a man of conscience' (Doubling 363). He notes that this 
fascination occurs alongside laws that prohibit representations of prisons, and letters 
from Coetzee to Peter Randall of Ravan Press and the writer Sheila Roberts in the late 
1970s indicate that he was aware that representations of the police were particularly 
targeted by the Publications Control Board (NELM 98.8.1.121,2005.33.4). In this 
light, McDonald notes that the unspecific setting of the novel, which informed the 
censors' benign view of the 'universality' of Barbarians ('All is of world-wide 
significance, not particularized 9), 41 opens Coetzee to the charge of self-censorship. 
The epistemological and referential failure of confessional narrative imposes a 
highly charged context on the indeterminacy of the novel more generally, such that 
the violence required to generate meaning is everywhere apparent. For the magistrate, 
40 Jean-Philippe Wade has demonstrated that the report on the grandfather's death in the early stages of 
the novel echoes the wording of statements given to the inquiry into the death of Stephen Biko in 1977 
(281). 
41 This is from the report of Reginald Ligbton (cited in McDonald 48). 
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however, immersed in the crisis precipitated by Colonel Joll's arrival, no such 
perspective is available, at least not at this stage. Early in the novel he overcomes his 
initial moral torpor to explore the results of Joll's 'investigations' in the makeshift 
prison. Shining his lantern into the 'dark chamber' he finds a young boy bound and 
terrified sharing the room with the sewn-up corpse of his grandfather. He proceeds to 
unpick the stitching and tear open the shroud that hides the results of Joll's attentions: 
'The grey beard is caked with blood. The lips are crushed and drawn back, the teeth 
are broken. One eye is rolled back, the other eye socket is a bloody hole' (7). The 
marks on the body are a devastating indictment of judicial torture. Yet having 
witnessed the extremes to which Joll is willing to go in his inquiries, the magistrate 
encourages the boy to tell the truth: 'Listen: you must tell the officer the truth. That is 
all he wants to hear from you - the truth. Once he is sure you are telling the truth he 
will not hurt you. ( ... ] If there is pain, do not lose heart' (7). Some pages later, he 
questions the veracity of the confession the boy eventually provided: 'Are you telling 
the truth? Do you understand what this confession of yours will mean? '(1 1) The boy 
is so badly hurt that slapping his cheek is 'like slapping dead flesh' (11). 
The magistrate has made a virtue of 'going to see' yet failed utterly to 
understand the nature of the scene before him. It is not clear what significance he 
finds in the corpse he describes so vividly - it becomes an enduring image in his 
consciousness and in the novel - but it is not the powerlessness of confessional 
narrative, 'truth' as he calls it, to halt the violence of the torturer. The magistrate's 
conviction that the 'truth' can be told mirrors his conviction that the 'truth' of the 
torture chamber can be apprehended visually: 'But alas, I did not ride away: for a 
while I stopped my ears to the noises coming from the hut by the granary where the 
tools are kept, then in the night I took a lantern and went to see for myself' (9). His 
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actions are informed by the conviction that they will effect a change - in the boy's 
fate, in his ethical makeup - but it is evident from Coetzee's text that no such 
transformation is available. 
If the magistrate's narrative is often characterized by 'double thought' it is 
more often than not an attempt to reconcile his desire for the future and for 
transformation with other desires - his desire for the girl, for an easy life, for a return 
to things as they were. Much of his attention to the girl is intended to construct a 
narrative of the events that occurred since she arrived in the town, from an image of 
her as whole and innocent on arrival, to the details of the torture she endured, and to 
find a place for himself in this narrative - he seems to believe that her testimony will 
take the form of an accusation that will allow him to confess. But he also subjects his 
apparently reparative actions to rigorous scrutiny. In one example, he embarks on a 
cycle of sceptical questioning following the consummation of their relationship. 
Rather than allow the magistrate or the reader to identify consummation with his 
wished-for transformation, the magistrate becomes estranged from the intimacy of the 
act by subjecting it to relentless and unproductive analysis. Like other examples of 
double thought staged in Coetzee's fiction the thoughts are frequently parenthetical or 
introduced with 'I think: ' or 'on the other hand, ' emphasising the potentially endless 
chain of tenuously connected propositions. In this case, the thread rolls along from 
'Not for an instant do I imagine... ' to 'I do not shy at the thought... ' to 'Perhaps the 
truth is... ' to '... or is it the case (I am not stupid, let me say these things)' and 
beyond (64). Not surprisingly, he eventually stumbles on the insight that words 'have 
lost all meaning' and brings it to a close by embracing the girl. 
Towards the end of the novel the magistrate finds himself reduced to the 
abject status of beggar -a temporary loss of status - moving from house to house, 
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recounting the story of his captivity in exchange for food, shelter and even sex. He 
sees in his story only the power to enable his survival - 'So I sing for my keep' -a 
lesson learned from his days in captivity: "'Declare your terror, scream when the pain 
comes! They thrive on stubborn silence: it confirms to them that every soul is a lock 
they must patiently pick. Bare yourself! Open your heart! " So I shouted and screamed 
and said whatever came into my head. Insidious rationale! For now what I hear when 
I loosen my tongue and let it sail free is the subtle whining of a beggar' (129). This is 
same the logic that defeats his attempts to construct a history of the frontier, giving it 
the ring of a 'plea, ' and most damningly, reduces his interactions with the girl to a 
series of narrative transactions. 
IV 
The 'turning back upon itself of the literary text describes a self-referential quality of 
literature that Coetzee associates with the challenge staged in Achtcrberg's Tallade 
van de gasfitter: the quest of the I to bring You into 'fullness of being' (73). In the 
essay this is related to the referential challenge staged in the poem (fixing referents 
for the signifiers I and You) and the challenge to him as translator to seek these 
referents in his reading and find a suitable way of rendering the meaning and the 
process of meaning-making in a new version. Coetzee uses a similar phrase to 
describe the metafictional dimension of Michael K. 'the moment when the text turns 
in upon itself and begins to reflect on its own textuality' (Doubling, 207). 
Ruttenburg has illustrated how such 'turning back upon itself' of 
consciousness and of narrative can be a response to rather than evasion of an 
overwhelming historical situation. Attwell takes this up in his discussion of the novel 
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and his sense that Coetzee, like Kafka in 'The Burrow, ' is staging 'a narrating subject 
confronting its own limits of possibility, indeed, its own death' (102). Ile relates this 
to Foucault's description of the reflexive moment in narrative as 'a kind of "wound, " 
for the process of doubling back is really an attempt on the part of writing to postpone 
death, to "conceal, that is, betray the relationship that language establishes with death 
- with this limit to which language addresses itself and against which it is poised"' 
(102). The figure of 'doubling back' or 'turning back upon itself' is a last resort of 
sorts, yet one that is intimately bound up with the production of discourse in all its 
forms. 
In ne Psychic Life of Power Judith Butler identifies the figure of the turn 
with the description of the formation of the subject and conscience. She describes 
bow diverse thinkers have resorted to a 'rhetorically, performatively spectacular' 
figure to account for the referential paradox of subject formation: 'that we must refer 
to something which does not yet exist' (4). The turn is a moment of rcflcction or 
more precisely a moment of self-rcflexivity which she relates to conscience, 'the 
means by which a subject becomes an object for itself, reflecting on itself, 
establishing itself as reflective and reflexive' (22). 
Butler's account of subject formation develops across a range of texts that 
bring together the issue of responsibility with the need for a politics of agency. 42 She 
reformulates the problem in slightly different terms in her most recent book, Giving 
an Account of OneseU! 'Given that we are vulnerable to the address of others in ways 
that we cannot fully control ... does this mean that we are without agency and 
without responsibility? '(84-85) Examining one's vulnerability to the address of 
42 See The Psychic Life ofPower (1997), Excitable Speech (1997) and Giving anAccount ofOneseU' 
(2006). 
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another, Butler locates a (provisional) solution in the work of philosopher Emmanuel 
Levinas who finds that 'responsibility emerges as a consequence of being subject to 
the unwilled address of the other'. In other words, the responsible agent emerges by 
virtue of his subjection to the other. Butler's reading draws on the essay 
'Substitution' in which Levinas too resorts to the figure of the turn to describe self- 
reflection. While Butler's earlier account privileged the turn inwards as the place 
where the conscience and hence the ethical subject was formed, Levinas describes 
how responsibility is prior to self-reflection, prior to the turn: 'the movement of the 
responsibility of the I for the Other (Autrui) and before the Other (Autrui)' is a 
6movement at once spontaneous and critical ... a necessity always to go straight 
before oneself without in some way having the time to turn back' (20 emphasis 
added). 
This is a way of thinking through the figures of self-consciousness to the 
possibility of ethical action. The idea of collapsing one moment into the next, of 
somehow refusing the logic of chronology, seems here to facilitate an ethical relation 
to the other. This is not unlike the logic of the aneconomic gift as Derrida describes it 
in Given Time, where the gift can take place under the guise of exchange by 
collapsing the chronology of events. Like Coetzee's interest in the temporality of ne 
Idiot, it seems that one's experience of time - in particular, the suspension of 
chronological time - is crucial to the possibility of the ethical. The kind of immediacy 
suggested in this temporal condition is not related to a transformative trajectory, but 
finds the possibility of ethical action in one's responsiveness in the present. As I have 
shown in his reactions to the torture taking place in the town and to the girl, self- 
consciousness itself does not offer the magistrate a way out of the crisis he is 
experiencing. But the novel stages other possibilities for ethical action. 
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One of the magistrate's pastimes at the frontier is hunting, but it also one of 
those activities interrupted in the present crisis of the novel. In one episode the 
magistrate encounters a waterbuck while hunting but fails to kill it. Not only does he 
fail to kill it, but it seems to present a challenge to the magistrate which he backs 
away from. The encounter is enacted only through their mutual gaze and the 
challenge is articulated in the eyes of the buck: 'I slide the gun up and sight behind 
his shoulder. The movement is smooth and steady, but perhaps the sun glints on the 
barrel, for in his descent he turns his head and sees me. His hooves touch ice with a 
click, his jaw stops in mid-motion, we gaze at each other' (39). 
The magistrate's encounter with the buck has the effect of disrupting the 
temporal progress of the novel: 'With the buck before me suspended in immobility, 
there seems to be time for all things, time even to turn my gaze inward and see what it 
is that has robbed the hunt of its savour' (39). The magistrate describes the encounter 
in terms of an excess of time, though the pair seem to be removed from the 
conventions of time by their mutual gaze. Ile terms in which the scene develops are 
very much reminiscent of Myshkin's description of the 'last conscious moment' 
before an epileptic fit: 'at that moment the extraordinary saying that there shall be 
time no longer becomes, somehow, comprehensible to me. I suppose ... this is the 
very second in which there was not time enough for the water from the pitcher of the 
epileptic Mahomet to spill, while he had plenty of time in that second to behold all 
the dwellings of Allah' (The Idiot 259). In other words, the magistrate experiences 
this moment with the urgency of the seconds before death or the oblivion of an 
epileptic seizure. 
After the buck makes his escape the magistrate tells us: 'I trudge on 
purposelessly for an hour before I turn back' (40). Wrenched from this seemingly 
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meaningful encounter the magistrate is thrown back into the banal world of 
chronological time: 'I turn back' (40). The episode is pregnant with meaning for the 
bewildered magistrate: 'the stars are locked in a configuration in which events are not 
themselves but stand for other things' (40). 43 In other words, if the waterbuck 
represents something more, if it has implications greater than the magistrate's 
susceptibility to an animal's gaze, the events are potentially recuperable within the 
narrative of transformation he would like to construct. What is incomprehensible to 
the magistrate is his apparent weakness as a response to the waterbuck. His inability 
to execute the shot and complete the hunt did not arise from the self-scrutiny of 
turning his gaze inward but from the challenge presented in the gaze of the buck: 'My 
pulse does not quicken: evidently it is not important to me that the ram die' (39). This 
encounter has all the immediacy of Levinas's description of the imposition of the 
Other; while the frozen moment allowed the magistrate to reflect on the events, the 
decision not to kill the buck was taken 'without in some way having the time to turn 
back' (20). 
In contrast to the knowledge and evidence that the magistrate actively seeks 
out and accrues to his developing conscience elsewhere in the novel, the gaze of the 
buck arrives unbidden and his response to it is a surprise even to himself. The 
magistrate, if only implicitly, links his failure to kill the buck and his relationship 
with the girl. From his feelings of being subject to the gaze of the buck ('not living 
my own life on my own terms') he proceeds to consider the girl's choice to stay with 
him. Her reply that 'there is nowhere else to go' confirms her lack of agency and 
43 This type of encounter is echoed in Petersburg when Coetzee's Dostoevsky goes to investigate a 
whining dog in the middle of the night in the conviction that it must be 'a sign. ' Attridge characterises 
this is an encounter with Derrida's arrivant and the kind of responsiveness I'm talking about here fits 
with his account (Coetzee 120-24). 
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subjection to the magistrate's will. She is sensitive to his need to link the story of the 
buck with his desire for her, but she does not indulge it: 'You should not go hunting if 
you do not enjoy it' (41). The magistrate's narrative is frustrated: 'That is not the 
meaning of the story, but what is the use of arguing? (41) She relents and gives him 
an account of the torture she endured and the instrument used to inflict it, but nothing 
in her account makes the connection with the buck. This is information he has sought 
since their first meeting, yet he wonders: 'Is this the question I asked? '(41) His 
questioning assimilates her testimony to his narrative of confession and 
transformation so that, finally, the only agency available to her is to withhold her 
story: "'I am tired of talking"' (4 1). The scene with the buck undoubtedly describes a 
step in the formation of the magistrate as an ethical subject. But in positioning it 
alongside his self-interested probing of the girl's wounds Coetzce demonstrates that 
the ethical subject is re-formed in every encounter with otherness; it is not a question 
of transformation, but reiteration. 
Describing the effect of Coetzee's use of the present tense on the narrative of 
the magistrate, James Phelan notes that 'as We read any one moment of the narrative 
we must assume that the future is always - and radically - wide open: the narrator's 
guess about what will happen next is really no better than our own' (223). Phelan 
relates this to the immediacy of the reader's identification (and complicity) with the 
magistrate but Coetzee's use of the present tense - and the openness to the future 
which it produces - creates the conditions in which such rciteration/rcpetition can 
occur. While Phelan claims that this openness to the future erases teleology from the 
magistrate's narrative, to my mind his actions and reflections are informed by a 
teleology of moral progress conditioned by his circumstances and position. In other 
words, the teleology that will emerge in 'Double Thoughts' is already evident in the 
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magistrate's desired transformation. However, Coetzee's narrative allows the 
contingency of each encounter to be thrust upon him and denies one encounter the 
opportunity to condition the next. 
The magistrate's meeting with the barbarians initially appears to be another 
expression of his desire for ethical transformation - the journey to the frontier is a 
kind of pilgrimage and his willingness to return the girl to her people a sacrifice. 
While the trip in certain respects signals a development of his relationship with the 
girl, it is in being further dispossessed of his bearings in the encounter with the 
barbarians that the magistrate becomes aware of the limitations of his own 
understanding. 
His loss of control is signalled most forcefully in his reliance on the girl to 
communicate with the men. His instruction to her to 'Tell them your story. Tell them 
the truth' no longer has the force of a threat as it did in the town, but becomes a 
source of bemusement to the girl, who responds with a smile: 'You really want me to 
tell them the truth? '(71) His alienation from the barbarians and from her is completed 
in his exclusion from their communication: 'From above the soft cascade of the girl's 
speech reaches me broken by the gusting of the wind. ( ... ]I cannot make out a 
word. '(71) She acts as interpreter for him in his attempts to negotiate a transaction 
with the men -a horse in exchange for silver. Ironically, the thoughts which occupy 
him while the negotiation between the girl and the men is taking place centre on his 
role as intermediary between Empire and Barbarian: 'And here I am patching up 
relations between the men of the future and the men of the past, returning, with 
apologies, a body we have sucked dry -a go-between, a jackal of Empire in sheep's 
clothing! '(72) While always highly qualified, the magistrate's earlier belief in his 
ability to negotiate and interpret the thoughts, wishes and transactions of the 
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barbarians is exposed in this incident as wishful, replaced by his utter vulnerability to 
the barbarians and to the girl. But to call his encounter with the barbarians a turning 
point would be to identify too closely with the transformative experience he desires. 
Instead, the encounter is revisited obliquely in his subsequent questioning by 
Joll in which the latter attempts to use the poplar slips as incriminating evidence 
against the magistrate: 'A reasonable inference is that the wooden slips contain 
messages passed between yourself and other parties, we do not know when. It 
remains for you to explain what the messages say and who the other parties were' 
(I 10). This time adopting the role of 'go-between' with some irony, he interprets the 
slips as a series of letters from a father to a daughter describing the death of his son in 
police custody. The arbitrariness of the connection between the magistrate's story and 
the slips which refuse to yield their meaning indicates the magistrate's newfound 
awareness of his limitations as cultural translator. As he admits before beginning the 
story: 'I have no idea what they stand for' and later that the slips are 'open to many 
interpretations' (110,112). Yet, concluding his narration he says 'Thank you. I have 
finished translating' (112). If he cannot read the slips, in what sense might he be said 
to translate? 
While the relation between the story and the poplar slips is avowedly 
arbitrary, the elements which make up that story are far from incidental. Most potent 
among the images he brings to life is that of the boy's body sewn up in a sheet. Joll 
and the warrant officer, and indeed the reader, recognise the image of the tortured 
body from the opening pages of the novel (6-7). Echoing the magistrate's earlier 
actions, the father in the story wishes to examine the body of his son: "'What if it is 
the wrong body you are giving me? " I said - "You have so many bodies here, bodies 
of brave young men. " So I opened the sheet and I saw that it was indeed he' (I 11). 
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The magistrate exploits the referential indeterminacy of the slips as a challenge to Joll 
but also to bear witness to the death of the grandfather earlier in the novel. He does 
not simply relate the mysterious slips to a completely invented story, but uses the 
slips to mediate the specific details he carries across from elsewhere in the novel. And 
his persistence in marking out the story as arbitrary, ' acknowledging the prejudicial 
nature of his endeavour, both allows the slips to retain their foreignness and serves as 
an accusation to his interrogators about the 'truth' they claim to extract and the 
methods they use to do it. In addition, the connection Wade establishes with the Biko 
inquiry brings greater force still to the image of the tortured body. 
The experience of repeated exposure to the unknown is felt with particular 
intensity in the dream sequence that punctuates the novel and the sense of openness - 
to the future, to the unknown - is captured powerfully in the recurring motif of the 
turn. The dominant motif in the dreams is the magistrate approaching a group of 
children playing on the town square. The children are alternately building a fort from 
snow or sand but run away as he draws near leaving behind one child with whom he 
interacts. In the dreams the magistrate is alternately benefactor and beneficiary, 
giving the girl a coin, offering to keep her warm and receiving bread from her: 'now I 
can see that what she is holding out to me is a loaf of bread, still hot, with a coarse 
steaming broken crust. A surge of gratitude sweeps through me' (109). It is not 
possible to claim the status of radically contingent for a series of related dreams; even 
if the mode of their narration preserves the freshness of the dream experience, they 
are, of course, conditioned by the desires and anxieties of the magistrate's waking 
life. Indeed it would appear that the subtle changes recounted in the dreams function 
as the unconscious correlate of the magistrate's struggle with his conscience 
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throughout the novel. Attwell notes that 'The dreams crystallize in lucid imagery the 
meaning of [the magistrate's] desires for continuity and reciprocity' (80). 
v 
Coetzee's magistrate is both a figure of the law and a guilty subject. He lives in a 
time when the law he represents has dispensed with due process and any pretensions 
ofjustice - it carries no force other than that which it can impose by violence. He has 
become a guilty subject in a double sense: he is at the mercy of this corrupt regime 
yet remains an agent of it. In this context, every narrative he attempts to construct has 
the ring of a plea -a story told in mitigation, an axcuse. And such excuses - in the 
form of double thought, attempted histories, pleas for food - proliferate throughout 
the novel. At the peak of his understanding the magistrate may acknowledge the 
limitations on what he can see and know and translate: 'There has been something 
staring me in the face, and still I do not see it' (155). At the same time, as his 
narrative 'turns back upon itself' it becomes a vehicle for the circulation of images of 
extraordinary power: the grandfather's dead body, the girl's damaged feet, his own 
suffering at the hands of Mandel. Fleetingly we find him capable of a spontaneous 
ethical response - to the waterbuck - but no one image or event has the power to 
condition his behaviour or transform his sensibility. 
vi 
In the character of the medical officer who narrates Part Two of Michael K, Coetzee 
is repeating many of the qualities of the magistrate from Barbarians. Like the 
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magistrate, he is identified only by his function in the machine of state (in this case a 
medical officer in the military) while self-consciously adopting a stance of minimal if 
efficient compliance with the policies and practices of the regime. Unlike the 
magistrate, the medical officer does not develop beyond this narrowly conceived role. 
Instead his narrative, a diary devoted exclusively to Michael K and contained within 
Ws narrative', highlights the contrastive purpose of his presence. The medical 
officer's diary is entirely external to K's consciousness yet obsessive in its attention 
to K's body and relentless in its pursuit of his story and meaning. This clearly echoes 
and intensifies the magistrate's obsessive relationship with the girl, so much so, that 
the medical officer reads like a gentle parody of the magistrate. The diary is also a 
highly stylised and elaborate version of the numerous encounters that take place 
throughout the novel between K and a range of interlocutors, from hostile soldiers to 
well-intentioned fellow-travellers and friendly vagrants, albeit focalized through the 
interlocutor rather than K. This draws attention to another point of contrast: its 
focalization through one character underlines the complex of perspectives embodied 
in what we come to think of as K's narrative in Parts One and Three. 
Moreover, within the diary the medical officer (or behind him, Coetzee) has 
contrived several different forms of direct address to K, most notably the mock 
interrogation, the letter from 'a friend' and the imagined confrontation on the Cape 
Flats (137-140,149-152 and 161-167). It seems to me that there is a principle of 
repetition at work here that is also replicated elsewhere in the novel pointing to its 
self-referential qualities and to a certain quality of fiction itself The medical officer's 
narrative is the space in which Michael K most obviously and most forcefully turns 
back upon itself - by echoing, repeating and foreshadowing other elements of the 
novel and even certain key motifs of Coetzee's previous novel. In his obsession with 
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K and specifically with K's meaning the medical officer also assumes the role of 
reader-figure within the novel, thus intensifying its metafictional dimension even 
further. In this way I believe the pattern of frustrated transformation (or 
'unconsummated conversion' in Ruttenburg's terms) leading to the turning back upon 
itself of the narrative that is at work in Barbarians can also be found in Michael K. 
However, Michael K offers considerably more than the frustrated obsessions 
of the medical officer. As I have mentioned, his encounter with K is only the most 
fully elaborated of a series of encounters between K and the copious characters he 
meets on his travels; it is unique only in being focalized through someone other than 
K. These other encounters are equally marked by the repetitive and self-reflexive 
qualities of Part Two of the novel but, I will argue, the unique temporality of K's 
narrative restores to these apparently reiterated encounters the contingency that 
characterises the creation of the ethical subject as discussed above. The motif of the 
encounter or exchange is used liberally by Coetzee in both Barbarians and Michael 
K, although commentators rarely find any continuity between these elements of the 
novels. Instead, what emerge as possibilities for the magistrate in the encounters of 
the dream sequence, for example, are taken to exemplify K's subjection to the will of 
those numerous characters he meets on his journey around the Western Cape. 44 1 Will 
argue that what is at stake in the repeated motif of the encounter is the element of 
contingency that enables the formation of the ethical subject. 
While K is not obviously a confessant or a confessor, these staged encounters 
repeat both the desires that motivate confessional encounters and the problems that 
prevent them from taking place successfully. Like many of the staged confessions in 
44 See Mike Marais, "Literature and the Labour of Negation" and Michael Valdez Moses, "Solitary 
Walkers". 
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Coetzee the encounter between K and the medical officer is hampered by the problem 
of address and the problem of finding a suitable interlocutor/confessor. In addition, 
many of the encounters depicted in the novel seem to take the form of an exchange or 
economic transaction, recalling the both calculation so detrimental to confession and 
the idea of confession as a highly instrumental exchange that emerges from the 
judicial confessions of Barbarians. If the temporality of Michael K offers a way 
around these transactions and exchanges, then it also offers the possibility of a 
confessional encounter not grounded in an economic calculation. 
Vil 
The medical officer's obsession with K is, in some respects, a version of Achterberg's 
'passion for You' but the self-consciously contrived nature of their encounters results 
in a parody that vacillates between conversion and interpellation. This is exemplified 
in the entries after K's escape when the medical officer reinvents their encounter as a 
spiritual conversion in which he came to see K as the agent of his salvation. The 
conversion and chase culminate (in the medical officer's mind) in an elaborately 
staged confession in which he asks K's forgiveness and attempts to explain the origin 
of his attachment: 'And here, in the light of day, you would at last have turned and 
looked at me [ ... ] And I would have come before you and spoken. I would have said: 
'Michaels, forgive me for the way I treated you' (164). The medical officer re- 
imagines K's time in the camp in supernatural terms, yet even in this invented 
encounter he reverts to double thought in order to extrapolate some significance for 
the episode: 
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And standing in the doorway I would turn my bleakest stare in upon myself, seeking 
by the last means I knew to detect the germ of dishonesty at the heart of the 
conviction - the wish, let us say, for example, to be the only one to whom the camp 
was not just the old Kenilworth racetrack with prefabricated huts dotted across it but 
a privileged site where meaning erupted into the world. 
So I would turn my gaze out again, and, yes, it would still be true, I was not 
deceiving myself, I was not flattering myself, I was not comforting myself, it was as 
it had been before, it was the truth, there was indeed a gathering, a thickening of 
darkness above one bed alone, and that bed was yours. 
Thus the medical officer manages to elide K's presence in favour of K's value. The 
language of self-scrutiny (the turn inwards) and rigorous honesty is familiar from the 
magistrate's narrative, but it is clear that the medical officer generates in this 
imaginary encounter an occasion for a false reflexivity that is frankly tautological. He 
attempts to guarantee the value of K's meaning by contemplating its absence: 
... if Michaels himself were no more than what he seems to be (what you seem to be), a skin-and-bones man with a crumpled lip (pardon me, I name only the obvious), 
then I would have every justification for retiring to the toilets behind the jockey's 
changing-rooms and locking myself into the last cubicle and putting a bullet through 
my head. Yet have I ever been more sincere than I am tonight? (165) 
The medical officer is offering his possible suicide as a guarantee of his sincere belief 
in K's significance, when it is rather the staged sincerity that facilitates the inflated 
terms of his narrative. Coetzee signals his scepticism about sincerity in 'Double 
Thoughts' and indeed one could read the medical officer's narrative as a highly ironic 
example of double thought. The imagined confession within the diary undermines the 
fiction of his concern for K's well-being ('At first I thought of you, I will confess, as 
a figure of fun' [163]), instead drawing attention to the manner in which the content 
is determined by the need for endless discourse and endless exchange value. K's 
meaning, for the medical officer, is bound up with the meaning of his own narrative: 
for it to have meaning, K must have meaning. Similarly, the encounter underlines the 
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medical officer's need for an addressee or an auditor (K is hardly a confessor, though 
the medical officer's belief in him as the agent of salvation might suggest otherwise). 
The auditor, needless to say, provides the occasion for the narrative - or confession - 
but even more striking is the manner in which the narrative constructs and positions 
the auditor as necessarily weak, innocent, idiotic, angelic, that is to say, a complete 
contrast to the authoritative if tainted status of the confessant. Just as a narrative of 
innocence was the offshoot of the magistrate's attempted confession, K finds himself 
positioned as innocent and harmless by the medical officer. Indeed K's essential 
innocence is something of an article of faith for the medical officer, who is so 
convinced that K is incapable of revolutionary activity that he invents a story of low- 
level complicity to avoid further investigation. 45 
For all the comedy of the quest, however, the medical officer's is not simply a 
harmless fantasy. His ironic self-presentation as a policeman indicates the inherent 
aggression of the confessional encounter: 'taking me for a policeman, a plain-clothes 
policeman in overalls and tennis shoes carrying a bundle with a gun in it' or 'the man 
shouting at your back, the man in blue who must seem to be persecutor, madman, 
bloodhound, policeman' (162,167). 
Vill 
The initial response of the medical officer to K mirrors the response common among 
the numerous characters who encounter him: the certainty that he needs to be 
protected, rescued, even saved from the inhospitable world into which he was 
45 K's innocence and simplicity is an article of faith for many critics too, who find both his behaviour 
and his politics simple. 
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'helped' by the midwife of the opening line. He is the beneficiary of numerous acts of 
kindness on his travels; even the homeless people of Part Three take him under their 
wing (and also try to steal his seeds while he sleeps). However the problematic nature 
of some of these exchanges is captured perfectly in one meeting with a soldier who 
claims K's money as the spoils of war. In a bizarre and awkward gesture, prompted 
by the sobering presence of Anna K's ashes but justified because K works for the 
ambulance (according to his hat), he returns ten rand to K: "'Just a minute. Just a 
minute ... Buy yourself an ice-cream"' (38). Such is the force of K's vulnerability 
that he is simultaneously a victim of theft and an object of charity. 
K is called an idiot no fewer than ten times in the course of the novel - by a 
clerk in Cape Town and the medical officer, among others -a reference no doubt to 
Dostoevsky's Myshkin (the medical officer also calls him a mouse). But when faced 
with the patronising and threatening presence of the Visagie's soldier-grandson on the 
farm, K himself reads Visagie's intentions in a similar language: 
He thinks I am truly an idiot, thought K. He thinks I am an idiot who sleeps on the 
floor like an animal and lives on birds and lizards and does not know there is such a 
thing as money. He looks at the badge on my beret and asks himself what child gave 
it to me out of what lucky packet. (62) 
Here we find K's resistance to Visagie's attempt to turn him into a servant and to the 
tag of idiot. Yet because K's thoughts echo those who call him an idiot and refer to 
the ambulance badge that attracted the soldier's attention, we also have a sense of the 
novel beginning to turn in upon itself. 
The degree to which K can be understood in terms of 'simplicity, is more or 
less the degree to which we accept the impressions of him communicated by his 
interlocutors in the novel: the clerk, Visagie, the soldier, but also the children who 
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stare at his mouth, Robert who claims that he is the focus of charity at the camp 
because he is harmless, the medical officer remarking on his impeded speech. In other 
words, K's simplicity is identified with his apparent exclusion from language, which 
critics struggle to reconcile with the narrative he inhabits. The logical impossibility of 
much of his narrative is exemplified in the description of his moments of reverie in 
the mountains, an unmediated relationship with the world according to Valdez 
Moses, yet a withdrawal from language possible only in the words of a novel. In 
another example the narrative continues while K sleeps, divorcing the anonymous 
narratorial consciousness from the focalizing consciousness of K. Most critics find 
that one can only approach K's paradoxical relation to language through the 
metafictional dimension of the novel. According to Valdez Moses: 'The 
acknowledgement of this ... logical contradiction, takes the form of a heightened self- 
consciousness of presentation and a deliberate disruption of conventional 
(unselfcritical) forms of narrative representation' (15 1). 
It seems to me that it is precisely at these moments when the text seems to 
repeat itself that the metafictional level of the novel is experienced most intensely. 
One becomes conscious that K is being spoken through by other voices, in the way, 
for example, that he echoes the politics of Robert from the camp or that he seems to 
echo Rousseau of the Reveries in his developing scepticism about charity. At other 
times, elements of the narrative seem to have a retrospectively predictive quality. in 
one clear example, K is enjoying the solitude of his time on the road to Prince Albert 
and speculates about the availability of 'forgotten comers and angles ... that belonged 
to no one yet. Perhaps if one flew high enough, he thought, one would be able to see' 
(47). This insight, that a perspective might be available from which one could find an 
unoccupied space, a comer of freedom, is immediately followed by a description of 
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two aircraft in the sky. This of course only points to the way in which one thought or 
idea might inform another, but their inversion attempts to interrupt the logic of the 
explanation. Later, the medical officer's narrative appears to echo and foreshadow 
elements in Parts One and Three of the novel (for example the farcical chase ends 
where we rejoin K in the subsequent section of the novel) - all of which 
problematizes our acceptance of K's narrative as loosely realistic and a sustained 
example of free indirect style. 
K's repeated assertion of his incompetence as a storyteller/narrator further 
intensifies our sense of the distance separating him from the narrative which he 
inhabits. There is a sharp contrast between the smooth pacing of the narrative voice in 
the novel and the hesitancy which marks K's direct speech, particularly his attempts 
to recount his own story. In instances in which he feels compelled to share his story 
(with the family that give him shelter for a night, the group at the camp, the homeless 
people at the end of the novel) its staccato 'then I ... then I... ' is in sharp contrast to 
the version of events we have read in the novel, a contrast K is intensely aware of 
After attempting to tell his story to December and his friends it strikes him that his 
story is 'paltry, not worth the telling, full of the same old gaps that he would never 
learn how to bridge' (176). His comment that 'His memories all seemed to be of 
parts, not of wholes' indicates that he views his life and the events that have befallen 
him as a series of discrete elements that can only be brought together when viewed 
from a particular perspective - from the air, say, or from the point of view of 
someone schooled in storytelling, which he is not. The truth about himself, as he sees 
it at the end of the novel is that: 'I have been a gardener, first for the Council, later for 
myself, and gardeners spend their time with their noses to the ground' (181). It is a 
version of his life not likely to arouse much interest or sympathy, but this is as he 
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wishes it: 'I was mute and stupid in the beginning, I will be mute and stupid at the 
end. There is nothing to be ashamed of in being simple' (182). What K desires from a 
story, therefore, is a narrative that is powerless to change the course of events and 
utterly without affect, that is to say, a narrative with no ascertainable value 
whatsoever. Valdez Moses describes this in Girardian terms as K's lack of desire for 
recognition but the medical officer comes even closer: 'Your stay in the camp was 
merely an allegory, if you know that word. It was an allegory - speaking at the 
highest level - of how scandalously, how outrageously a meaning can take up 
residence in a system without becoming a term in it' (166). 
K's thoughts on storytelling contrast dramatically with the swiftly-paced 
narrative that brings together his 'life' and 'times' so effortlessly. The opening pages 
account for the events of K's life as the result of his cleft palate: 'Because of his 
disfigurement' and 'Because of his face K did not have women friends' (4). Almost 
every paragraph is governed by a temporal marker that leaves no room for hesitancy 
or doubt in the story it tells: 'Year after year'; 'late one morning'; 'for months'; 'for 
eight years' (4-6). This paves the way for the seamless link between K's life and the 
violent times in which he lives: 'Then late one afternoon in the last week of June a 
military jeep travelling down Beach Road at high speed struck a youth crossing the 
road, hurling him back among the vehicles parked at the curbside' (11). The narrative 
clearly functions by way of a perspective on time and causal relations that does not 
apply to K himself. The uniform chronology he imposes on the events of his life (then 
I... then I) provides no logical connection between them. 
K's experience of time seems to be one of living intensely in the present, 
unable to form anything but the most cursory connections with events in the past and 
capable of imagining the future as either an uninterrupted continuation of the present 
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or a totally unknowable and unpredictable entity. 'Now' becomes a particularly 
loaded word for K, bearing the pressure of action required in any given moment: 
'Now was the time' and 'Now, he thought ... now is my last chance: now' (18 & 
110). 'Now' also lends a retrospective teleology to events that carried no real sense of 
intention at the time: 'Now I am here, he thought. Finally. '; 'Now it is completed, he 
said to himself'; 'Now I am back, he thought. '(50,113,18 1) 
The intense experience of the present can be a source of anxiety for K: Anna 
K's ashes come to circulate as a very powerful signifier on K's trip to Prince Alfred 
but perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the cremation is K's vision of his mother 
being consumed by flames 'all the time' when he receives the ashes at the hospital 
(32). But the meeting of the continuous and the unpredictable in K's experience of 
time is not usually so traumatic. Marvelling at the prized water pump on the farm, K 
remarks that: 'Every time he released the brake and the wheel spun and water came, it 
seemed to him a miracle' (60). It seems paradoxical that a repeated and ostensibly 
predictable event like the functioning of a mechanical water pump could attain the 
status of miracle, but such is K's susceptibility to present and future events that past 
form does not have the power to condition his expectations. In an essay on Kafka 
Coetzee confronts a similar temporal problem in 'The Burrow': the difficulty of 
reconciling the apparently iterative aspect of the narrative with the unforeseeable 
nature of the actions that recur. Kafka's creature is in a heightened state of anxiety as 
he is repeatedly 'at the mercy of forces he cannot control or predict' (Doubling 212). 
K's attitude to the future is characterised more by openness than anxiety, however. 
Attridge finds in K's temporal experience: '... a kind of openness to the future ... a 
kind of trust in events that has no relation to the calculations by which most of us 
live' (57). Indeed, in its combination of mechanical repeatability and unpredictable 
129 
miracle, at least as presented in K's narrative, the water pump takes on some of the 
qualities of Derrida's 'machine-event' (Timited Ink T). 
While K shows himself to be open to future events, he has no desire to make a 
strong impact on the future - to have children, to leave a legacy or any other trace of 
his existence. His attitude to the future is also not conditioned by any pre-existing 
moral beliefs. In response to one of his kinder benefactors, who indicates that he 
believes in helping people, K is puzzled: 
Do I believe in helping people? he wondered. He might help people, he n-dght not 
help them, he did not know beforehand, anything was possible. He did not seem to 
have a belief, or did not seem to have a belief regarding help. Perhaps I am the stony 
ground, he thought. (48) 
x 
Mike Marais finds in K's numerous encounters a 'labour of negation' and holds that 
they are above all examples of 'contact with a character who allempts to assert 
himself by negating K's alterity' (107). He holds that the encounters are 'identical 
and thus interchangeable. ' In this reading the recurring motif of the encounter is 
deployed uniformly by Coetzee to emphasise, by sheer excess of example, the self- 
interestedness and violence implicit in the entry into social relations. But Marais must 
omit many of the details specific to each encounter in order to determine their 
position and value within the novel only on the basis of the perceived outcome of 
negation, albeit a powerful idea and in some cases a valid observation. The 
equivalence that Marais creates between many different elements in the encounters 
allows him to conflate, among other things, interrogation, incarceration, theft, charity, 
altruism, kindness and need. He finds in K an alternative to this 'labour of negation' 
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insofar as he is increasingly 'a consciousness that is divested of a controlling 
subjectivity, ' although this is reflected in his relationship with things rather than with 
people (107). In Marais's reading, K's withdrawal from the conscious world is 
enacted through his exclusion from the field of language, a strategy which is 
foregrounded by Coetzee in the metafictional framing provided by the medical 
officer's diary. But this too ignores those instances where even a character as weak 
and marginal as K has something to offer: care for his mother, protection to the 
children at the camp, carrying a bag for the young mother in the closing pages when 
K himself barely has the strength to walk. And the novel closes with K's fantasy of 
acting as benefactor to an anonymous old man, repeating again the miracle of 
bringing water from the spring at the farm. 
The narratives of the magistrate and the medical officer are also defined by 
the fantasy of acting as benefactor - to the girl and K respectively. But as I have 
shown, these fantasies are informed by a desire for a fixed meaning that would 
facilitate their moral transformation, guaranteeing their place in the future. 
Barbarians and Michael K renounce such certainties in favour of the principles of 
indeterminacy and contingency. I argued that the ethical subject in Barbarians is 
produced not by transformation - transformation is simply not available in either 
novel - but by reiteration, a possibility that emerges from the varied outcomes of the 
encounters described in the novel. This can also be found in Parts One and Three of 
Michael K where the protagonist's experience of time and the narrative in which it is 
described renounces the time of transformation in favour of a radical openness to the 
future and to the encounters it might bring. 
K is the victim of many utterly unsympathetic characters throughout the 
novel: the soldier who steals his money, the muggers, the policeman who searches his 
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belongings, the clerks and the guards at the medical officer's camp all distinguish 
themselves by their contemptuous treatment of him. But this does not determine all of 
the encounters in the novel. While waiting for news of his mother outside the hospital 
in Stellenbosch K accepts money from an old man to buy them both food: 'He sat 
beside his friend on the bench and ate. The pie was so delicious that tears came to his 
eyes. The man told him of his sister's uncontrollable fits of shaking. K listened to the 
birds in the trees and tried to remember when he had known such happiness' (30). 
The encounter is a foreshadowing of the 'bliss' K would experience eating the 
pumpkin he had grown himself, but it is rooted in an encounter with another that is 
not obviously founded on subjection or negation. At the start of his journey with his 
mother they encounter three young girls who accompany them for part of the trip, one 
of them walking along holding Anna K's hand. She gives them each a coin from her 
purse before they part (26). It is followed immediately by a fanner's convoy from 
which the children in the trucks point at K and his mother, making comments they 
cannot hear. These are minor episodes but they demonstrate in equal measure the 
kindness and the cruelty with which K and his mother were met. 
Elsewhere K is drawn, if somewhat reluctantly, into a form of narrative 
exchange. In his interactions with the man who invites K into his home, with Robert's 
group at the camp, and with December and his companions K senses in the encounter 
that his turn has come to speak. In the encounter with the family the urge to speak and 
frustration at not being able to are quite strongly felt: 'At the table the urge again 
came over him to speak. He gripped the edge of the table and sat stiffly upright. His 
heart was full, he wanted to utter his thanks, but finally the right words would not 
come. The children stared at him; a silent,. e fell; their parents looked away' (48). If K 
finally feels inadequate to the task, it is because he cannot create a coherent whole 
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from the various elements that could be incorporated into a story of his life. Aware of 
his limitations as a storyteller, he nevertheless understands the power of certain 
elements of his story: 'Now I must speak about the ashes, thought K, so as to be 
complete, so as to have told the whole story' (79). 
In one early example, K's instinct to reciprocate the generosity of a man who 
gives him a lift is unnecessary: 'But the old man did not need help, nor was he in the 
mood for talk' (35). After his encounter with the prostitute K feels all narrative 
powers leave him: 'When it was over he felt that for the sake of both of them he 
ought to say something; but now all words had begun to escape him' (179). The 
prostitute's willing embrace - particularly of his deformed mouth - brings about this 
intensification of K's natural disinclination towards storytelling. In most of these 
examples we see that K experiences the desire for reciprocation but not as a necessity. 
For better and worse, Coetzee preserves the distinctiveness of each encounter: both 
the nature of the interlocutor, the circumstances of the encounter and K's response, 
which is conditioned by his experience of the present rather than informed by a 
particular teleology. 
xi 
I have described the medical officer as a parody of the magistrate of Barbarians -a 
form of repetition - and his narrative is itself marked by repetitions, a series of 
situations contrived to facilitate his address to K. Michael K ends more or less where 
it begins: K imagining a journey where he would act as saviour. I have already 
suggested that this fantasy repeats K's sense of wonder at the repeated miracle of the 
water pump. But the story of K does not, at this point, seem destined for a happy or 
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redemptive ending and one wonders if the repeated journey might not end like the 
first one: in death. The power of the novel to get behind itself, to undermine any 
reading we might impose on it - redemptive or pessimistic - means that it truly is the 
enemy of analysis (Ruttenburg 749). In many ways this effect is achieved through 
repetition -a turning back upon itself that reflects the representational impasse of 
Ruttenburg rather than the charge of evasion levelled at the novel by many critics. If 
we can also understand repetition to preserve the element of contingency in every 
encounter - and fiction uniquely placed to stage this - then the possibility for ethical 
action is also preserved. Repetition in this sense poses a challenge to the teleology of 
moral progress and desire for transformation that in many ways determines the 
actions of the magistrate and the medical officer. When the ethical subject does 
emerge, it seems to be a result of a collapsing or flattening of chronology which 
denies the economy of exchange the ability to signify as exchange. 
Barbarians and Michael K are therefore determined by the teleology of 
confession that will drive 'Double Thoughts' but also pose a serious challenge to this 
teleology. I am attempting to describe Coetzee's engagement with confession as 
characterised by discontinuity, as a result of the apparent incapacity of confession to 
allow the confessing subject to proceed through the teleology described in the essay, 
that is, to allow confession to deliver absolution or cynicism to lead to grace. By 
describing the way in which the economic model of confession is undone by 
collapsing chronological time, I am in effect describing a kind of discontinuity - the 
occurrence of different events that cannot be described as conditioning one another. 
And yet, it seems clear to me that neither am I describing events that occur in utter 
isolation. What must be described as a discontinuity in philosophical and critical 
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'A private matter ... till It is given to the world': Confession as a Figure for 
Authorship in Foe and The Master ofPetersburg 
"All novelists are dangerous modelsfor other novelists, 
but Dostoevsky ... is especially dangerous. " 
-- T S. Eliot 
I 
Coetzee's Nobel lecture, a story called 'He and His Man, ' addresses the relationship 
of the writer to his art. 'He' is Robinson Crusoe who after a lifetime of adventure has 
settled in Bristol to write stories, a process which 'he' describes, or figures, as 
receiving witness reports from 'his man' - not his 'man Friday' but one whose 
particularity varies according to the circumstances he describes. For the reader these 
46 stories and circumstances are familiar from the works of Daniel Defoe, but to 
Robinson they are all figures for different aspects of his time as a castaway on the 
island. 
Like Nobel Laureates before him, Coetzee used this auspicious occasion to 
examine the practice of writing. In this regard, the problem staged within 'He and His 
Man' and the critical challenge it presents - how to articulate the relationship 
46 See AttTidge (196). 
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between author and creation - is continuous with Coetzee's oeuvre rather than a 
commentary on it. His point in the Nobel lecture seems to be that the relationship 
between author and creation - and the process that connects them - can only be 
approached figuratively and is consequently subject to the possibilities and 
limitations of figurative language, best approached through literary rather than critical 
discourse. This emphasis on figuration is exemplified in the closing image which 'he' 
describes as a likeness for he-and-his-man: 
... they are deckhands toiling in the rigging, the one on a ship sailing west, the other 
on a ship sailing east. Their ships pass close, close enough to hail. But the seas are 
rough, the weather is stormy: their eyes lashed by the spray, their hands burned by 
the cordage, they pass each other by, too busy even to wave. 
The image exploits the idea of a shared spatial and temporal framework but it is 
underpinned by a lack of awareness of the other so fundamental that it might be 
understood as an essential incapacity or even unwillingness of one to acknowledge 
the presence of the other, or at least a sense that they are, in this seemingly opportune 
moment, at cross purposes. That is to say, their interests are potentially at odds with 
one another and are not served by acknowledging one another. As such, it. is highly 
suggestive of the bond that exists between author and creation, or as Attridge sees it, 
between author and the act of creation. He finds in the image: 'the haunting illusion 
... that there is an unbridgeable distance between the person who lives in the world 
and the person, or impersonal force, that produces the words' (200). But the image is 
also a figure for figuration itself -a process which allows radically different and 
often irreducible elements to be suspended in one frame, held in place, as the two 
ships are, by the imaginative force behind them. 
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There are many different ways of describing the relationship between writer 
and creation. The notion of the author came into being to categorise this relationship 
in legal and economic terms. Another figure which can, at least in theory, bridge the 
gap between private writing subject and creation is the metaphor of confession, which 
sees the work as the expression or projection of the writing subject (everything is a 
figure for Crusoe's time on the island). My focus here will be on the identification or 
conflation of these categories, by writers and readers. I will argue that Coetzee 
collapses the distinction between the private and public dimensions of authorship 
through his deployment of confession as a figure for the creative process in Foe and 
77ie Master of Petersburg. In both cases this involves a problematic identification of 
author and creation. In Foe, Susan Barton describes her relationship with the famous 
author Daniel Foe in terms of confession, she is the confessant who recounts her true 
experience to the confessor, who interrogates and disseminates her version of events. 
In Petersburg, literary works - produced by the historical Fyodor Dostoevsky, the 
character Dostoevsky and his son Pavel - are all in some sense identified with their 
respective creators such that authorship comes to seem like a transgression of the 
private in the interests of the public. Coctzee's work, therefore, resuscitates the 
author/writing subject as a topic for critical discussion thereby self-consciously 
opening himself to the risks that this might entail. 
One of Coetzee's key insights into confessional narrative in his non-fiction 
writings on the subject is its relentless self-intcrcstedncss. I have already cited one of 
his more extreme statements: 'The only sure truth in autobiography is that one's self- 
interest will be located at one's blind spot' (392). Time and again, it is suggested that 
the primary interest served by confessional narrative is narrative itself, and anything 
that serves writing is surely in the best interest of the writer. The confession of a 
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writer, therefore, serves the interests of authorship. But in the model of writer and 
creator that I outline above, the author is also a private writing subject facing other 
interests and demands. By adopting confession as a figure for authorship I hope to 
describe the competing interests of the author-characters in Foe and Petersburg. 
In 'Double Thoughts' Coetzee describes 'Stavrogin's confession' in Yhe 
Possessed as 'a game whose essence is that certain limits will not be transgressed, 
though the contestants will pretend to each other and to themselves that there are no 
limits. It is thus a game of deception and self-deception, a game of limited truth. 
Tikhon ends the game by breaking the rules' (289). 1 will demonstrate that in Foe, the 
author Susan Barton navigates the self-interestedness of authorship and confession by 
observing and manipulating the limits of confessional discourse. As 'the agent of 
other-directed ethics, ' Barton self-consciously stops short of transgressing certain 
limits in making her confession (Spivak, Critique 182). The limits in play in 
Petersburg, on the other hand, are the limits of private and public; to the extent that 
writing appears to transgress these limits it is interpreted as confessional and is itself 
the subject of confession. Indeed, confession and authorship acquire their greatest 
force in the manner in which the author-character risks transgressing certain limits. 
In terms of the discontinuity that I have been describing in Coetzee's 
engagement with confession generally, Barton's manipulation of the limits of 
confessional discourse in the first three sections of Foe prepares the ground for the 
shift of voice, tone and register in section IV. Naming its final chapter 'Stavrogin, ' 
Petersburg is the only Coetzee novel that explicitly engages the confessional 
framework that I outline in my introduction. The startling omission from the novel, 
however, is Tikhon. To pick up the Derridean terms that I draw on in chapter 1, the 
'event' that occurs in Petersburg is the event of writing rather than the event of 
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absolution or forgiveness, and it is no more reducible to calculation than the latter. 
Indeed, Petersburg suggests that the event is related to exceeding limits and 
conditions rather than working within them. Confession, on the risk-model proposed 
by Michel Leiris, acquires its greatest force in the context of this excess. But if 
Petersburg is a confession, it is without any trace of self-forgiveness. This might well 
be an invitation to the reader to act as confessor. 
11 
Beyond the extension into the public world that is publishing, the relationship 
between author and work has become difficult to approach unless within the strictly 
referential framework of literary biography. In spite of Coetzee's apparent academic 
sympathies with schools of thought that are inherently sceptical about the 
accessibility of the author (or writing subject) as a subject for critical analysis, his 
particular body of work - novels, essays, memoirs, interviews, reviews - consciously 
keeps in play, and in some cases presupposes, the lived experience of an author 
(though not necessarily J. M. Coetzee). 47 Ile is acutely aware of the value placed on 
authorship as a western cultural institution and, by extension, the currency available 
to the author by way of publishing and reputation. But he is also sensitive to the fact 
that writing, publishing and reputation are part of the writer's lived experience; to the 
extent that the writer's life affects and is affected by the institution of authorship, they 
are inextricably bound up one with the other. Nor does the writer's life begin when he 
or she enters the field of publishing; Coetzee's interest in autobiography and 
47 His reviews for the New York Review ofBooks are instructive in this regard: the provision and 
evaluation of biographical information is very much part of Coetzee's reviewing formula. This 
frequently necessitates the inclusion of published material beyond the scope of the particular review 
essay, such as biographies, diaries, letters, etc. 
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experiments with autobiography might be seen as an attempt to reconcile pre- and 
post-publication dimensions of the writer's life. 
The tendency in Coetzee's work to stage both the private and public 
dimensions of writing is most keenly felt in Foe and Petersburg where he reimagines 
the authorial practice of the historical Daniel Defoe and Fyodor Dostoevsky. Foe 
rewrites Defoe by collapsing the distinction between Robinson Crusoe and Roxana, 
author and character, history and fiction, to create a narrative that might represent an 
early stage in the creation of the well-known novels or such drastic alternatives that 
they would never be written. 48 In Petersburg Dostoevsky the author becomes a 
character in a novel that stages the act of creation of The Possessed, drawing detail 
from his works and biography, as well as Russian history. 49 
Both novels propose to restore a context, albeit fictional, to the creation of 
these familiar works of literature. Mike Marais says of Petersburg that it reminds us 
that the writer is 'ineluctably situated in history' (Teath and Response' 87). But what 
is in question in these novels is not just a recreation of the historical, political and 
cultural context in which they were written and which might be reconstructed by way 
of a particular kind of historical research but an imaginative projection of the 
material, emotional and physical conditions in which the person we know as the 
author wrote the works in question. Moreover, Coetzee has allowed these conditions 
to appear to implicate themselves, obliquely, into the artistic works that are produced 
by the respective author-protagonists within each novel, so that the relationship 
48 According to Spivak 'Defoe's Robinson Crusoe, which engenders Foe, does not exist' (Critique 
183). 
49 Petersburg engages many more works of Dostoevsky than The Possessed, but for ease of reference 
at this stage I will limit myself to the novel that seems to offer an over-arching structure to Coetzee. In 
addition, Patrick Hayes has demonstrated that Foe's structure owes something to Dostoevsky's Crime 
and Punishment, thus complicating any easy delimiting of intertextual reference. 
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between author and work, while certainly not one of identity, comes to seem more a 
question of likeness than one would previously have thought. 
Attwell's comment that in Foe Toetzee sheds a "preliterary" light on his 
protagonists in order to place the transformations of the "literary" in question' 
provides a very clear description of the project while also revealing its inherently 
paradoxical nature (107). Attwell is referring specifically to Coetzee's use of the 
historical names Cruso, Foe and Susan, but his comments hold true for the way in 
which Coetzee invents a biography for his author protagonists in order that it can be 
seen to be transformed into the work that is taking shape within the novel. Both 
novels imagine a biographical context only to complicate its relationship to the work 
of art: the emphasis is unquestionably on the process of transformation. But naming 
aside, the 'preliterary' in Foe and Petersburg is already transformed: it is fiction or at 
least fictionalised. Coetzee's is not the practice of the literary biographer but of the 
novelist; insofar as he is working back from existing literary works to imagine the 
circumstances of their coming into being, his act of creation might be seen as the 
fictional equivalent of reading autobiographically. What Coetzee reads back into 
these novels, however, is a view of the transformations of the artistic process as 
quantifiable in terms of loss, perversion and betrayal. Susan Barton, who for the 
greater part of Foe is determined that the story of her time as a castaway be narrated 
and published eventually resigns herself to a marginal position with regard to that 
story: 'But now all my life grows to be story and there is nothing of my own left to 
me. [... ] Nothing is left to me but doubt' (133). And Daniel Foe, the 'author' she has 
entrusted with reshaping and publishing her narrative, exploits her story and becomes 
a conspirator in her marginalisation. He describes himself as: "'An old whore who 
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should ply her trade only in the darle" (151). Friday's role in the novel also 
problematically underlines its reliance on the dynamics of absence or loss. 
In Petersburg the transformation of the writing process is figured in the 
darkest possible terms: 'Perversion: everything and everyone to be turned to another 
use, to be gripped to him and fall with him' (235). The artistic process emerges as a 
kind of transaction in these novels, where lived life is sold or exchanged or simply 
used to produce something of dubious value. It is a transaction governed by a 
principle of devaluation and loss. Indeed one is compelled to ask what model of 
authorship and creativity - and relationship between author and creation - allows it to 
be understood in such negative terms? Is it the case that any model of creativity that 
incorporates the private dimension of authorship - the lived life of the writer, the 
confessional model - becomes a model of devaluation by that very inclusion? 
III 
The debate on authorship is still conducted within the terms of two influential essays: 
Roland Barthes' 'The Death of the Author' (1968) and Michel Foucault's 'What is an 
Author? ' (1969). Both essays historicize the category of author, locating its 
emergence in a post-enlightenment western tradition with increasing emphasis on 
individual responsibility and private property. This 'positivism, the epitome and 
culmination of capitalist ideology' is one dimension of Barthes' rejection of the 
concept (143). His essay famously announces the disappearance of the author from 
the text, offering a critique of the temporality whereby the author is considered to 
precede a work: 'The Author, when believed in, is always conceived of as the past of 
his own book: book and author stand automatically on a single line divided into a 
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before and an after. The Author is thought to nourish the book, which is to say that he 
exists before it, thinks, suffers, lives for it, is in the same relation of antecedence to 
his work as a father to his child' (145). Foucault comments that the concept of the 
author is: 'a privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas, 
knowledge, and literature' (115). Rather than do away with this valuable analytical 
category he redefines the public extension of the writer as a function of discourse: 
'the function of an author is to characterize the existence, circulation, and operation 
of certain discourses within a society' (124). This allows him to discuss the cultural 
history of authorship while closing off its reliance on a private writing subject (the 
referential subject of autobiography, for example): 'Writing unfolds like a game that 
inevitably moves beyond its own rules and finally leaves them behind. [ ... ] it is 
primarily concerned with creating an opening where the writing subject endlessly 
disappears' (116). The respective interventions of Barthes and Foucault have effected 
a division between the public role of the author - the author function - and the private 
writing subject. 
The public and private dimensions of authorship are kept in play in Coetzee's 
writing on the subject, even if this is, finally, with the aim of collapsing the 
distinctions between them. His most extended meditation on the topic is in Giving 
Offense, his 1996 book on censorship. It is, on the face of it, a surprising volume 
insofar as it explores the way in which an essentially public institution, which 
presumes to regulate the circulation and dissemination of a writer's work, insinuates 
itself into the private life of the writer. To this extent, as its analysis moves between 
the public and private spheres it is simultaneously premised on the collapse of the 
distinctions between them. In an early chapter outlining the terms of the argument, 
one can delineate two strands to the analysis that roughly correspond to the private 
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and public dimensions of authorship. In the first instance, he discusses censorship as 
a pathogenic invader into the scene of writing, inserting itself boldly between the 
writer and his work. This is an intrusion into the writer's unconscious, the delicate 
and intimate world of writing which Coetzee describes thus: 'It is also a very private 
activity, so private that it almost constitutes the definition of privacy: how I am with 
myself' (38). But in the following pages he goes on to discuss the emergence of 
authorship as a profession: 'The notion that, by dint of writing, a person could aspire 
to and attain fame' (41). He by and large concurs with Foucault on the importance of 
censorship in formalizing and legalizing the role of author but he also presses this 
public dimension of authorship much further than Foucault, to embrace the 
'mystique' of the author and the desire for 'fame and immortality' opened up by the 
invention of printing: 
A book can be seen as a vehicle used by an author to project his signature - and indeed sometimes his portrait - into the world, in a multiplied form. It is this 
potentially endless multiplication of traces of himself that gives to the author in the 
early modem age intimations of a power to cross all spatial and temporal boundaries. 
(41) 
So authorship is not merely 'the definition of privacy' but the willingness and 
compulsion to sacrifice it in the sphere of publishing. In this account, the author's 
capacity to create is as reliant on the public domain as on the private. The reward for 
these acts of self-projection and self-sacrifice is the cultural capital and mystique that 
attaches to the role of author, a power that has immense potential in the context of 
state-sponsored censorship but about which Coetzee is also highly ambivalent. 
An incident in Russian literary history provides Coetzee with a term for the 
kind of currency unique to the artist: mastery. The incident referred to involves 
Stalin's attempts to ascertain the threat posed by poet Osip Mandelstam, leading him 
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to ask Boris Pasternak if Mandelstam was in fact 'a master. ' For Coetzee the power 
of the writer exceeds the author function described by Foucault; it is a power which is 
not limited to publishing and being read: 'the word of the master author has a 
disseminative power that goes beyond purely mechanical means of dissemination' 
(43). The idea of mastery is perhaps, in its twentieth and twenty-first century guise, 
the role of the public intellectual. But the 'fame and immortality' sought and attained 
by the master author is not, in the end, restricted to his or her reputation as a writer 
(though it is a result of it), but attaches itself to all aspects of lived experience. 
The essays in Giving Offense leave one in no doubt that censorship, even as it 
is designed to police boundaries, does not observe the boundaries of private and 
public life and indeed the essays frequently highlight the permeability of this 
boundary. To the extent that censorship could be said to police authorship, it does so 
with no respect for the supposedly distinct fields of author function and private 
writing subject. If McDonald's research on South African censorship demonstrates 
that Coetzee's readers on the censorship committees were more sympathetic than he 
imagined, Giving Offense records the imaginative experience of the writer under 
censorship. The inherent instability in the division of authorship into a private and 
public dimension animates Coetzee's treatment of authorship in Foe and especially in 
Petersburg where we feel the full force of the confrontation between 'the definition 
of privacy' and the power of mastery and the sacrifice of one for the other. 
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IV 
As I point out in chapter 1, Coetzee's critique of Rousseau is more or less a critique 
of the notion of sincerity and the self-interest that it masks. Coetzee's use of 
confessional narrative is therefore never far removed from questions of self-interest, 
particularly the self-interestedness that comes with the desire to be an author. If we 
approach the problem of authorship in this context, one can see that the interests of 
the private writing subject for whom writing is the 'definition of privacy' are not 
necessarily compatible with the desire for 'fame and immortality' that marks the 
desire to accede to the world of publishing, and that neither set of interests is 
compatible with the lived experience of the writing subject and the world he or she 
inhabits and his or her motivation to give an account of it. But if a certain principle of 
loss or failure seems to be built in to Coetzee's relentless scepticism about the self- 
interestedness of confession, as I point out in earlier chapters, his body of work bears 
out the fact that he has not entirely abandoned confession as an idea, that is, the idea 
of telling the truth about oneself. If 'the idea of the truth' serves as the model 
confession within the Coetzee oeuvre, than it is relentlessly challenged by competing 
interests. 
Coetzee's author protagonists in Foe and Petersburg, Susan Barton, Daniel 
Foe and Dostoevsky, all write on the basis that there is something to be gained from 
the enterprise. For Barton it is initially the fame of authorship, for the more 
established Foe and Dostoevsky it is at least a settling of the debts that find them 
evading bailiffs and creditors for the duration of both novels. Barton clings doggedly 
to the notion that her narrative must be true to her 'substantial' experience and Foe 
seeks out stories of adventure and criminality as the raw material for his narratives. 
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Dostoevsky too conceives of his own life as currency that he must spend in order to 
write: 
In fact, it is not so much a life as a price or a currency. It is something I pay with in 
order to write. [ ... ] Nevertheless, Ipay too I pay and I sell: that is my life. Sell my life, sell 
the lives of those around me. Sell everyone. [ ... ] A life without honour; treachery without limit; confession without end. (222) 
Dostoesvky's comments suggest that there are material benefits to be gained from 
writing but also that the creative acts with which the novel concludes yield work of 
artistic merit and value or that some form of equivalence if not added-value governs 
the transformation of life into art. What is truly chilling about Petersburg, however, is 
that Dostoevsky does not write with any such certainty nor does the novel offer one. 
Similarly, while Daniel Foe might have eventually benefited from the publication of a 
castaway narrative, it is at the expense of Barton's 'substantial experience' and her 
authorial ambitions. 
Earlier in Petersburg, after reading a story written by his stepson as a thinly- 
veiled sketch of the boy's unhappy childhood, Dostoevsky longs to give him some 
writerly wisdom about the relationship between life and art. He describes the 
economy of the writing process: 'We do not write out of plenty, he wants to say - we 
write out of anguish, out of lack' (152). In an interview in Doubling the Point 
Coetzee (speaking of Kafka) is critical of the idea that 'art becomes the alienated 
artist's private means, his private vice even, for turning lack and woe into gain' (203). 
While I do not wish to conflate Coetzee's comment in an interview with an 
observation from one of his characters, there is some consistency about the idea that 
while art might well emerge from a position of lack or marginality, it does not 
necessarily translate into gain. 
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In Foe, the self-interestedness of the creative process is staged through the 
deployment of confession as a figure for accession to authorship. Barton conceives of 
herself as a confessant and sees confession as ultimately instrumental, but when faced 
with the betrayal of her interests by Foe, she confesses just enough to protect the 
interests of Friday, becoming, in Spivak's term, 'the agent of other-directed ethics' 
(Critique 182). Petersburg is equally preoccupied with concerns about the self- 
interestedness of confession and authorship but I will argue that it attempts to 
overcome self-interest by staging the artistic process in terms of gambling and risk. 
This, in a general sense, is informed by the 'unproductive expenditure' of Georges 
Bataille's critique of the principles of classical utility. Gambling, in his view, is an 
example of 'unproductive expenditure, ' a type of activity where 'in each case the 
accent is placed on a loss that must be as great as possible in order for that activity to 
take on its true meaning' (118). This is echoed in Dostoevsky comments about his 
recklessness in Petersburg: 
Of course they are something to be ashamed of, these reckless bouts of his. Of 
course, when he comes home stripped bare and confesses to his wife and bows his 
head and endures her reproaches and vows he will never lapse again, he is sincere. 
But at the bottom of his heart, beneath the sincerity, where only God can see, he 
knows he is right and she is wrong. Money is there to be spent, and what form of 
spending is purer than gambling? (15 9) 
Artistic production is similar to gambling in that it too is an example of 'unproductive 
expenditure. ' Bataille goes so far as to say that artistic production 'can be considered 
synonymous with expenditure; it in fact signifies, in the most precise way, creation 
by means of loss. Its meaning is therefore close to that of sacrifice' (120). In the 
material sense that the economic terms can render quite vividly Bataille comments 
that while artistic production is a form of symbolic expenditure, 'poetic expenditure 
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ceases to be symbolic in its consequences' (120). While creativity in this view is a 
form of symbolic expenditure, as an aspect of lived experience it has real 
consequences. Bataille runs the risk of privileging the romantic conception of the 
artist as hero and fetishizing loss as the guarantee of artistic authenticity. But loss is 
no more the certain outcome of artistic production than gain. Rather, as Michel Leiris 
points out, it is the risk of loss that gives weight to artistic production. I will show 
how Petersburg embraces the risk of loss in its engagement with the myth of 
Orpheus, its staging of the creative process as the transformation of life into art and 
its implicit invitation to be read autobiographically. While section IV of Foe might be 
seen as a further betrayal of Barton's interests by Coetzee, I will suggest that the idea 
of artistic production as risk allows us instead to set aside the calculations of rational 
self-interest in our reading of the ending of the novel. 
V 
The attractiveness of autobiographical narrative to readers is not just fuelled and 
satisfied by autobiographical texts, but by texts that use autobiography as a conceit. 
In 'A Fiction of the Truth' Coetzee expands on his understanding of Defoe's realism 
as 'fake autobiography, ' describing it as a kind of fiction that exploits the 
'autobiographical pact' that exists between writers and readers of autobiography, that 
is, 'the assumption on its readers' part that it adheres to certain standards of 
truthfulness. ' It is notable that Defoe's realism is not just described in terms of 
creating a positive balance of credibility in the mind of the reader, but of exploiting 
the reader's conviction that the story he or she reads is verifiably true. Coetzee refers 
to it as forgery or ventriloquism while Ian Watt, in his influential study Yhe Rise of 
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the Novel, describes Defoe as 'a great, a truly great liar' (93). This is realism 
conceived as deception. 
In his introduction to the Oxford World's Classics edition of Robinson Crusoe 
Coetzee ponders this deception, wondering why the writer, presumably the person we 
call Daniel Defoe, insists on maintaining the charade that Robinson Crusoe is a living 
person. It is not only, he concludes, because 'Crusoe is Everyman, and every man is 
an island' - in other words, that the story is emblematic - but because there is a 
confessional dimension to the identification: in describing the solitude of the writing- 
life in London the returned castaway seems to 'merge' with Daniel Defoe, 'from 
whose head he was born' (vi). The tendency to identify author with creation is an 
extension of this merging of Crusoe and Defoe which Coetzee fictionalises in 'He 
and His Man, ' as the works of Daniel Defoe appear to issue from the pen of Robinson 
Crusoe. Indeed Coetzee introduced the story at the Stockholm ceremony by recalling 
his confusion as a child about the precise nature of the relationship between the man 
called Daniel Defoe and the man called Robinson Crusoe, playfully re-enacting the 
confusion when giving the title of the story: 'I cannot remember which comes first, 
he or his man. '50 
The young Coetzee's confusion about the relevance of Daniel Defoe to a story 
that was patently that of Robinson Crusoe points to the success of Defoe's particular 
brand of realism. In his introduction to Robinson Crusoe, Coetzee calls Defoe 'an 
impersonator, a ventriloquist, even a forger... ' (vii): 
The kind of 'novel' he is writing (he did not of course use the tenn) is a more or less 
literal in-Litation of the kind of recital his hero or heroine would have given had he or 
50 His opening remarks are not published with the text of the Nobel lecture but can be viewed as part of 
the lecture on the Nobel Prize website: 
<http: //nobelprize. org/nobel_prizes/literaturellaureates/2003/coetzee-lecture. html> 
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she really existed. It is fake autobiography heavily influenced by the genres of the 
deathbed confession and the spiritual autobiography. (viii) 
Defoe's consistent flirtation with the 'autobiographical pact' in his fiction has 
not so much devalued the autobiographical pact as emphasised the potential for new 
pacts to develop between readers and writers of fiction and autobiography. As 
Coetzee points out, only children are puzzled by the relationship between Defoe and 
Crusoe, not yet familiar enough with the conventions of one genre (fiction) to be 
blind to the conventions of another (autobiography -a kind of history). In 'Truth in 
Autobiography' Coetzee comments that a certain degree of blindness is in the 
interests of the continuing viability of autobiographical discourse: blindness to the 
limitations of the genre and blindness to the existence of the pact. But his point is 
more far-reaching than this, incorporating literary and critical discourse as well as 
autobiography: 'All forms of discourse may have secrets, of no great profundity, 
which they nevertheless, cannot afford to unveil' (6). If the deckhands described in 
'He and His Man' do not acknowledge one another, it may be because they cannot 
afford to. 
Coetzee's use of the term 'autobiographical pact' implicitly invokes the work 
of life-writing theorist Philippe Lejeune. In 'The Autobiographical Pact' Lejeune 
begins his discussion of autobiographical narrative with a definition: 'Retrospective 
prose narrative written by a real person concerning his own existence, where the 
focus is his individual life, in particular the story of his personality' (4). As the essay 
develops, so does the reach of his definition, to the extent that he eventually insists on 
the identity of author and protagonist as verified by the reader via the author's proper 
name as essential to autobiography: 'Autobiography does not include degrees: it is all 
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or nothing' (13). 51 'Double Thoughts' is notable for its testing of various limits and 
conditions in which successful confession can take place, but for Lejeune the limits 
that he outlines with regard to autobiography seem to be binding. 
The usefulness of Lejeune's definition lies in its ability to illuminate 
Coetzee's loss-model of creativity. In its vehemence, Lejeune's definition provides an 
extreme example of a model of autobiographical writing based on the absolute 
identity of author and work that sets a standard by which we can begin to discuss the 
artistic process in terms of transformation, loss and perversion. In a later, somewhat 
more conciliatory essay, Lejeune admits that his strict adherence to the necessary 
identity of author and protagonist in autobiography emerged from his conflation of 
autobiography and confession: 'I have always reasoned as if the center of the 
autobiographical domain was the confession. I have evaluated the whole thing by 
imposing upon it the rules of functioning of one of its parts: confessions must be 
signed for them to have any value; there can be no compromise with the truth' ('The 
Autobiographical Pact (bis)' 125). This model of autobiography and confession - 
grounded in a literal apprehension of the relationship between author and work - 
implicitly devalues writing that does not meet its rigorous and essentially referential 
standards of truth-telling. Lejeune admits that his need to define autobiography in 
such rigorous terms arose from an anxiety about its deployment in more dilute forms: 
'My entire analysis was part of an obvious fact: 'How to distinguish autobiography 
from the autobiographical novel? ' (127) 52 However, the confessional model continues 
to dog autobiographical and literary discourse as the standard of truth-telling to which 
" Coetzee never mentions Lejeune but touches on the idea of the autobiographical pact in 'A Fiction 
of the Truth' and the pact between author and reader more generally in 'Truth in Autobiography. ' It is 
also the subject of discussion in a recent interview with David Attwell ('All Autobiography' 214-15). 
52 My purpose is not to adopt Lejeune's model of the autobiographical novel but to illustrate the 
extreme referential standards that apply to autobiography and confession. 
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one might aspire and as a result autobiographical and literary discourse continue to 
fall short of this standard. In other words, loss (or failure) ineluctably follows 
confession. 
Lejeune's attempts to define and theorise the field of autobiography have been 
the subject of rigorous critique, most notably within the field of American 
deconstruction in which Paul de Man spear-headed the attack on the capacity of 
autobiographical discourse to reveal reliable self-knowledge: 'it does not' 
('Autobiography as DeFacement' 173). De Man's critique of Lejeune singles out his 
reliance on the judgement of the reader to verify the status of autobiography: 'From 
specular figure of the author, the reader becomes the judge, the policing power in 
charge of verifying the authenticity of the signature and the consistency of the 
signer's behaviour, the extent to which he respects or fails to honour the contractual 
agreement he has signed' (174). In terms invited by Lejeune's analysis of his own 
argument, his reliance on the reader to verify the existence of an autobiographical 
pact turns the reader into a confessor, charged with verifying the authenticity and 
truthfulness of autobiographical writing. For this reason the confessor figures that we 
find in Foe and Petersburg, Foe and the detective Maximov, are both described as 
predators, spiders who have lured their victims into a web of self-accusation and 
deceit. Those who confess therefore run the risk of having their confession received 
in this unsympathetic manner. But the confessor figure is significant in Coetzee's 
writing on confession as more than a policeman or judge; in 'Double Thoughts' it is 
the holy monk Tikhon, notably absent from Petersburg, who allows Stavrogin's 
confession to come to an end by offering a generous interpretation of his actions that 
introduces the possibility of absolution and grace. So while the inherently relational 
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activity of confession would appear to rely on the presence of a confessor, this is not 
necessarily the policeman or the judge of Lejeune's pact. 
V 
Foe begins with Susan Barton's account of her time on Cruso's island and here and in 
her initial interactions with Foe we have a sense of the plenitude of her story, a 
narrative which she feels empowered to recount: 'Do you think of me, Mr Foe, as 
Mrs Cruso or as a bold adventuress? Think what you may, it was I who shared 
Cruso's bed and closed Cruso's eyes, as it is I who have disposal of all that Cruso 
leaves behind, which is the story of his island' (45). Section Il takes the form of 
letters to Foe and, when it eventually becomes clear that the letters are not reaching 
their addressee, diary entries giving an account of the material difficulties facing 
Barton and Friday, who she sees as her charge. It documents an erosion of Barton's 
confidence in her narrative and in her ability to relay it, even if the imperative to do 
so seems ever more urgent. Section III is an encounter between Barton and Foe in 
which they discuss the fate of Friday, Barton's narrative, and her long-lost daughter. 
In effect, it marks Foe's attempt to sideline Barton's castaway story in favour of other 
narrative options - Friday's story or the story of Barton's daughter. The authority 
which she claimed over the story in the early stages is now subject to doubt; looking 
back from the later stages of the novel she remarks to Foe: 'I presented myself to you 
in words I knew to be my own -I slipped overboard, I began to swim, my hair 
floated about me, and so forth, you will remember the words - and for a long time 
afterwards, when I was writing those letters that were never read by you, and were 
later not sent, and at last not even written down, I continued to trust in my own 
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authorship' (133). Section IV represents a complete break with the logic of the novel 
up to this point as an unnamed narrator assumes control of the narrative, casting 
Barton's story aside in favour of that of Friday. 
The reader of Foe is thus faced with a series of overlapping but discontinuous 
narratives in which competing stories attempt to assert themselves: on the face of it, 
the story of Cruso's island, but the primary stakeholders are the survivors, Barton and 
Friday. Critics have responded by hailing the novel as a feminist and a postcolonial 
rewriting of Defoe's canonical texts: the context Coetzee recreates for Defoe's novels 
seems to render visible the marginalized female and colonial subjects thus allowing 
the artistic process that gave rise to Roxana and Robinson Crusoe to appear more like 
silencing and effacing than representing and expressing. But the competing narratives 
within Foe have attracted equal attention: the feminist and the postcolonial rewritings 
that Coetzee appears to undertake are not entirely compatible; Foe might not be the 
only antagonist in the novel. Spivak's reading of the novel is informed from the 
outset by a sense of the competing interests at play: 'I am suggesting that ... the book 
may be gesturing toward the impossibility of restoring the history of empire and 
recovering the lost text of mothering in the same register of language' (183). Hayes 
puts it in bolder terms: 'why does the price of Friday's 'voice' appear to be Susan's 
'silence', and vice versaT (282) Indeed Hayes's argument is driven by his concern 
that the politics of section IV of the novel (which he argues is a wisdom tale, a kind 
of non-novel), which has otherwise been welcomed by critics for restoring Friday's 
presence in the narrative, 'do not serve Susan's interests' (282). For Spivak, this is 
not just about voice or representation, but more specifically, the problem of 
negotiating an ethical position. Acknowledging the discontinuities between the 
different narratives in Foe, she asserts that Coetzee's interests lie elsewhere: 'He is 
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involved in a historically implausible but politically provocative revision. He 
attempts to represent the bourgeois individualist woman in early capitalism as the 
agent of other-directed ethics rather than as a combatant in the preferential ethics of 
self-interest' (182). 
Employing the confessional teleology of 'Double Thoughts, ' Attwell points 
out that the confessional dimension of Barton's narrative means that in section IV 
Friday 'possesses the key to the closure of the narrative' (112). For Hayes, who also 
employs the confessional teleology of the essay, the wisdom tale ending is not only 
discontinuous with the rest of the novel, which prioritises the liberal, novelistic values 
represented by Barton, but is fundamentally at odds with them. In describing the 
relation between the novel and its conclusion in terms of a conflict of interests, Hayes 
is setting Barton against Friday, the marginalized female subject against the 
marginalized colonial subject. 
By introducing a female character to the story of Robinson Crusoe, Coetzee is 
positing an alternative version of the well-known narrative in which, now mediated 
through the consciousness of a woman, Cruso's lack of interest in anything but the 
most meagre subsistence on the island robs the castaway story of much of its appeal. 
To restore some of this appeal Barton seeks the help of Foe, an author famed for his 
ability to transform a story into an adventure. In her estimation Foe is not an author in 
the sense of creator, but a craftsman who can work with the materials of someone 
else's story in order to transform it into art: 'Many strengths you have, but invention 
is not one of them' (72). She adopts the figure of confession to describe the process 
she embarks on with Foe: he is the confessor who hears a story and by making it 
available to a wider audience, provides fame rather than absolution. This echoes the 
practice of eighteenth-century court reporters and the confessional practice of the 
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Ordinary of Newgate prison himself, who would hear the last confessions of those 
prisoners sentenced for execution and later publish them in his widely read 
Account. 53 
In the characters of Barton and Foe we have the two dimensions of authorship 
embodied in different characters: Barton represents the private dimension of 
authorship that draws on the lived life and stubbornly asserts its origins in the real 
and Foe, the famous author, is the public extension of the writing life, Foucault's 
author function. Barton's conviction that authorship is a direct extension of the lived 
experience of the author is reflected not just in her adoption of the figure of 
confession for her attempt to accede to authorship via Foe, but in the way she reads 
other writers in the same terms. When Foe recounts an episode from Dante's Inferno, 
asserting the literary text's claim to truth, Barton responds by conflating the truth of 
the text with that of the author: "'True grief, certainly, but whoseT said I- 'The 
ghost's or the Italian's? "' (138) 
What occurs in the first three sections of Foe can be understood as a sequence 
of staged confessional narratives: first person account, letters and diaries, and a 
personal encounter. These forms are not necessarily confessional forms, but the 
governing principle of these three sections of the novel is Susan Barton's address to 
the author Daniel Foe, which she conceives as a confession. But her narrative is 
equally marked by the tensions between the demands of truth-telling and the risk of 
deception or self-deception that Coetzee finds typical of the genre. Indeed, the figure 
of confession that structures her relationship with Foe points equally to the 
importance of her belief in representing her own substantial experience and the 
necessity to structure this in such a way as to appeal to readers. As much as she 
53 See Linebaugh. 
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attempts to separate out these qualities of confessional narrative, as the novel 
progresses one finds that she too is implicated in an attempt to persuade as much as 
represent: she may have relinquished responsibility for the readability of the 
published account to Foe, but as sections II and III attest, she also has an audience or 
a reader in Foe and must expand on her version of events to maintain his interest and 
convince him of its worth. Attridge notes the overlap between literary representation 
and self-presentation in his discussion of Foe and the canon: 'What Foe suggests is 
that the same imperative drives our self-presentations and representations; unless we 
are read, we are nothing' (75). In keeping with this, while Barton initially set out to 
recount the story of her time on the island, once her first-person account fails to 
deliver her to fame as an author her focus shifts to finding a way to reveal Friday's 
story. 
That Barton and Foe should be implicated in 'plotting' a confession is hardly 
surprising. One of the main intertexts for Foe is Coetzee's chosen example of the 
genre of confessional fiction: Defoe's Roxana. If Barton's narrative appears to be 
structured by the dynamics of concealing and revealing typical of the confessional 
novel it is because the over-arching structure is provided by the confessional model of 
Roxana and for this reason her narrative seems to tend inevitably toward her 
confession that she has indeed abandoned her daughter. This, at least, is the story that 
her confessor Foe prompts her to tell. But in spite of the powerful determining force 
of genre (as I outlined in chapter 2) this is a teleology that she nonetheless resists to 
the last. 
Confessing is certainly not a disinterested activity for Barton, even if it does 
not reflect the interests pursued by Foe. Initially, she believes that having the story 
told and published will bring 'immortality and fame' but later she sees it as the means 
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whereby both she and Friday will find freedom: 'Can you not press on with your 
writing, Mr Foe, so that Friday can speedily be returned to Africa and I liberated from 
this drab existence I leadT (63) But her view of confession conflicts most clearly 
with that of Foe insofar as she adheres not just to this instrumental view of narrative 
but is convinced that the story that will bring her success or freedom will be the 
account of events she described, that it will be faithful to her substantial experience. 
In other words, no more than Foe, she is enticed by the 'mystique' of authorship but, 
unlike Foe, she is resistant to the sacrifices involved in acceding to it. While she 
clings to the end to the hope that the story can somehow act on her life, her 
expectations diminish as she experiences the material and creative hardships of 
writing and is faced with Foe whose responses, when they come, are not what she 
expects and which appear to serve a different set of interests than hers and Friday's. 
In splitting the public and private dimensions of authorship into two different 
characters, Coetzee allows the conflict of interests between privacy and mastery to 
unfold in dramatic fashion. It quickly becomes apparent to Barton that Foe is 
operating under a completely different set of priorities: like the deckhands toiling in 
the rigging in 'He and His Man, ' she and Foe are at cross purposes. 
Both Barton and Foe resort to confession as a figure several times in the 
course of the novel, but to very different ends: for Barton, determined to provide a 
truthful account of her time on the island, the confessional intention to tell the truth 
provides the over-riding figure for the relationship between her and Foe - her 
sincerity is guaranteed by her apparent naivety - whereas Foe, seasoned on the 
confessions of the criminals of Newgate prison, views confession as essentially 
instrumental and therefore self-interested. But while the agency exercised by Barton 
in the novel issues from her desire for confessional narrative, it is confession 
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understood not just in terms of expression and giving voice, but as a discourse 
structured equally by disclosure and concealment and subject to manipulation. 
Describing her first encounter with Foe in a letter to him, Barton writes: 'one 
of my fellow-servants told me you were Mr. Foe the author who had heard many 
confessions and were reputed a very secret man' (48). Her description perfectly 
captures the ambiguities of the motif she is employing: Foe is someone to confide in 
yet famous for keeping secrets; he has a reputation for listening but a career that 
involves writing and disseminating. It places Foe unambiguously in the category of 
author - the one who sacrifices the private for the sake of the public. In this 
knowledge, she approaches him hoping to secure a position in his household for 
herself and Friday in exchange for the fascinating story she would offer. Confronted 
by Foe's silent contemplation, however, she immediately questions the wisdom of her 
actions: '... I thought to myself. What art is there to hearing confessions? - the spider 
has as much art, that watches and waits' (48). The art that Barton expects from Foe is 
that of transforming the material of her experiences into a viable, publishable 
narrative. While she entertains the ambition of becoming an author she also accepts 
the differences between her and Foe as fundamental: 'The memoir I wrote for you I 
wrote sitting on my bed with the paper on a tray on my knees ... Yet I completed that 
memoir in three days. More is at stake in the history you write, I will admit, for it 
must not only tell the truth about us but please its readers too. Will you not bear it in 
mind, however, that my life is drearily suspended till your writing is doneT (63) 
However, the notion that Foe's artistry might have something in common with the art 
of the confessor allows the question of authorship and the process of artistic 
transformation to be understood more clearly as an issue of authority and it is given a 
particularly sinister gloss by the predatory spider. While Barton initially conceived of 
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her confessor in benevolent terms, the underlying threat in the image of the spider 
waiting to prey on the confessant drives home the conflict of interests at play. 
Both Barton and Foe return to confession in a self-conscious manner later in 
the novel but, by this stage, the motif has acquired a resonance beyond their figures 
through the novel's growing emphasis on the dynamics of concealing and revealing, 
or in confessional terms, withholding and confessing. Barton has given up all hope of 
fame but remains convinced that full disclosure of the island story will deliver her 
and Friday to 'freedom. ' She has always claimed the island story as her own, even 
though it involved speaking for both the dead Cruso and the mute Friday: '... it is I 
who have disposal of all that Cruso leaves behind, which is the story of the island' 
(45). But the apparent incapacity of the first person narrative of section I to deliver 
her to fame or freedom - or to maintain the interest of Foe - leads her to interpret this 
failure as a failure of disclosure, in other words, that she did not confess with 
sufficient fullness. The problem, she decides, is not with her story but with Friday's. 
As she has come to see it, the core of the story resides with Friday, who cannot speak 
of it because he is mute - Cruso told Barton that Friday's tongue had been cut out, 
but no evidence is provided to support his claim. For Barton, this loss is an obstacle 
to the story's successful completion: 'The shadow whose lack you feel is there: it is 
the loss of Friday's tongue. [ ... ] many stories can be told of Friday's tongue, but the 
true story is buried within Friday who is mute. The true story will not be heard till by 
art we have found a means of giving voice to Friday' (117-18). It becomes clear that 
Friday poses the most serious threat to the model of literary invention proposed by 
Barton, to the plenitude and accessibility of her story, for how can we expect Friday's 
story to materialise if he cannot speak and therefore cannot confess - or cannot 
enable Barton to confess on his behalf? What role can there be for Friday and 
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Friday's silence in a model of narration and authorship that seems to privilege voice 
and disclosure above all else? 
While placing Friday's silence at the centre of the island story, Susan 
expresses her fear that in describing the loss of Friday's tongue, Cruso might have 
been 'employing a figure', she wonders 'whether the lost tongue might stand not only 
for itself but for a more atrocious mutilation' (119). Seeing Friday dance, naked 
except for one of Foe's outer robes, Susan believes she has uncovered Friday's real 
secret: 'What had been hidden from me was revealed. I saw; or, I should say, my eyes 
were open to what was present to them' (119). The kind of revelation that Susan 
believes she has witnessed is not entirely susceptible to confessional narrative, but 
I 
she struggles to find another register within which to articulate it: 'I do not know how 
these matters can be written of in a book unless they are covered up again in figures' 
(120). So while the idea of full disclosure seems essential to Barton's conception of 
authorship as embodied in the figure of confession, it is a form of disclosure that must 
rely for its circulation on the concealment of figurative language. And one of these 
forms of concealment is the figure of confession itself, which she resorts to once 
more: 
When I first heard of you I was told you were a very secret man, a clergyman of 
sorts, who in the course of your work heard the darkest confessions from the most 
desperate penitents. I will not kneel before him like one of his gallows-birds, I 
vowed, with a mouth full of unspeakable confidences: I will say in plain terms what 
can be said and leave unsaid what cannot. Yet here I am pouring out my darkest 
secrets to you! You are like one of those notorious libertines whom women arm 
themselves against, but against whom they are at last powerless, his very notoriety 
being the seducer's shrewdest weapon. (120) 
Barton believed that it was in her power to control the narrative in spite of 
relinquishing final authorial power to Foe, yet it turns out to be otherwise. She finds 
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herself as desperate as any of Foe's penitents, revealing secrets in order to keep his 
attention. She compares herself to the criminals of Newgate prison whose final 
confessions would be recorded and published, not only by crime reporters such as 
Daniel Defoe, but also by the Ordinary of Newgate himself whose Account, 
according to Linebaugh, 'enjoyed one of the widest markets that printed prose 
narratives could obtain in the eighteenth century' (250). Significantly, the secrets in 
question are not Barton's, but Friday's. She has managed to tie their fates together, 
apparently in Friday's interests, but now it would appear, in her own too. It should be 
noted, however, that while Barton believes herself to be confessing and disclosing in 
this moment, the only figure she has found for Friday's supposed mutilation is the 
figure of the secret itself (Yet here I am pouring out my darkest secrets to you! '). 
However, as the confessional dynamic persists it is clear that Foe is not 
satisfied with the (non)disclosure about Friday; he is convinced that the truth of 
Susan's story lies in her search for the daughter she supposedly abandoned and that 
her other confessions are merely a ruse to distract from this fact. So it is not enough 
that Barton confess, she must fulfil Foe's expectations - the expectations created by 
the intertextual relationship with Roxana - by confessing to a particular kind of 
transgression. Embracing the role of confessor/interrogator he presses her for 
information about her daughter, but she recognises the strategy: 
I told myself (have I not confessed this before? ): He is like the patient spider who sits 
at the heart of his web waiting for his prey to come to him. And when we struggle in 
his grasp, and he opens his jaws to devour us, and with our last breath we cry out, he 
smiles a thin smile and says: "I did not ask you to come visiting, you came of your 
own will. " (120) 
Once again we have the threatening figure of the confessor as a spider, but this time 
Barton understands the nature of her vulnerability more fully: exploiting the motif of 
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confession does not necessarily place her in control of the narrative. Coetzee's point 
is not simply to underline the threat implicit in the authority wielded by Foe, the 
confessor - though this is an important point - but to illustrate the risk run by the 
confessant in confusing confession with agency. It is, in Michel Foucault's terms, the 
'internal ruse of confession' by which western man became a 'confessing animal, ' 
cultivating the belief 'that all these voices which have spoken so long in our 
civilization ... are speaking to us of freedom' (60). In this way we can see that the 
deployment of confession in the novel, as evidenced in Barton's apparent willingness 
to share 'her darkest secrets' with Foe, undermines the value of disclosure that it 
seems to privilege. 
It is in this context that Barton comes to understand the power of the 
confessional narrative: not the power of disclosure as such, but its seemingly endless 
capacity to promise a truth other than the one it avows. In other words, confessional 
narrative creates a certain potentiality, an unrevealed secret. The agency that one 
derives from confession lies not in the power to disclose but in the power to withhold: 
this is confessional currency. This is exemplified in the 'darkest secrets' that she 
claims to confess on the part of Friday: they are inscribed in the confessional 
narrative and simultaneously deferred for a different moment of revelation. Barton 
comes to understand that, as in The Possessed, confession is a game of limited truth. 
Her agency - an 'other-directed agency' in Spivak's terms - emerges from her ability 
to play this game. 
In Spivak's account of the novel, it is the ability to protect a secret rather than 
reveal it that is its primary virtue. The issue at stake for her, given the text's 
scepticism about the interests served by disclosure (and the failure of disclosure to 
deliver a position from which one can act ethically), is the value available to its 
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opposite: withholding. And not alone that: the central problem of Foe is how to make 
withholding visible. This, I believe, could only occur in the context of a text that 
invests so much of its imaginative resources in disclosure. Thus, it is given to Susan 
to confess that she is, in fact, keeping secrets. But furthermore, she manages to 
protect Friday's secrets by appearing to disclose them: 'You err most tellingly in 
failing to distinguish between my silences and the silences of a being such as Friday' 
(121). Friday, according to Barton, is 'the child of his silence, ' at the mercy of 
whatever story she chooses to tell of him. But this, of course, is merely a story she 
chooses to tell of him. She sees herself as an agent who knowingly withholds 
information in order to shape her version of events: 'I am not, do you see, one of 
those thieves or highwaymen of yours who gabble a confession and are then whipped 
off to Tyburn and eternal silence, leaving you to make of their stories whatever you 
fancy. It is still in my power to guide and amend. Above all, to withhold. By such 
means do I still endeavour to be father to my story' (123). In this respect Barton is the 
private dimension of authorship that defends its interests against all the odds and 
refuses to be sacrificed. Barton's understanding of confessional narrative has 
undoubtedly grown in complexity from her earlier conception of recounting a story to 
Foe that he might publish - 'I presented myself to you in words I knew to be my 
own' (133) - but her change in emphasis from disclosure to withholding still allows 
her to protect the dimension of private experience that animates confessional 
narrative. That is to say, she still adheres to a view of authorship that is rooted in the 
lived experience of the author, but this experience might have to be concealed in the 
figures that propose to reveal and disclose it. 
Foe attempts to challenge Barton's emphasis on withholding and the private 
sphere she protects with two stories about convicts at Newgate prison. The stories 
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relate to two women who are facing the gallows and whose actions are therefore 
taking place in the shadow of last things. In this way, both anecdotes explore ways of 
embracing the end - in both cases, death. The first woman attempts to postpone the 
end by making endless confessions to the ordinary of Newgate and the second 
woman embraces the end having arrangements made for the care of her daughter. The 
first anecdote is not merely an account of how one might achieve immortality through 
notoriety and publishing (though this was part of the contract between the ordinary 
and prisoners) but an attempt to stave off death by the act of narrating and confessing. 
The incident is a parody of the argument presented by Coetzee in 'Double 
Thoughts' where no confession is true or final but constantly subject to reevaluation 
and further disclosure. Foe's anecdote is implicitly a threat to Barton - Foe as 
confessor has the power to bring her narrative to an end, as she recognises - but also 
a warning that her new position which privileges withholding might also be subject to 
revision. The alternative is to embrace the story Foe is determined to tell, the ending 
preordained by the intertextual relationship with Roxana, and the great transgression 
that he presumes to lie behind her incomplete confessions. While these are presented 
as alternative possibilities, they are in truth two versions of the first: Susan 
capitulating to the authority of Foe. Worse still, as Susan has already observed of 
Friday, it is now she that is at the mercy of the story Foe decides to tell. 
In keeping with the suggested antagonism of the title, critical accounts of Foe 
have described the conflict between Barton's interests and those of Cruso, Friday and 
Foe. Spivak's assessment that she is 'the agent of other-directed ethics rather than ... 
a combatant in the preferential ethics of self-interest' (182) recuperates the loss 
implicit in her model of authorship for a postcolonial ethics but it can also, I believe, 
be recovered for a model of confession that casts aside self-interested disclosure in 
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favour of a withholding disguised as disclosure. Attridge notes that canon formation 
relies on a certain amount of silencing, which may take many forms: 'All canons rest 
on exclusion; the voice they give to some can be heard only by virtue of the silence 
they impose on others. But it is not just a silencing by exclusion, it is a silencing by 
inclusion as well: any voice we can hear is by that very fact purged of its uniqueness 
and alterity' (82). The silence that Barton successfully defends is not her silence but 
Friday's, who appears substantial as, in Spivak's terms, the agent of a withholding, 
'the guardian at the margin' (190). 
Marking the discontinuity inherent in Coetzee's confessional model, section 
IV abandons the self-referential confessional mode of the earlier part of the novel, 
even if it implicitly retains the thernatics of revealing and concealing insofar as it 
draws much of its power from daring to imagine what had previously been withheld: 
the home of Friday. In addition, the authority by which it asserts itself as a space in 
which 'bodies are their own signs' is achieved by the relentless undermining of 
authority that has gone before. While it is clearly a departure in style from what has 
preceded it, it also repeats and echoes earlier passages from the novel and, as Attridge 
has amply illustrated, from canonical literary and non-literary texts, thereby drawing 
on a different kind of authority. Narrated by an unspecified I, that seemingly cannot 
be fragmented by its location in different times and places, without the qualification 
of citation that occurs elsewhere in the novel, renouncing even the positioning of 
ventriloquising a specific voice, section IV is unapologetic in its adoption of literary 
tropes. If, as Susan asserted earlier, that in order to speak of Friday's secrets they 
would need to be 'covered up again in figures, ' then this is how the 'home of Friday' 
is achieved in the closing section of the novel (120). 
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So if, in this novel of staged confessions and 'fake autobiography' confession 
and disclosure have only the power to conceal and the only agency available to the 
confessant is the agency of withholding - in other words, a power derived from the 
ability to retain confessional currency rather than spend it - what means of 
signification is available to the putative autobiographical? In spite of Barton's 
memoir, her concern for the material conditions of authorship, and the challenge she 
throws down to Foe, her efforts to accede to the public role of author fail. In a recent 
interview with Attwell, Coetzee responds to a question about self-invention in 
autobiography: 'As for postcolonial or feminist autobiography, as long as the agenda 
that drives it remains political, I don't see it being allowed to venture far into the 
realms of invention. I look forward to being proved wrong' (217). But in an earlier 
interview the fictional context of Foe seems to provide a space in which to reconcile 
what Attwell calls the need for 'historical self-reclamation' with the textual processes 
of self-invention. Coetzee asks: 'is representation to be so robbed of power by the 
endlessly sceptical processes of textualization that those represented in/by the text - 
the feminine subject, the colonial subject - are to have no power eitherT (248) In Foe 
the power available to the feminine subject is complicated by a refusal to equate 
representation with the disclosure of confession. Instead, authorship emerges as an act 
not unlike the dynamic of disclosure and concealment that informs confession - 
strategic, self-interested, and dependent on others. 
That Barton's strategic confession is conducted through a rigorous 
interrogation of narrative authority does not undermine her ability to speak. As Foe 
asks her towards the end of the novel: 'Have you considered that your doubts may be 
part of the story you live, of no greater weight than any other adventure of yoursT 
(135) If Barton manages to protect Friday's secret by naming it as secret, we cannot 
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discount the possibility that she also protects her own secrets, but by naming other 
secrets. In Given Time Derrida discusses 'Counterfeit Money, ' a story by Baudelaire 
in which a man excuses an act of excessive generosity to a beggar by confessing that 
his donation was in fact counterfeit. In Derrida's account, the generosity of this act - 
its qualities of the 'gift' - is disguised by the confession. According to Derrida: 'It is 
superficial, without substance, infinitely private because public through and through. 
It is spread on the surface of the page, as obvious as a purloined letter, a post card, a 
bank note, a check, a 'letter of credit' - or 'a silver two-franc piece' (169). Insofar as 
confessional narrative is always subject to reassessment, revision and further 
disclosure, it is constantly threatened by the accusation of untruth or insincerity. What 
better repository of secrets? 
vi 
Building on Foucault's account of the emergence of the category of author as a 
subject against which the censorship apparatus could act, Coetzee, in Giving Offense, 
posits the notion of the master who is targeted by the state not for what he writes but 
on account of 'a certain disserninative power of which the power to publish and have 
read is only the most marked manifestation' (43). Coetzee highlights the way in 
which the machine of state censorship targets the master author not by publishing 
restrictions but by invading the creative process itself In general, Giving Offense is 
concerned less with the material impact of censorship on the circulation of texts and 
more with the effects of the censorship apparatus on the individual, either the private 
writing subject or the subject as a conduit for ideas. In this way, censorship becomes 
an extension and intensification of the creative process itself, a less than benevolent 
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presence that both threatens and enables the writing process and the writing subject. 
The essays are informed by the principle that literary works produced and published 
in these circumstances bear the traces of the various writers' struggles with their 
respective foes; Coetzee's challenge is to find a critical register with which to analyse 
writing enterprises that have become divided against themselves due to the presence 
of a censor. He frequently figures writing in these circumstances as a kind of 
madness, an enterprise that must serve such conflicting interests that it appears to be 
mad, or at the very least, irrational. Discussing the private writing subject as the locus 
of a struggle between various ideas, desires and instincts, he presents an elaborate 
metaphor of the unconscious as a zoo, over which the 'zookeeper of rationality' 
struggles to maintain control (37). As I noted, the activity of writing which takes 
place in this 'zoo' is described by Coetzee as 'the definition of privacy' (38). 
In most cases, Coetzee's study of censorship proceeds through a metaphorical 
framework to an understanding of how the factors that influence the circulation and 
regulation of discourse act on the writing subject, and vice versa, so that the 
distinctions between the public and private dimensions of the writing process grow 
less and less distinct. While the author, as identified by the name on the title page, 
becomes a target of the law under censorship, the influence of the master author 
extends beyond the printed page and the reach of censorship is not confined to the 
way the law can exercise itself on the author. 
Unusually for a book on censorship, Giving Offense consistently questions 
and even undermines the power of censorship to curtail or prohibit the circulation of 
'threatening' texts or ideas. Coetzee is quick to note that even in the darkest daYs of 
censorship in South Africa, alliances between writers (at least in English) and foreign 
publishers assured that their work would not be consigned forever to oblivion. In the 
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case of the master author, he speculates that the currency of the writer's reputation 
might be enhanced by the attention of the censorship apparatus and therefore wonders 
'whether writers under censorship are wholly disinterested in presenting themselves 
as embattled and outnumbered, confronting a gigantic foe' (44). While available 
correspondence from the late 70s shows his anxieties about censorship and about 
benefiting from the notoriety of being censored (though none of his novels were 
banned), the fact that this was largely misplaced does not undermine its role in the 
creative process (see Ravan Material at NELM). Although presented in terms of an 
external threat or invasion, censorship is continuous with the psychic drama of the 
creative process and can therefore be enlisted in the service of this process. In an 
essay on Breyten Breytenbach, Coetzee's analysis attempts to negotiate between the 
defiant public utterances of the writer who views the censor unequivocally as a foe 
and the private world of his writing that bears the scars of his engagement with this 
foe. Coetzee describes the public statements as: 'an unambiguous struggle between a 
voice struggling to utter itself and a gag that stifles it' (Giving Offense 232). But his 
account of Breytenbach's 'private' encounter with the censor in his work is more 
typical of the struggle between the private and the public that characterises Coetzee's 
reading of censorship elsewhere: 'the doctrine to be teased out of his more intimate 
writings, is that the writer writes against and cannot write without a manifold of 
internalized resistances that are in essence no different from an internalized censor- 
twin, both cherished and hated' (232). In other words, there is an element of 
productive constraint in the limitations of working under censorship. I will suggest 
that in Petersburg this is replicated in the author's relation to his private life more 
generally. 
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Censorship conceived in this private dimension is not unlike the dynamic of 
confessional narrative insofar as it too relies on a process of revelation and 
suppression, that is to say, confession is a form of self-censorship. If the only agency 
available in Foe is the power to withhold one's story, this is because confession 
attains its value in Foucault's terms as 'a ritual in which the truth is corroborated by 
the obstacles and resistances it has had to surmount in order to be formulated' (62). 
Another variation on this dynamic occurs in 'Double Thoughts' as Coetzee describes 
the typical Rousseauean confession in terms of self-censoring: 'Confession consists 
in a double movement of offering to spend "inconsistencies" and holding back 
enough to maintain the "freedom" that comes of having capital' (272). On the other 
hand, it is the 'lack of prudent self-censorship' that leads Coetzee to find in Geoffrey 
Cronj6's writing 'the heart-speech of autobiography and confession' (164). The 
emphasis on censorship helps us to see these two versions of confession not so much 
as opposites but as continuous with the dynamic of revelation and suppression: the 
difference is that the former is governed by the Rousseauean pact of sincerity, which 
Coetzee is deeply sceptical of, and the latter by a torm of madness or demon- 
possession, undoubtedly less calculated than Rousseau's sincerity but also 
considerably more dangerous. 
If the conflicting demands of the creative process can be understood to rely on 
a similar dynamic (the zoo of the unconscious, the influence of the censor, the 
deckhands at cross purposes) then it follows that it is not necessarily in the interests 
of the writer to admit this. Coetzee's concern about the role of setr-censoring in 
confessional narrative is evident in his discussion of the way in which genre relies on 
the existence of unspoken rules or pacts between writers and readers of 
autobiography in 'Truth in Autobiography'. He comments on the necessity of a 
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certain degree of blindness to the continuing viability of autobiographical discourse: 
blindness to the limitations of the genre and blindness to the existence of the pact (5). 
Indeed, as I have mentioned, his point is more far-reaching than this: 'All forms of 
discourse may have secrets, of no great profundity, which they nevertheless, cannot 
afford to unveil' (6). We can see this being teased out in different ways in both Foe 
and Petersburg. In Foe, the emphasis on withholding is one way of protecting secrets 
that Barton cannot afford to reveal - or is not authorised to unveil. Whereas the 
power of section IV of the same novel derives from the element of risk in seizing this 
authority, at whatever cost. In Petersburg, as the protagonist says, 'nothing is private 
anymore' (24 1). 
Vil 
The circulation of dangerous, revolutionary ideas and their potentially lethal 
consequences is Dostoevsky's theme in Yhe Possessed. The novel is considered the 
major intertext for Petersburg and Coetzee duly takes up the Dostoevskian thematics 
of the circulation of dangerous ideas by exploring the metaphorical implications of 
the idea of possession, picking up Dostoevsky's concern with the nihilistic tendencies 
of radical Russian politics but especially by figuring both writing and reading as acts 
that might potentially transgress the law, social norms and personal bonds. The locus 
of this struggle is author and master Fyodor Dostoevsky. Coetzee uses possession as a 
figure for one's susceptibility to forces beyond one's control, a state of receptivity 
that potentially enriches but also endangers the self and those around one. 54 In 
Petersburg radical politics, grief, sexual intimacy, epilepsy, reading and writing are 
54 Attridge describes this in tenns of Derrida's arrivant. 
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all described in terms of possession. It is a state not unlike madness, particularly 
insofar as it appears to operate at a remove from the normal calculations of rational 
self-interest. In this way possession is a way of staging a certain unguarded and 
uncensored element in fiction. Coetzee's novel, however, is animated by the risks 
implicit in such an exercise. 
In 'Tbe Autobiographer as Torero, ' Michel Leiris attempts to outline a kind of 
writing - autobiographical or fictional - that embraces risk in a particularly intense 
manner: 'I distinguish in literature a genre of major significance to me, which would 
include those works where the horn is present in one form or another, where the 
author assumes the direct risk either of a confession or of a subversive work, a work 
in which the human condition is confronted directly or 'taken by the horns' and 
which presents a conception of life 'engaging' its partisan - or its victim' (163). 
Leiris's comments are generally taken to suggest that autobiographical writing is a 
particularly risky business. Petersburg is not an autobiography, nor does it stage the 
writing of an autobiography. But it is a novel that is alive to the risks of the writing 
enterprise as embodied in the actions of the writer protagonist Dostoevsky. This is 
particularly evident in the closing chapter as he figures writing as a form of gambling 
and sees the story he has produced as a challenge to God: 'Now God must speak, now 
God dare no longer remain silent. [ ... ] The device he has made arches and springs 
shut like a trap, a trap to catch God' (249). The high stakes attaching to writing in 
these pages emerge from the connection between Dostoevsky's writing and the world 
that Coetzee has invented for him: in writing this story and leaving it to be read, 
Dostoevsky appears to betray the memory of his dead stepson in the narrative he has 
created and corrupt the innocence of the girl who he intends to read the story. In other 
words, the sense of risk that pervades Petersburg is a result of the slippage that 
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occurs between the private and public dimensions of the writer's life. Dostoevsky's 
writing is not, strictly speaking, autobiography but it runs the risk of being read 
autobiographically. 
In Petersburg Coetzee explores the private and public dimensions of 
authorship by constructing the character of Dostoevsky from his reading of the 
published works of Fyodor Dostoevsky, an oeuvre which at this stage stretches 
beyond the fiction to include the letters, diaries and biographies that prove so 
valuable in the case of a master author. The novel thematizes the distinction between 
fiction and biography as modes of knowledge, only to complicate the relationship 
between them by emphasising those aspects of Dostoevsky's life that were most 
frequently read back into his work, the result being that Coetzee's Dostoevsky is 
more an authorial figure than a historical figure. In addition, Coetzee invents a 
biographical context for the writing of The Possessed, inviting both the reader and the 
writer to read the fictional biography back into the novel as it is taking shape. In this 
way Coetzee manages to stage this writing as a seýr-conscious act of betrayal and as a 
gamble, a flirtation with the risk of autobiographical writing. While Petersburg, like 
Foe, is extremely sensitive to the material circumstances in which writing occurs and 
the material benefits and costs that accompany authorship, through the metaphor of 
gambling Petersburg stages a kind of writing which flaunts even its most closely 
guarded secrets, such that the calculations of rational self-interest are no longer 
applicable. If Petersburg can be read as a confession, it confesses that writing is a 
form of gambling, exposing itself to the losses that this entails. 
Coetzee's preoccupation with the circulation and potency of dangerous ideas 
and his most overt engagement with Yhe Possessed is evident in his staging of the 
genesis and writing of the chapter from the Russian novel that has become known as 
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'Stavrogin's Confession'. In the closing chapter of Petersburg, called 'Stavrogin' 
after the character from 7he Possessed, Coetzee's Dostoevsky appears to write two 
stories that readers familiar with the Russian author will recognise as a version of the 
chapter 'At Tikhon's. ' In the chapter in The Possessed, a dialogue between Stavrogin 
and a holy monk named Tikhon, Stavrogin confesses to having sexually assaulted a 
young girl, who he subsequently allowed to commit suicide; or, more specifically, he 
has written a pamphlet in which he confesses to the crime, and which he now intends 
to circulate in atonement for the crime. Tikhon is permitted to read most (but not all) 
of the pamphlet; Stavrogin retains one page. The encounter has become exemplary of 
a successful secular confession for Coetzee, informing his reading of confession in 
'Double Thoughts' and in interviews discussing the essay. 
Such was the disturbing nature of the character and the confession that 
Dostoevsky was forced to omit the chapter from the serialized version of the novel 
due to the objections of his editor. Furious reworking of the novel ensued to limit the 
damage caused by the omission of the chapter, to the extent that it is now impossible 
to reinsert it into the completed novel; it is still circulated merely as an appendix to 
the rest of the text. Both the structure of the chapter and its subsequent publication 
history mean that Stavrogin's transgression must remain private in order to prevent 
the circulation of the dangerous and obscene ideas that are contained within it but one 
of the most disturbing aspects of the confession is Stavrogin's insistence that the 
pamphlet in which it appears be circulated. He states his determination that once one 
person (i. e. Tikhon) reads it, everyone shall read it. Tikhon, as confessor and 
interlocutor, does not question the veracity of Stavrogin's confession, but examines 
instead the motives behind his desire to have his shameful secret circulated in this 
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manner: 'It is as though you purposely wished to represent yourself as a coarser man 
than your heart would desire' ('At Tikhon's' 3 0). 
In his biography of Dostoevsky, Joseph Frank describes how in its existence, 
revisions and suppression 'Stavrogin's Confession' gave rise to the rumour that 
Dostoevsky was guilty of a similar offence against a child, a rumour that has 
persisted to this day and that still necessitates refutations in biographies and accounts 
of the writer's life and works . 
55 The presumption that 'At Tikhon's' constituted a 
confession on the part of the writer is not justified by the text nor by reference to any 
external evidence, yet in its vivid preoccupation with guilt, desire for punishment and 
determination to be published and circulated it is certainly an explosive and 
suggestive document, the result being that the force of the writing - the pcrformative 
power of the staged confession - is identified with the author's purpose. The 
suppression of the chapter, together with its thematic preoccupation with the 
withholding and circulation of texts, enhances its confessional currency and 
consequently its truth value. 
The importance of 'Stavrogin's Confession' in 'Double Thoughts' is not that 
Stavrogin is an ideal confessant who has somehow managed to circumvent the pitfalls 
of confessional self-interest - on the contrary, the omissions in his confession are 
calculated to fascinate and forestall truth-telling - rather, the burden of Stavrogin's 
confession is assumed by his auditor and confessor, Tikhon, who reads Stavrogin's 
confession for its performance rather than omissions and consequently recommends 
Stavrogin to another holy monk who might grant him absolution. Tikhon, in 
Coetzee's account, comes to represent the possibility of grace, absolution, and self- 
55 Frank goes to great lengths to illustrate the spuriousness of this rumour, yet Watson. in his article 
about Petersburg, cites it as part of the background to the novel. 
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forgiveness but his reworking of the episode is notable for its omission of a Tikhon 
figure, a confessor that might alleviate the anguish of the confessant. Even the change 
in titles, reworking 'At Tikhon's' into 'Stavrogin, ' indicates an opposition in purpose 
and intention that defines the later novel. 
The discontinuity that I have been attempting to describe is figured by 
Coetzee as an incomplete conversion or ongoing dialogue between Stavrogin and 
Tikhon. The absence of Tikhon in Petersburg therefore suggests that only one part of 
the dialogue is represented in the novel - the cynicism of Stavrogin. To keep with my 
framework of confession as a figure for authorship, this is borne out by the confessor 
figure we find in the novel: Maximov the detective who, like Foe, is figured as a 
predatory spider. But insofar as confession in the novel takes the form of writing, the 
confessor could be seen as a reader. In this way, confessors multiply: Dostoevsky 
himself becomes a confessor in his readings of Pavel's stories and diaries, Coctzec is 
a confessor insofar as Petersburg relies on his readings of Dostoevsky, and the 
readings of Dostoevsky that he draws on - by Freud, Eliot and others - allow them to 
become confessants. But the kind of readings they engage in run the risk of being 
predatory in the manner of Maximov. Might it be possible to read the novel in the 
spirit of Tikhon? 
Taking as its starting point Dostoevsky's manipulation of the historical 
material in The Possessed, Petersburg presents two related layers of transformation: 
Coetzee's decision to rewrite the episode as the possible murder of Dostoevsky's 
twenty two year old stepson Pavel (rather than the student Ivanov) and, crucially, the 
author protagonist's reworking of these invented biographical circumstances into 77ie 
Possessed. While the murder of Ivanov in Moscow in 1869 is widely believed by 
scholars of the Russian author to have influenced the genesis of 7he Possessed, 
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Dostoevsky's stepson outlived the author, thus driving a fictional wedge between 
Coetzee's novel and the context it proposes to recreate. 
Petersburg is therefore first and foremost a novel about grief and a grieving 
father's attempt to find an appropriate response to the death of his son. However, in 
spite of the intensity of his grief, Coetzee's Dostoevsky both cannot and is not 
permitted to mourn in an appropriate manner: from the outset his actions are 
governed by the writerly imperative to bring Pavel back to life, a response informed 
by a series of recurring references to the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice. In addition, 
once reinserted into the world of St Petersburg, Dostoevsky finds that he is no longer 
just a father but an author, and not alone that - he is a master with all of its ensuing 
demands and responsibilities. 
Although he is travelling under false documents and not named himself until 
page thirty four of the novel, the reader quickly discovers the identity of the 
protagonist through his encounters with other characters, all of whom recognise him 
as the author, Fyodor Dostoevsky, and consequently assume a certain amount of 
knowledge about him or his work. Pavel's landlady, Anna Sergeyevna, is aware of 
the nature of his relationship to Pavel but also of his reputation as a writer via her 
husband's reading of Poor Folk. After carrying out his charade of unmasking the 
impostor Isaev at the police station, the star-struck detective Maximov gushes in his 
presence: 'You are a man of gifts, a man of special insights, as I knew before I met 
you' (45). Ivanov, beggar and police spy, adopts the familiar Fyodor Mikhailovich 
('you don't mind, do youT 87) without any formal introduction. As the novel 
progresses, Dostoevsky's status as master manifests itself in two ways. In a manner 
similar to Coetzee's account in Giving Offense (essays which were composed in the 
same period as Petersburg), the power and value of Dostoevsky's reputation becomes 
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a key to the developing political drama: one of the more plausible explanations for 
Pavel's death is that it was a strategy to lure his famous stepfather out of hiding. 
Added to this, however, is the fact that the currency of Dostoevsky's reputation and 
its ability to replicate and disseminate itself far exceeds any expected political 
intervention: such is his celebrity that the details of his private life are as well-known 
as his work: Maximov incautiously hints at rumours about his uneasy relationship 
with his father, as does Nechaev. In this way we can see that Dostoevsky's biography 
is public property before he ever contemplates selling it in the closing pages of the 
novel: 'it is not so much a life as a price or a currency. It is something I pay with in 
order to write' (222). 
In spite of the writer's attempt to dedicate himself to the supposedly private 
activity of mourning for his stepson - 'there is a measure to all things now, and that 
measure is Pavel' (167) - the competing demands of authorship (or mastery) 
consistently violate the private experience of mourning. This is something imposed 
on Dostoevsky by the demands of authorship but it also emerges as a compulsion to 
respond to Pavel's death in writing. While the novel abounds with images of 
Dostoevsky seated at the desk in Pavel's room, assuming the pose of the writer, in 
such moments he is generally absorbed in memories of his son. For the writer, it is 
not possible to separate mourning and writing. The conflicting interests of 
Dostoevsky's different roles, father and author, private and public, reach a crisis point 
in the final chapters of the novel as he appears to answer the Orphic imperative to 
bring Pavel back to life by writing a version of 'Stavrogin's Confession' in the empty 
pages of his stepson's diary: the beloved son, Pavel, is transformed into Stavrogin. 
Petersburg demonstrates that writing is a source of power and Dostoevsky's 
life a currency that can be exploited to this end, yet it also leaves the writer vulnerable 
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to exploitation. Aware of the immense potential of the Dostoevsky signature Nechaev 
seeks to harness it to his utilitarian politics. The picture of Dostoevsky created in the 
novel no doubt owes something to Coetzee's reading of the writer's private letters, 
diaries and notebooks, valuable documents in the public domain precisely because 
this was not their intended forum. 56 One must imagine that the preoccupation with 
private papers within The Master of Petersburg is Coetzee's confession to the 
intrusions committed in the novel: 'The prospect that after our decease a stranger will 
come sniffing through our possessions, opening drawers, breaking seals, reading 
intimate letters - such would be a painful prospect to any of us, I am sure' (39). 
But the novel owes as much to Coetzee's reading of Dostoevsky's oeuvrc, the 
fictional output that constitutes his life's work and a more significant reflection of 
what we know, or think we know, about Dostoevsky. This is particularly evident in 
his treatment of Dostoevsky's epilepsy. While seeming to fall within the order of 
knowledge of biography, the representation of epilepsy in Petersburg is grounded in 
Dostoevsky's depiction of Prince Myshkin in Yhe Idiot. In describing the 'time out of 
time' characteristic of epilepsy, Coetzee writes: 'As for him, he hears nothing, he is 
gone, there is no longer time' (68). This echoes Myshkin's description of the 'last 
conscious moment' before an epileptic fit: '... at that moment the extraordinary saying 
that there shall be time no longer becomes, somehow, comprehensible to me' (259). 
In this way we can see that the novel thematizes the distinction between the 
literary and biographical modes of knowledge. The reader/confessor figure of 
Maximov is typical in this regard, assuming a certain familiarity with the writer on 
the basis of having read his work: 'knowing you as I do, that is, in the way one knows 
56 The main resource on Dostoevsky's life of this period is Joseph Frank's DostoevsAy: 7he 
Miraculous Years 1865-1871 published in 1995, a year after The Master ofPetersburg appeared 
(Coetzee's review appeared promptly in 7he New York Review ofBooks). 
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a writer from his books, that is to say, in an intimate yet limited way' (147). This is 
the kind of knowledge that Coetzee stages of Dostoevsky. The entire Dostoevsky 
canon, and a lifetime of engagement with it, lies behind Petersburg. We can draw on 
no less an authority on Dostoevsky than Frank to list some of the intertexts for The 
Master ofPetersburg, among them The Brothers Karamazov, Crime and Punishment, 
ne House of the Dead and an early story entitled 'The Landlady' ('The Rebel'). He 
irritably notes that Coetzee 'plays fast and loose with the historical record' and 'has 
culled from many places for his own purposes. ' Frank's irritation belies the 
significance of the epistemological framework Coetzee has put in place: the literary 
rather than the biographical is the mode of signifying and knowing in Petersburg. 
Indeed such is Coetzee's dedication to the literary as a way of generating meaning, 
that it comes to influence other aspects of experience: memories, for example, are 
constructed from literary sources. Allusions to other works by Dostoevsky, when they 
are not put to the author protagonist by other characters, are figured as memories that 
are half-remembered or half-forgotten, that is, Dostoevsky, the author, experiences 
references to his own writing as (vague) memories. One of the more obvious 
examples is the reference to Crime and Punishment in Dostoevsky's premonition of 
an epileptic attack while waiting to meet Maximov: '... somewhere to the side falls 
the nagging shadow of a memory: surely he has been here before, in this very ante- 
room or one like it, and had an attack or a fainting fit! But why is it that he recollects 
the episode only so dimly? And what has the recollection to do with the smell of fresh 
paintT (3 1) By figuring Dostoevsky's relationship to his own work in this way 
Coetzee is placing the experience of creativity within the range of life experiences 
that might be remembered or forgotten. But he is also verifying his character's status 
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as an author, establishing links with published texts that are verifiable, if not in 
historical terms then at least in literary (historical) terms. 
The biographical elements that Coetzee has chosen to emphasise are those that 
are most frequently read back into the fiction: his epilepsy, gambling, debts, the 
suggested assault on a child. Writing in The Dial in 1922, T. S. Eliot's warning to 
novelists about the dangers of having Dostoevsky as a literary model are grounded in 
his belief that Dostoevsky's 'particular topography, the characteristics of his 
universe' are inseparable from the life he lived (329). More controversially Freud's 
'Dostoevsky and Parricide' is an account of the writer's epilepsy which describes it as 
a symptom of his neurosis and locates its origin in his sense of guilt about the murder 
of his father. He describes Dostoevsky as a kind of criminal: 'it comes from his 
choice of material, which singles out from all others violent, murderous and egoistic 
characters, thus pointing to the existence of similar tendencies within himself, and 
also from certain facts in his life, like his passion for gambling and his possible 
confession to a sexual assault upon a young girl' (442). Freud is initially careful 
enough to frame his reading in the context of Dostoevsky's 'choice of material' but it 
is clear in his veiled reference to 'Stavrogin's Confession' that his essay is an 
example of the willingness to identify author and creation. 57 
In the course of the novel, Pavel comes to represent a very different idea of 
authorship to his famous stepfather: he too was a writer, albeit an unpublished one, 
something Dostoevsky only learns after his death. For this reason, Pavel's private 
papers, containing some stories, journals and letters - all that remains to his 
stepfather - acquire an added value. Indeed the limits of the private and public 
S7 In an interview in Doubling the Point Coetzee singles out this essay as an example of the 'old. 
fashioned Freud' that 'Double Thoughts' attempts to set itself against (245). 
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dimensions of authorship are contested on the basis of these papers. In his eager 
pursuit of Nechaev and his circle, the detective Maximov engages in a thorough 
investigation of Pavel's papers and insists that his stories be admitted as evidence of 
his political radicalism. Dostoevsky, on the other hand, refuses Maximov's 
allegorical reading of Pavel's story for two reasons: because it is private and because 
Maximov is not equipped to read it. Dostoevsky equates his son's stories with his 
diaries and letters on the basis that they were unpublished. For Dostoevsky, a story is 
'A private matter, an utterly private matter, private to the writer, till it is given to the 
world' (40). However, this does not mean that they cannot be read; rather, in keeping 
with his assertion of their private status, Dostoevsky reads them in a spirit of 
violation and transgression (148-153,216-222). And this is the kind of reading that 
Dostoevsky advocates. He rebukes Maximov's allegorical reading claiming that 
Pavel's papers 'will tell you least of all because clearly you do not know how to read' 
(46). Instead Dostoevsky proposes that 'reading is being the arm and being the axe 
and being the skull; reading is giving yourself up, not holding yourself at a distance 
and jeering' (46). Attridge points out that the view of reading that emerges from these 
encounters is a form of madness, or 'demon-possession' as Maximov himself 
responds (134). 
As the focus of this debate through his papers, Pavel can be seen as an 
incipient author figure. He comes to represent the private dimension of authorship in 
a similar way to Susan Barton in Foe, and in a manner that is simply no longer 
available to the master, Dostoevsky. By Dostoevsky's reckoning, this standard of 
privacy can only be asserted as long as the stories remain unpublished, that is to say, 
as long as Pavel's name does not appear on the title page of a published book he 
cannot be held legally responsible for its content. By virtue of being read, however, 
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such assertions of privacy are placed in question. As Attridge comments on the desire 
for acceptance into the literary canon: 'What Foe suggests is that the same imperative 
drives our self-presentations and representations; unless we are read, we are nothing' 
(75). The fact of being read collapses the distinction between Pavel's literary 
offerings and his diaries and letters. Contrary to the political allegory that Maximov 
finds in Pavel's story, Dostoevsky reads it as a veiled autobiography: 'Not untrue, not 
wholly untrue, yet how subtly twisted all of itV (151) Later, reading a particularly 
hurtful passage in Pavel's diary, he speculates about his motives in writing it: 'For 
whom were these mischievous pages intended? Did Pavel write them for his father's 
eyes and then die so as to leave his accusations unanswerable? Of course not: what 
madness to think so! (219) Yet Pavel's papers are eventually shown to be vulnerable 
to his stepfather, whose writing in the closing pages of the novel is a kind of 
reauthoring or even forgery. 
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Petersburg is deeply informed by a sense of writing and reading that adheres to the 
idea of private experience as something that might be transformed into art, with the 
emphasis on transformation as opposed to representation. This notion is adhered to by 
the novel's writers and readers and it is staged by Coetzee in the way he has 
constructed his author protagonist and invented the scene of authorship of one of his 
major novels. The novel also demonstrates the paradoxical nature of this view of 
writing and reading by drawing attention to the manner in which everything is already 
transformed by the competing interests at stake in the creative process, a process 
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which is both 'the definition of privacy' and in which 'nothing is private anymore. ' 
To the extent that the culminating events of the novel owe their force, at the very 
least, to the creative process as a dimension of private experience if not to the 
inscription or transformation of this experience in the work produced, the novel 
demands that the relationship between author and work be taken seriously. 
In its preoccupation with private papers, diaries, letters, confessions and 
rumours Petersburg stages the value of the private in the public realm, a principle 
which corrupts and collapses the distinction between the two. This is evident in the 
political plot of the novel, the interest in Dostoevsky's personal life and the creative 
process itself as represented in both writing and reading. Insofar as these activities 
seem to generate loss they can be related to the 'pure expenditure' that Bataille rinds 
typical of gambling and artistic production. And to the extent that they keep in play 
the lived experience of the author - as inscribed within the artistic work and as 
represented in the artistic process - the stakes attaching to this gamble are very high 
indeed. If autobiography is a particularly risky activity in Leiris's account, its 
possible staging in Petersburg is laden with risk. 
It is precisely the question of risk and the writer's willingness or compulsion 
to embrace it that defines artistic inspiration in Maurice Blanchot's 'Orpheus' 
Gaze. '58 Blanchot reads the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice as Orpheus' reckless 
pursuit of the forbidden darkness represented by Eurydice to the exclusion of all else, 
even Eurydice. Contrary to Bataille, Blanchot maintains that: 'What the Greek myth 
tells us is that a work of art can only be achieved when the artist does not seek the 
experience of unrestrained intensity as an end in itself' (177). That is, Orpheus must 
58 Mike Marais draws on this essay in his reading of Petersburg, but he is not interested in inspiration 
or risk. 
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observe the injunction not to look back at Eurydice. At the same time, however: 'the 
myth simultaneously implies that Orpheus' fate is to refuse to submit to this law ... 
Thus he betrays his purpose, Eurydice and the dark. Yet not to look back would be no 
less a betrayal' (177-8). Blanchot implies that for this to occur Orpheus must exercise 
a certain impatience and recklessness with regard to both Eurydice and art as his 
inspiration lies in his willingness to risk both, this is the paradoxical necessity of art: 
'To look at Eurydice without a thought for art, with the impatience and recklessness 
of a desire oblivious of laws, that is what inspiration is' (179). Part of the necessity of 
art is that there is no guaranteed gain from Orpheus' gamble: 'it does not ensure the 
success of the work of art any more than it celebrates in art the triumph of Orpheus' 
ideal or Eurydice's survival. Art is no less threatened than Orpheus by inspiration. 
The moment of inspiration is, for art, the point of maximum insecurity. That is why 
art tends so often and so violently to resist what inspires it' (179-80). Blanchot's 
sense of the risks involved in examining the source of one's creativity and art's 
resistance to it is articulated by Coetzee in 'Truth in Autobiography' in terms of self- 
interest, secrets that the confessant or writer cannot afford to reveal (6). It is also 
comparable to the suggestive figure of the deckhands from 'Ile and His Man. ' But for 
Blanchot, Leiris and Bataille the artist's power lies in the willingness to embrace 
one's inspiration and flaunt one's secrets, as we find in Petersburg. 
Among papers donated by Coetzee to the National English Literary Museum 
in Grahamstown are seminar notes on olive Schreiner (NELM 2002.13.2.3.4). 59 
Discussing Schreiner's career, Coetzee speculates about the source of her inspiration 
or, to be precise, about her apparently stalled inspiration following the success of 
Story of an African Farm. Ile attributes what he sees as her late creative paralysis to 
5' They are notes for an MA course at UCT in 1993. 
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her unwillingness 'to absorb herself deeply enough in the project to transform it and 
allow it to transform her. ' In other words, Schreiner fails to risk something of herself 
in her creative endeavours. In an extraordinary turn, Coetzee breaks with the 
discussion of Schreiner to admit: 'Of course I am talking about myself. Whenever we 
talk about something else we are talking about ourselves. ' But he closes off this 
autobiographical moment just as quickly, claiming that it is not in his interest to 
pursue this line of thought: 'But I choose not to reflect on it, turn myself back to look 
upon it (like Orpheus). Life is too short. (The meaning of the Orpheus story: you kill 
your inspiration by turning back to look at it. )' The wariness expressed here is typical 
of comments Coetzee has made in interviews about the risks to the creative enterprise 
of the kind of self-scrutiny demanded by forms such as the literary interview. His 
responses to Attwell's subtle questioning in Doubling the Point frequently evade this 
kind of analysis by deferring to what may or may not be in his interest, as a writer, to 
know, His comments on the influence of Ren6 Girard on his work are typical in this 
regard: 'Whatever the truth, I feel that questions of influence on my novel-writing are 
not for me to answer: they entail a variety of self-awareness that does me no good as 
a storyteller, as a site where fantasy should not be hampered by unnecessary 
introversions and doubts (105). ' But the comments on Schreiner are particularly 
interesting given Coetzee's discussion of the paralysing effects of Schreiner's 
perceived distance from her creative enterprise and his unprompted invocation of the 
myth of Orpheus. What Coetzee omits in this account of the Orpheus myth as a story 
of inspiration, is an acknowledgement that it is precisely the risks implicit in how one 
treats one's inspiration that gives inspiration its power. In this particular instance 
Coetzee chooses not to engage in the activity of creative self-scrutiny. 
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The myth of Orpheus and Eurydice is invoked from the beginning of Ae 
Master ofPetersburg and consistently throughout the novel to describe the nature of 
Dostoevsky's duty towards his stepson. For Dostoevsky this is not to mourn the 
passing of his son but to bring him back to life by conjuring his presence, using 
words and writing to breathe life into him. The earliest example sees Dostoevsky 
trying to conjure Pavel's presence in his own room by repeatedly invoking his name: 
Silently he forms his lips over his son's name, three times, four times. I le is trying to 
cast a spell. But over whom: over a ghost or over himself? Ile thinks of Orpheus 
walking backwards step by step, whispering the dead woman's name, coaxing her 
out of the entrails of hell; of the wife in graveclothes with the blind, dead eyes 
following him, holding out limp hands before her like a sleepwalker. No flute, no 
lyre, just the word, the one word, over and over. When death cuts all other links, 
there remains still the name. Baptism: the union of a soul with a name, the name it 
will carry into eternity. Barely breathing he forms the syllables again: Pavel. (5) 
In this early reference to the myth the focus is on the power of Orpheus to bring the 
dead back to life and by implication, the power available to the writer to do likewise. 
But while this compulsion and necessity governs all references to the myth in the 
novel, subsequent examples focus more on the risks implicit in such an activity. 
Some pages later, seated at the desk in Pavel's room, Dostoevsky is flooded with 
what he calls memories, among them a scene of farewell. Trying to understand the 
significance of the images, there is a break in the third person voice of the narrative. 
The narrative seems to move into direct address (speech or thought), but while '1' is 
used throughout the passage, it is not clear that it always refers to the same person; 
the move to the first person might collapse the distinction between the 'he' of the 
narrative and the 'I' of Dostoevsky's experience, or between Dostoevsky and Pavel: 
'Because I am he. Because he is I. Something there that I seek to grasp: the moment 
before extinction when the blood still courses, the heart still beats. [ ... ] Not oblivion 
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but the moment before oblivion' (53). The scene he imagines is Pavel's death but it is 
also an echo of the 'time out of time' by which he (and Myshkin) describe the 
moment before an epileptic seizure: a brief moment of clarity which is followed 
almost immediately by the annihilation of the seizure. In other words, this is a 
moment of openness and vulnerability but also of risk. In Dostoevsky's mind the 
'moment before oblivion' becomes a scene of departure and farewell which is 
articulated in the terms of the myth of Orpheus: 
All that I am left to grasp for: the moment of that gaze, salutation and farewell in one, 
past all arguing, past all pleading 
I ... I I bold your head between my hands. I kiss your brow. I kiss your lips. 
The rule: one look, one only; no glancing back. But I look back. 
Forever I look back. Forever I am absorbed in your gaze. A field of crystal points, 
dancing, winking, and I one of them. Stars in the sk7, and fires on the plain 
0 0 answering them. Two realms signalling to each other. (54) 0 
The collapse in the narrative voice seems to be a symptom of a more profound loss of 
consciousness or self-consciousness when, in full knowledge of the consequences, he 
dares to look back on the forbidden image. Indeed, given the consequences of looking 
back in the story of Orpheus and Eurydice, it is almost a confession: 'But I look back 
[ ... ] Forever I look back. Forever I am absorbed in your gaze' (54). Yet in keeping 
with Blanchot's discussion of the myth, there is no option but to look back: 'not to 
look back would be no less a betrayal' (178). In other words, there is no real 
calculation of interests at work in this episode; Dostoevsky cannot choose not to look 
back, as Coetzee does in his piece about Schreiner. So while the look back is similar 
to Coetzee's double thought, the characteristic motion of self-consciousness, in the 
situation staged in the novel self-awareness is more of a compulsion than a choice. 
60 The image of the deckhands in 'He and His Man' seems to me to echo this passage. 
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Dostoevsky's awareness of the threat that overshadows the power of Orpheus 
does not inhibit his willingness to embrace the myth. Rather, be grows bolder and 
more resolute in facing the risks involved: 
On the streets of Petersburg, in the turn of a head here, the gesture of a hand there, I 
see you, and each time my heart lifts as a wave does. Nowhere and everywhere, torn 
and scattered like Orpheus. Young in days, chryseos, golden, blessed. 
The task left to me: to gather the hoard, put together the scattered parts. Poet, 
lyre-player, enchanter, lord of resurrection, that is what I am called to be. (152) 
Once more we have Dostoevsky in the role of Orpheus assuming the obligation to 
resurrect Pavel, but crucially, Pavel is also figured as Orpheus, albeit the dead 
Orpheus for whom risk is no longer an issue. 
It is in the final chapter, however, that references to Orpheus acquire their full 
force: 
An image comes to him that for the past month he has flinched from: Pavel, naked 
and broken and bloody, in the morgue; the seed in his body dead too, or dying. 
Nothing is private anymore. As unblinkingly as he can he gazes upon the 
body parts without which there can be no fatherhood. And his mind goes again to the 
museum in Berlin, to the goddess-fiend drawing out the seed from the corpse, saving 
it. 
Thus at last the time arrives and the hand that holds the pen begins to move. 
But the words it forms are not words of salvation. (241) 
Dostoevsky's efforts throughout the novel have been directed to bringing Pavel back 
to life, conjuring him up in words or breathing life into Pavel's own words. But in 
this final section of the novel he accepts that this will not happen, at least not in the 
form he expected: 'Ultimately it will not be given to him to bring the dead boy back 
to life. Ultimately, if he wants to meet him, he will have to meet him in death' (237- 
38). One way of meeting him in death is to gaze on his corpse, as he does in the 
above scene. This scene contrasts starkly with Barton's resistance to describing the 
body of Friday in Foe. Of course, the differences between looking on the corpse of a 
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relative and the body of a man who is apparently in a position of dependence (and 
marked in terms of racial difference) are great. Rather, what I would like to draw 
attention to is the difference between Barton's (compelled? strategic? ) restraint and 
Dostoevsky's lack of restraint, which is at the same time compulsive and highly self- 
conscious. The emphasis on the unblinking gaze, his refusal of any consolation, is in 
keeping with the chapter as a whole: 'refuse the chloroform of terror or 
unconsciousness' or 'as long as he does not flinch' (234,235). Couched in the terms 
of Orpheus' betrayal of Eurydice, Dostoevsky's gaze leaves him exposed to all kinds 
of risk; his intention is 'not to emerge from the fall unscathed, but to ... wrestle with 
the whistling darkness' (235). While he has consistently and self-consciously 
engaged with the world as material for his art, it seems more and more that he is 
willing to look on his stepson as a source of inspiration while simultaneously 
betraying him. 
In addition, the doubling of the figure of Orpheus that I mention earlier occurs 
again in the final chapter: 'Letters from the whirlwind. Scattered leaves, which he 
gathers up; a scattered body, which he reassembles' (246). In this way we can see that 
in the process of attempting to resurrect his stepson, Dostoevsky is also resurrecting 
Orpheus, that is to say, bringing the figure of the author back to life. Beside his 
stepfather, the master author, Pavel represented a more private dimension of 
authorship: unpublished, read only by those closest to him who sought hints of 
reproach, love or political radicalism in his notebooks and diaries. In other words, it 
is the private writing subject that Coetzee attempts to resurrect in Petersburg. lie 
compares his exploitation of Pavel's memory to the goddess saving the seed from the 
corpse, a seed which is undoubtedly writing. But just as Pavel cannot be imagined as 
himself, this is not quite the dimension of authorship that we get. In these pages the 
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beloved stepson becomes Stavrogin, but so too does the author -a cold, amoral figure 
willing to risk everything. 
But what does this further twist on the figure of authorship as confession 
imply? "Stavrogin" comes into being in the two stories, 'The Apartment' and 'The 
Child, ' that Dostoevsky writes into his stepson's diary. Although the chapter is titled 
'Stavrogin, ' and the similarities between the stories and The Possessed leave little 
doubt about the character's identity in the reader's mind, Stavrogin is not actually 
named in the stories. Rather: 'He is, to a degree, Pavel Isaev, though Pavel Isaev is 
not the name he is going to give himself' (242). In other words, in the creative 
process described here Dostoevsky in some sense becomes the character he is 
creating: 'In his writing he is in the same room ... And he is not himself any longer' 
(242). This is the field that 'he' and 'his man' attempts to untangle. Here, 'he' is not 
named, but he is recognisable as Stavrogin. 
While Dostoevsky's Stavrogin achieved greatest notoriety in the suppressed 
confession of 'At Tikhon's, ' the stories in Petersburg can only be understood as a 
confession in the light of the biographical context which Coetzee has painstakingly 
put in place and a reading of the stories as versions of this biography. Dostoevsky's 
sense of betrayal emerges not from his conviction that this is necessarily the case - he 
describes the character thus: 'It is a version that disturbs him. It is not the truth, or not 
yet the truth' (240) - but from his belief that Matryona will read the stories. The 
stories contain just enough detail - the white suit, the story about Maria Lebyatkin - 
to alert the young Matryona to the correspondence with Pavel. In addition, having 
consulted her on an alternative name - Dusha - 'the child' becomes the confessor to 
his depraved Stavrogin. Written in his hand, in Pavel's diary, it is not clear to what 
extent Dostoevsky views the stories as forgeries. But it is clear that aside from being 
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creative events, they are calculated to act on Matryona's innocence. To the extent that 
the entire chapter, 'Stavrogin, ' stages Dostoevsky self-consciously preparing for and 
writing these stories, it is a confession of betrayal and corruption on his part: he 
confesses that his intention is to betray Pavel's memory and corrupt Matryona's 
innocence. But, given the kind of creative process that is staged in the chapter, the 
betrayal is not simply the act that tarnished Pavel's memory for Matryona but the 
writer's openness to anything and to any version of Pavel. This, in Blanchot's terms, 
is the carelessness and recklessness of his creative enterprise: 'Ile must do what he 
cannot do: resign himself to what will come, speech or silence' (239). The chapter 
stages the risks of the creative process as a form of gambling, and in the shape 
creativity takes in the stories, Dostoevsky sees himself as gambling with his soul. Ile 
describes himself as a voluptuary of the moment before the fall, the moment when 
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uncertainty reigned but doom beckoned: 'For which he will be damned' (242). In the 
stories he gambles with God: 'To corrupt a child is to force God. The device he has 
made arches and springs shut like a trap, a trap to catch God' (249). In return for 
whatever material gains attach to writing, 'he had to give up his soul' (250). The 
stakes for this particular gamble could not be higher and the confession could not be 
articulated in more powerful terms. The other confessions that occur in the novel are 
Dostoevsky's insincere confessions to his wife, about his relationships with other 
women but mostly about his relentless gambling and the huge losses he incurs as a 
result (62,84-85,159). 61 Describing the pain that his gambling brings on his wife, 
Dostoevsky also manages to portray the allure of gambling: 'Without the risk, 
without subjecting oneself to the voice speaking from elsewhere in the fall of the 
61 'His indiscretions hitherto have been followed by remorse and, on the heels of remorse, a voluptuous 
urge to confess. These confessions, tortured in expression, yet vague in point of detail, have confused 
and infuriated his wife, bedevilling their marriage far more than the infidelities themselves, (62). 
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dice, what is left that is divineT (84) For this reason he continues to gamble and 
continues to confess. 
In spite of its close intertextual ties to The Possessed, The Master of 
Petersburg is overwhelmed by the force of the fiction of Dostoevsky's grief at his 
stepson's death. One could use the novel's metaphor of possession to describe 
Dostoevsky as possessed by grief to such an extent that it overwhelms all other 
demands and interests: 'there is a measure to all things now, including the truth, and 
that measure is Pavel' (167). We are in a situation when, according to Dostoevsky, 
'either the heart speaks or the page remains blank' (97). For most of the novel, his 
attempts to write are abortive and the page does indeed remain blank. But not in the 
final chapter. In 'Stavrogin' Dostoevsky sets aside Pavel as a measure and obeys only 
the risk of the creative process, a gamble whose stakes are determined by the 
biography that Coetzee has invented for Dostoevsky and the overwhelming grief that 
pervades the novel. But the risks that attach to writing relate not only to the 
possibility of betraying one's inspiration like Orpheus, but of being seen to; that is to 
say, one runs the risk of being read autobiographically. 
The issues relating to staging and reading the biographical within a work of 
fiction are particularly loaded in the case of Petersburg. Writing about the novel, 
many critics have quietly inserted the facts of Coetzee's own biography into the 
critical record: his son Nicolas died in an accident in 1989 at the age of twenty 
three . 
62 In most cases, the fact duly noted - or, indeed, footnoted - it remains to the 
reader to decide what, if any, bearing it has on one's experience of reading 
Petersburg. Attridge comes closest to articulating the challenge presented by the 
biography by suggesting that Petersburg might well be a confession of personal 
62 Among the critics who mention Nicolas Coetzee are Attridge, Lawlan, Gallagher, and Gaylard. 
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betrayal on the part of Coetzee. Attridge admits - or confesses - his reluctance to 
4carry out the betrayals' that exploring this aspect of the novel would entail and that 
he experiences the novel's implicit invitation to do so as a challenge to his own 
'preconceptions about fiction, about the act of literature' (136). There can be little 
doubt that in its preoccupation with the currency of the writer's reputation and 
personal life, the circulation of rumours and the persistent tendency to read the 
biographical back into the fiction, Petersburg invites a reading that explains its 
transformations of Yhe Possessed in terms of Coetzee's own loss and grief. But 
unlike 'Stavrogin, ' which is confessional insofar as it can refer to the invented 
biography throughout the novel to verify a transgressor (Dostoevsky), victims (Pavel 
and Matryona) and a crime (leaving the story for Matryona to read), there is no 
referential frame by which to read any aspect of Petersburg as a confession by 
Coetzee. 
But the novel in many ways takes this kind of reading as its theme. By 
pointing to the way in which the historical Dostoevsky has been read and to how 
Dostoevsky and Pavel are read within the novel, Coetzee opens himself to a similar 
kind of invasive reading. Given the novel's preoccupation with risk and gambling, 
one could also say that if Coetzee has written a novel that invites a reading that 
explains it in terms of his son's death, then he is risking the possibility that it will be 
read as such. And most ominously, in the absence of a Tikhon figure, reading is 
mediated through the figure of the confessor as predatory spider, who observes no 
limits and threatens the private writing subject. This is exemplified in Maximov's 
veiled threat to Dostoevsky: Me prospect that after our decease a stranger will come 
sniffing through our possessions, opening drawers, breaking seals, reading intimate 
letters - such would be a painful prospect to any of us, I am sure' (39). 
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A reading that would restrict itself to these terms would not just be a betrayal 
of Coetzee, as Attridge fears, but a betrayal of the way in which the novel 
painstakingly lays out the tenris of its reference. Yet it runs the risk of being read in 
this way, and of seeming to have been conceived and written in this same gambling 
spirit when, like Dostoevsky, Coetzee gazes on his inspiration at the risk of betraying 
it. The author represented and resurrected in Petersburg is the private writing subject 
who experiences writing as a betrayal of lived experience and whose life is deeply 
affected by the experience of writing. 
In 'He and His Man' the deckhands - writer and creation? writer and 
inspiration? - do not dare to look up for fear of being distracted from the job at hand: 
'they pass each other by, too busy even to wave. ' Resurrecting the author as private 
writing subject runs the risk of dissolving the metaphor, creating the possibility and 
danger of 'two realms signalling to each other' (54). But this discontinuity can only 
be bridged figuratively, by the creative process itself. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
'Nothing is private anymore': Reinventing the Limits of Performance In Age of 
Iron and Disgrace 
I 
In the closing pages of Disgrace, as David Lurie tries to find words and music for the 
opera he is composing, he is prompted by the playful company of a young dog in the 
backyard of the animal welfare clinic that now serves as his place of work to consider 
writing a part for a dog into the score. The inclusion of the dog would be only the 
most recent reconception of a work that began as a revisiting of Byron's time in 
Ravenna but is now a reimagining of that time from the perspective of Byron's 
mistress, the middle aged and lonely Teresa Guiccioli. Aller all his efforts to adapt 
and accommodate new considerations into the opera, Lurie wonders if he would risk 
allowing the dog to howl alongside 'lovelorn Teresa' and thinks: 'Why not? Surely, 
in a work that will never be performed, all things are permitted? ' (215) 
Lurie has long since submitted to the comic impulse that seems to drive the 
opera and the inclusion of a dog is a further embrace of this. But the idea that resides 
in the comment - the notion that if the opera will never be staged by performers in 
real time, then it need not be determined by the demands of context, audience, genre, 
etc.; in short, in the absence of any limiting factor anything can be allowed - has far- 
reaching implications for a novel that itself offers little by way of the comic and in 
which so much seems to be at stake. The allusion to Dostoevsky's The Brothers 
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Karamazov sits uncomfortably with the comic tone of the opera; the challenge posed 
by Ivan's notorious comment that if God doesn't exist, then everything is permitted is 
one aspect of Dostoevsky's novel that leads Coetzee to see it as 'the battle pitched on 
the highest ground' (Diary 226). In the context of Lurie's highly allusive narrative, 
one cannot rule out the possibility that the reference to Dostoevsky is a kind of comic 
deflation at Lurie's own expense. But while the tone of the opera is comic,, Lurie 
nonetheless pursues the project seriously. And behind Lurie, stands Coetzee; his 
avowed regard for the Russian author makes it difficult to imagine that the allusion is 
either accidental or entirely comic. 
But can Lurie's claim that the work will never be performed be taken 
seriously? Once the score and libretto are written, who is to say that the opera will 
never be performed, let alone read, not to mention the fact that the act of writing and 
composing impose their own constraints. As it stands, Lurie is at least operating 
within the conventions of the opera form and working with historical material that 
places particular constraints on the project: 'He is inventing the music (or the music is 
inventing him) but he is not inventing the history' (186). Lurie's assertion comes to 
sound more like an attempt to install performance itself as a limit against which to 
measure actions, rather than a strategy to transcend the limitations of performance. In 
this regard, his statement echoes another Dostoevsky character; as Coetzee points out 
in 'Double Thoughts, ' the Underground Man claims that unlike Rousseau who lied 
out of vanity, 'he will have no readers and therefore ... will have no temptation to lie' 
(276). So, the attempt to suspend or remove limits that are perceived as inhibiting 
might just be a way of installing yet another limit. 
The concept of performance as something that takes place under specific 
conditions and subject to calculation and quantification is also treated seriously in 
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Disgrace. Etymologically, performance has its roots in the notion of carrying out or 
executing an action or a promise, or to achieve, complete, or finish something, and 
one definition describes the 'capabilities, productivity, or success of a machine, 
product, or person when measured against a standard' (OED). The novel's critique of 
instrumentalism and calculation is a critique of the idea of performance as something 
that can be measured and quantified, a critique that covers Lurie's new discipline of 
Communications as well as his appearance before the university committee charged 
with investigating allegations of sexual harassment against him. The acts of 
confession, testimony, apology, forgiveness and reconciliation - made and withheld - 
that structure the novel can also be described in terms of performance or 
performativity, after J. L. Austin. As I outline in chapter one, speech act theory 
attempts to delineate a kind of language that acts (performative) rather than states 
(constative) and to define the circumstances in which this can occur. The novel stages 
with such urgency the struggle to create and meet the conditions in which a 
felicitously performative speech act can be made that the nightmarish scenario of 
Ivan's statement looms in the background: in the absence of speech acts, conceived 
privately and in terms of their role in the law, everything is permitted. 
Like many of the novels I have discussed so far, 4ge of1ron and Disgrace are 
concerned with the limits within which certain speech acts can take place. But they 
are unique in articulating this problem specifically within the terms of speech act 
theory, in their attention to the contemporary historical situation in which they were 
composed and the determining effects of that situation on the availability of felicitous 
speech acts. If, as Derrida. suggests, the interest in speech act theory arose from a 
desire for speech acts to produce events and thereby 'master history, ' few places have 
experienced the need for this to occur more keenly than South Africa. The violent 
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events depicted in these two novels in particular make the need for pcrformative 
speech acts to influence events seem all the more urgent. 
In Age of Iron, Mrs Curren is preoccupied with the conditions in which her 
confession -a letter to be delivered to her daughter after her imminent death from 
cancer - can be successfully made and received. The novel engages with the 
conditions of confession that emerge in 'Double Thoughts, ' evoking the notion of 
death as a guarantee of sincerity in Mrs Curren's terminal illness and continuing 
Coetzee's preoccupation with the problem of address in the treatment of Verceuil, her 
confessor. But like Barbarians, Michael K, Foe and Petersburg, Age of Iron also 
stages this confession as self-interested and goal-oriented insofar as the letter is a plea 
to her daughter, a plea for salvation or redemption and a way of living on after her 
death. In this way, it is modelled on the confessional teleology of 'Double Thoughts. ' 
But it is so consistent in its observation of the conventions of confessional narrative 
that it seems to succeed in fulfilling the requirements of the trajectory. I will argue 
that Mrs Curren's careful negotiation of the conditions for a successful confession 
together with her openness and susceptibility to changes in those conditions allows 
her narrative to be experienced as a successful confession. 
In Disgrace, the limits within which speech acts can occur are experienced by 
the protagonists as so narrowly conceived that they make successful speech acts - 
confession, testimony - seem impossible. This contrasts with the potentially 
unlimited vulnerability to unpredictable and violent events in the novel. I will argue 
that the novel's critique of instrumentalism, which is conducted by depicting speech 
acts as potentially successful only under very limited and narrowly conceived 
conditions, is directed at the political expediency that informed the establishment of 
the TRC and the resulting limitations on the kind of justice that it was allowed to 
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deliver. As part of this critique the novel stages the possibility of suspending the 
limits and conditions of speech acts altogether, but ultimately the only potential for 
successful speech acts emerges in attempts to renegotiate and delineate limits and 
conditions under which accommodations can take place, as we find in the event of 
Lucy's 'marriage' to Petrus. As in Age of Iron this necessitates a certain 
responsiveness and openness to a new set of conditions, but it also restores the 
horizon of the idea of justice and the idea of the truth that informs all of Coetzee's 
engagements with confession. 
11 
Age of Iron and Disgrace, published almost ten years apart in 1990 and 1999 
respectively, are the two novels in the Coetzee oeuvre that address themselves most 
explicitly to the historical, political and social context in which they were written. 
Age of Iron closes not with the deathly embrace of Verceuil but the dates of 
composition of the novel: '1986-89' (181). The authority that Mrs Curren claims in 
the novel is also inextricably linked to this context: 'my truth: how I lived in these 
times, in this place' (118). As Attridge illustrates in his reading of Disgrace, it is 
equally preoccupied with 'the times' and their impact on the lives and events depicted 
in the novel (Coetzee 165-72). David Lurie finds 'the times' unreceptive to his 
attitudes and actions thus precipitating devastating changes in his personal 
circumstances and his daughter Lucy refuses to look any further than her immediate 
context to justify the decisions she takes in the aftermath of a violent attack on her 
farm, 'in this place, at this time [... ] This place being South Africa' (112). Alongside 
the undoubted emphasis on the South African context, South Africa is also situated in 
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a wider global context of travel, emigration, commerce and values, as illustrated by 
Attridge (93,166-69) and Stanton. 
But the preoccupation with the historical and political conditions which form 
the backdrop to the composition of both novels is not merely contextual; both novels 
self-consciously stage the determining effects of these conditions. In Age of1ron the 
conditions of possibility for the entire narrative lie in its context, as the novel 
proposes to stage the final address of the terminally ill Mrs Curren to her daughter 
whose residency in the United States was initially at least an act of protest against 
South Africa's apartheid state. The novel is scrupulous in its attention to the 
conditions which give meaning to this narrative: the plausibility of the writing project 
from day to day, its legitimacy as an address to an other or interlocutor guaranteed by 
Verceuil's 'promise' to post the letter to her daughter, and its distinction between her 
spoken confessions to Verceuil and the act of writing them down on paper for her 
daughter to read (75). And all this before one considers the authority that accrues to 
Mrs Curren's narrative by virtue of being her last word, guaranteed by her imminent 
death. In short, the novel goes to great lengths to legitimise its conceit, ensuring that 
the process of confessing or testifying that it sets in motion can be satisfactorily 
completed, at least until the final lines. Or, to put it in the terms invited by its 
preoccupation with confession, it is concerned to guarantee its felicity as a 
performative speech act. 
In contrast, as Lurie's ex-wife Rosalind points out, his catastrophic loss of 
status is brought about by the fact that he did not 'perform well' when invited to 
explain his actions before a university committee charged with investigating 
allegations of sexual harassment against him (188). Indeed, his failure to 'perform 
well' by either of the OED's definitions - 'to carry out' or 'to complete or finish' - 
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has been the subject of considerable critical interest even if the notion of measuring 
performance is itself the subject of critique in the novel. 
Given the preoccupation with confession in Coetzee's work, it is not 
surprising that it features prominently in the two novels which confront the South 
African context in which they were written most directly. What must be remarked on, 
however, is that the momentous changes in South African society in the period 
between the publication of these novels seems to have intensified Coetzee's 
scepticism about the availability and efficacy of confession as a performative speech 
act. Specifically, if Age of Iron represents an attempt to negotiate, however 
successfully, the conditions required for confession to take place, Disgrace presents 
an almost relentless critique of the model of performativity which proposes to lay 
down and measure such conditions - in a new context which does precisely this - to 
the extent that the subject of critical scrutiny in the novel is the confession and 
testimony that are not made. In the starkest terms Disgrace asks what hope there is 
for performative speech or what meaning is available to symbolic actions, when 
events have the power to impose themselves with such terrible consequences. 
The specific context engaged by Disgrace is the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. Emerging from the negotiated settlement that would 
eventually see a transfer of power in South Africa from the National Party to the 
African National Congress, the TRC has been described as a 'quasi-legal' or 'quasi- 
juridical' body, performing a legal function but also inflected by Christian and 
psychoanalytic discourses of reconciliation and healing (Sanders, lmbiguffles I and 
184). The terms of its juridical function were defined so that in the event that the 
conditions laid out were met, amnesty from prosecution could be granted. The 
limitations of the kind of justice available from the TRC, its perceived 
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instrumentalism - inviting narrative with the goal of achieving healing or amnesty - 
and its conflation of different (incompatible) discourses are the target of Coetzee's 
critique in Disgrace. To a significant extent, David Lurie's refusal to provide 
anything but the most cursory explanation for his relationship with Melanie Isaacs to 
the university committee is a rejection of the quasi-judicial model of the TRC that the 
hearing invokes. More precisely, it is a refusal to submit to its procedures and accept 
its conditions, asserting his right to 'Freedom of speech. Freedom to remain silent' 
(188). Lucy's later refusal to report the rape to the police and again in her refusal to 
justify this decision to her father, insisting that what happened to her was a 'private 
matter, ' also involves a rejection of legal avenues of redress. Crucially, however, 
David's refusal to confess is grounded in his adherence to a strict understanding of 
legal procedure; he later insists on the law as the appropriate way to deal with the 
attack at the farm: 'I want those men caught and brought before the law and 
punished' (119). On the other hand, Lucy's rejection of the law as a means of redress 
suggests a more radical critique of the kind of justice available through the law than 
David's rejection of the perforinative requirements of the committee. 
In How to Do Things with Words, Austin exhaustively describes different 
kinds of performative utterances and the conditions required for them to carry out 
their function felicitously; his stated aim is to 'consider how many senses there may 
be in which to say something is to do something, or in saying something we do 
something, or even by saying something we do something' (109). For Austin, such 
utterances are not susceptible to judgement as true or false, but may be happy or 
unhappy, felicitous or infelicitous, sincere or insincere, all of which would effect their 
successful completion. To reach successful completion they should recognisable, 
verifiable, repeatable. If the conditions which make such recognition possible are not 
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met, the speech act is considered to have been a misfire. In addition, the performative 
conditions for the successful completion of the speech acts at issue in these novels - 
confession, apology, testimony, forgiveness - is that they are sincere, honest, even 
selfless. If this condition is not met, the speech act is considered to have been an 
abuse. These qualities are obviously inconsistent with the demands for veriflability 
and repeatability, and this irreconcilability is the focus of Derrida's writings on the 
subject. In addition, many of the conditions and limits that apply to confessional 
narratives (so conditions giving rise to misfire if they are not met) are attempts to 
prevent the charge of abuse. For Derrida, all confessions - and indeed all speech acts 
- are susceptible to the charge of abuse, as I point out in my discussion of the 
performative dimension of supposedly constative speech acts in chapter 1. 
Many of the performative utterances described by Austin are official or legal 
ceremonies such as naming, marrying, swearing, and his critics have highlighted the 
potentially regulatory function of the field he analyses. Hillis Miller notes the 
frequent references to 'the law, to lawyers, judges and legal theorists' (Speech Acts 
132) and, as I point out in chapter 1, performative conditions aside, speech acts 
frequently rely on the authority of the law for their successful completion. The law, of 
course, relies to a significant degree on utterances that might be considered to be 
performative speech acts, albeit that their successful completion is guaranteed by 
conventions codified in the law. A quasi-judicial institution, the TRC might be seen 
as extending and intensifying this reliance of the law on performative speech acts. 
If Austin's work presents a theory of language as essentially instrumental - he 
counts even literature among the 'uses' of language - his intention to isolate the 
conditions for felicitous performative utterances has initiated a tendency to measure 
and quantify the force and validity of speech acts and to emphasise above all else 
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their successful completion. Shoshana Felman singles out as Austin's fundamental 
gesture 'substituting, with respect to utterances of the language, the criterion of 
satisfaction for the criterion of truth' (Yhe Literary Speech . 4ct 61). But, as I point out 
in chapter 1, Derrida makes a virtue of the resistance of performative utterances to 
quantification, finding a clear ethical dimension in their immeasurability and 
resistance to economic models of exchange. This is particularly evident in his 
writings on forgiveness and confession. Yet in most cases where performative speech 
comes into play, it is invariably bound up in a system of calculation or quantification. 
So it is for most critiques of the TRC, the unspoken backdrop to Derrida's lecture on 
forgiveness. 
-4ge of Iron predates the political negotiations that would institute the TRC 
and the national spectacle that it would become. However, Neill argues in a recent 
essay that together with other confessional novels of the interrcgnum it created the 
conditions in which the TRC would eventually function: 'In the prominence which 
they gave to confession, these writers might be thought to have anticipated (and 
perhaps even helped to create the climate for) the elaborate rituals of public 
contrition, supervised by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, through which 
the post-apartheid state successfully averted the South African Day of Judgement' 
(4). He goes on to note that these novels also in a sense anticipate the scepticism 
about confession that is to be found in Disgrace. 
As I suggest in chapter 1, among the key texts of the interrcgnum period we 
might count Coetzee's 1985 essay 'Double Thoughts, ' which in its own way is 
concerned with the circumstances in which confession can reach successful 
completion. In its dialogue with the model of confession that emerges in the essay, 
Age ofIron is typical of Coetzee's work of this period. 
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Coetzee could not have foreseen the spectacle of the TRC when he was 
drafting 'Double Thoughts' in the early eighties, nor does he explicitly engage with 
the idea of confession as a speech act in the Austinian sense, but the tensions within 
the essay between the conditions in which confession might take place and the 
rigorous policing of motives and interests on the one hand and the potential operation 
of grace on the other, tensions set in motion by the confessional teleology he 
describes, foreshadow some of the debates around the workings of the commission. 
Indeed, the TRC might be seen as an institutional realisation of the 'new collective, 
projected in Gordimer's 'Living in the Interregnum' and, as I have illustrated in 
previous chapters, an agent of the desired transformation that is the subject of fantasy 
in many of Coetzee's novels of this period (includingAge qf1ron). 
But the TRC is an institution negotiated in a fraught political context, not the 
projected horizon of 'the idea of the truth. ' So rigorous is the critique of 
instrumentalism in Disgrace that the model of confession provided by the essay 
comes to seem instrumental itself, mirroring too closely the desire to measure the 
performance of the confessant. At the same time, given the violent events of the 
novel, the need for speech acts - as opposed to violent acts - to shape events could 
not be greater. (Mastering history is not an option in Disgrace; Attwell and Sanders 
have pointed to the gloomy and vengeful nature of history in the novel ['Race in 
Disgrace' 338 and 4mbiguities)). In this context I will describe Lucy's 
accommodation with Petrus as simultaneously restoring the horizon of 'the idea of 
the truth' and 'the idea of justice' that is obscured by the instrumentalism of speech 
acts and itself a kind of speech act that allows for a new beginning. 
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III 
Prompted by a suggestion from David Attwell in an interview conducted shortly 
before the publication of Age ofIron that at a deep level his work projects 'a certain 
faith in the idea, or the possibility, of an ethical community, ' Coetzee commented on 
the novel's preoccupation with the conditions for speaking: 
... there is also the entire performance (in an Austinian sense) of the book itself as the message of someone speaking from the jaws of death, as a backward herald, so to 
speak, a herald looking and speaking back. Much of the book is in fact taken up with 
the question of whether performative conditions for messengerhood are met 
(conditions involving authority to speak, above all). (340) 
Coetzee's response indicates some of the ways in which Age ofIron attempts to stage 
the performative conditions for speaking: the authority of the dying and of Mrs 
Curren's narrative as a last word, the necessity of Vcrceuil's role as messenger so that 
her daughter might receive the letter, and the extent to which she can speak 
authoritatively of the events in Cape Town in this period. Age of Iron is marked by 
Mrs Curren's self-conscious negotiation of these conditions for speaking, a kind of 
speaking that she understands in explicitly confessional terms: 'As far as I can 
confess, to you I confess' (124). Thus in Age of Iron the successful completion of 
Mrs Curren's confession relies in the first place on her imminent death and secondly 
it becomes a question of trust as she must rely on Verceuil to fulfil her final wishes. 63 
The other significant performative act of the novel, Mrs Curren's suggestion that she 
try to retrieve some symbolic capital from her death by setting herself alight outside 
government buildings, is fundamentally flawed as it would not be received or 
understood as a meaningful symbolic act in those circumstances. While the 
63 The nature of this trust is the subject of Attridge's discussion of the novel (91-112). 
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conditions for elaborate performative gestures do not obtain, Mrs Curren's 
confession, predicated on the impossible trust in Verceuil, is made, whether or not it 
is received. And if the proposed public suicide would fail by the exacting standards of 
Florence, Mrs Curren's housekeeper, the novel shows Mrs Curren opening herself to 
a different kind of public and to public judgement, which suggests the possibility of 
the 'ethical community' Attwell proposes in his question above. 
One of the key problems with confessional narrative identified by Coetzee in 
'Double Thoughts' is the question of closure: how does the secular confessant, for 
whom absolution in the Christian sense is not available, successfully end his or her 
confession? In the essay as in the fiction (see my discussion of Barbarians) the 
ending that affords the confessant the least opportunity for self-deception and double 
thought is the ultimate closure of death, outlined in Coetzee's discussion of Tolstoy's 
A Confession and Dostoevsky's Yhe Idiot. Ippolit's confession in The Idiot, according 
to Coetzee, is the closest we come in that novel to an authoritative confession 
precisely because of the circumstances in which it occurs: 'Ilis confession belongs to 
last things, it is a last thing, and therefore has a status different from any critique of it. 
The sincerity of the motive behind last confessions cannot be impugned, he says, 
because that sincerity is guaranteed by the death of the confessant' (284). But the 
eventual failure of Ippolit's experiment in truth-telling places the authority of these 
limits in doubt. Instead, his 'Explanation' comes to seem like a seed which will allow 
him to live on. Confession, then, even in the shadow of death, is a way of living on 
rather than achieving closure. 
As I point out in the introduction, critics who have sought to relate the 
confession essay to Coetzee's fiction have frequently done so through the teleology 
implicit in his description of the process of which confession is just one part - 
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'transgression, confession, penitence, absolution' - focussing for the most part on the 
successful completion of this cycle, allowing the confession to deliver closure 
through absolution or some proposed secular equivalent. I take as typical of the forms 
this critique usually takes essays on Age ofIron which emphasise the novel's reliance 
on death as a guarantee of truthfulness (Collingwood-Whittick, Head), the 
significance of Verceuil as confessor, and, sceptical of the ability of confession to 
deliver grace, its availability through other means (Neill). 64 
In keeping with the proximity of confession to death throughout Coetzee's 
writings, Age of Iron in a sense unites the two anecdotes recounted by Foe to Susan 
Barton in Foe about a woman who hopes to postpone death by confessing and 
another who hopes to live on through her daughter: Mrs Curren's confession both 
postpones the moment of the end and invests in the moment beyond the end by 
addressing her confession to her daughter: 'This is my life, these words, these 
tracings of the movements of crabbed digits over the page. These words, as you read 
them, if you read them, enter you and draw breath again. They are, if you like, my 
way of living on. Once upon a time you lived in me as once upon a time I lived in my 
mother; as she still lives in me, as I grow towards her, may I live in you' (120). Like 
Coetzee's staging of confession elsewhere, the possible self-intcrestedness of the 
confessional narrative places in doubt the authority claimed by her proximity to 
death. 
The authority of death is already comprehensively undermined in the novel - 
by the force of the other deaths that are taking place around Mrs Curren and by her 
awareness of the conditions on which her narrative relies and her attempts to meet 
these conditions (and for the most part, failing). Death is self-consciously staged as 
64 For a fuller discussion of these essays see my Introduction (9-10). 
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the limit which becomes the condition of possibility for the entire novel and the 
deeply private, final address to her daughter that is staged within it: 'Death is the only 
truth left. Death is what I cannot bear to think. At every moment when I am thinking 
of something else, I am not thinking death, am not thinking the truth' (23). But if, 4ge 
of Iron charts this gradual movement towards death, its setting (and composition) in 
Cape Town in the late 1980s falls in the shadow of another projected end: the fall of 
the apartheid state. While it is tempting to identify a common purpose in these two 
imminent endings, in other w6rds to view Mrs Curren's cancer as a metaphor for the 
pathology of apartheid (see Attridge 102) -a strategy she resorts to herself, with little 
effect - the novel in fact stages these endings as competing horizons: "'Your days are 
numbered, " I used to whisper once upon a time, to them who will now outlast me' 
(9). In Attwell's terms the novel stages a 'conflict of limits' between the personal and 
the historical (121). And while Mrs Curren repeatedly asserts the intimate nature of 
her narrative and the status of the letter itself as 'private papers, ' what meaning 
accrues to it is established by the twin horizons of her personal journey towards death 
in a country that lurches through an ongoing crisis. 
As the novel progresses, the competing horizon of history shifts from the 
public figures parading on the television to the specific form of Mrs Curren's 
domestic, Florence, and her family. Through Florence Mrs Curren gets an insight into 
the world of the Cape Flats, in her accounts of the chaos taking place in the schools, 
in the attitudes of her son and his friend, and in two trips to Guguletu township. 
Witnessing the aftermath of Bheki's death in Guguletu, she is acutely aware of her 
irrelevance to the mourning crowd or the on-looking security forces, a point 
underlined again in her exile from her house following the police attack on John. 
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Yet it is her overt attempt to push the limits of what death might mean that 
drives home her marginal status in the society. She suggests to Verccuil that she is 
willing to set herself alight in her car outside the official buildings on Government 
Avenue as a protest against the policies and actions of the apartheid state. She 
conceives of the idea as a means to yield something from her life: 'I am trying to 
work out what I can get for it' (104). But she realises finally that she may not get 
anything for it (indeed, that the idea of getting something for it is itself a false one). 
She finds no sign that the act she intends to be deeply symbolic would find any 
understanding: 'These public shows, these manifestations - this is the point of the 
story - how can one ever be sure what they stand for? An old woman sets herself on 
fire, for instance. Why? Because she has been driven mad? Because she is in despair? 
Because she has cancer? I thought of painting a letter on the car to explain. But what? 
A? B? C? What is the right letter for my case? And why explain anyway? Whose 
business is it but my ownT (105) But of course if her intention is to claim some 
symbolic force for her death then it is disingenuous to suggest that it might be private. 
The instinct to 'get something for it' turns out to be not unlike the confessant's desire 
for absolution: 'I want to sell myself, redeem myself, but am full of confusion about 
how to do it' (107). But like the confessant's desire for absolution, the conditions in 
which death might be meaningful arc beyond her control. Ifer death in these 
circumstances does not have symbolic currency. 'It is like trying to spend a drachma. 
A perfectly good coin somewhere else, but not here. Suspiciously marked' (152). 
Like the 'Explanation' of Ippolit Terentyev, her desire for a public spectacle 
also runs the risk of being a desire to live on through some symbolic value. In 
keeping with the self-consciousness of her narrative, she sees the falseness that lies 
behind the instinct: 'The truth is, there was always something false about that 
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impulse, deeply false, no matter to what rage or despair it answered' (129). While her 
revaluation of the desire for symbolic value seems to emerge from the self-conscious 
spiral of thought typical of confession, she identifies Florence as her true audience: 
'If Florence were passing by, with Hope at her side and Beauty on her back, would 
she be impressed by the spectacle? Would she even spare it a glance? A juggler, a 
clown, an entertainer, Florence would think: not a serious person. And stride on' 
(129). Florence's judgement becomes the benchmark by which Mrs Curren measures 
the seriousness of her positions: 'Florence is the judge. [ ... ] If the life I live is an 
examined life, it is because for ten years I have been under examination in the court 
of Florence' (129). 
While Mrs Curren experiences Florence's presence as an exacting judgement 
on her insignificance to the events occurring in Cape Town in the late 1980s, the 
more overtly confessional qualities of her narrative could be seen as a kind of 
advocacy for herself and the life she lives. While she never explicitly expresses the 
desire for absolution, she wishes for salvation and redemption, and at several points 
describes her narrative as a plea. She is making a general case for the life she has 
lived, even suggesting that this is constitutive to the confessional form and the first 
person it uses. Addressing John, she speculates that he sees her first and foremost as 
'I, a white' (72) but (drawing on Thucydides) notes that every 'F claims some kind of 
exceptionality- 'A word of protest: I, the exception. [ ... ] The truth is, given time to 
speak, we would all claim to be exceptions. For each of us there is a case to be made. 
We all deserve the benefit of the doubt' (73). But the nature of the plea that she 
addresses to her daughter is quite different; she is pleading for love, forgiveness, and 
even company. This is initially the subject of her confession to Verccuil, admitting a 
deep desire for her daughter to return, to utter the words 'Save me! 1 (67) She real ises 
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the burden this places on Verceuil: 'How tedious these confessions, these pleas, these 
demands! ' (67) But it is of course also a deeply embedded plea to her daughter. 
This is also true of the more overtly confessional moments in the narrative - 
overtly confessional because staged as disclosures that are then subject to a rigorously 
stylised revaluation that seems to speak directly to the dynamics of confession as 
outlined in 'Double Thoughts. ' The first such moment occurs after she has seen the 
body of Bheki and his comrades laid out in Guguletu. Mrs Curren describes the scene 
in terms of a coming-to-awareness, an exposure to a reality of which she can no 
longer deny awareness in good faith: 'I thought of the boy's open eyes. I thought: 
What did he see as his last sight on earth? I thought: This is the worst thing I have 
witnessed in my life. And I thought: Now my eyes are open and I can never close 
them again' (94-95). With echoes of the magistrate from Barbarians, this highly 
stylised double thought suggests that even this harsh awareness can be circumvented, 
might be redirected to more self-interested purposes, as she goes on to acknowledge 
in an explicit warning to her daughter: 'I ask you to draw back. I tell you this story 
not so that you will feel for me but so that you will learn how things are. [ ... ]I am the 
one writing: 1,1. So I ask you: attend to the writing, not to me. If lies and pleas and 
excuses weave among the words, listen for them. Do not pass them over, do not 
forgive them easily. Read all, even this adjuration, with a cold eye' (95-96). 
Later, her confession is broken into stages - the first, second, third words 
tending it would appear towards the last word, but not reaching this point of 
authority. She firstly confesses to wanting salvation, but being unable to accept 
loving John, loving the unlovable, as her route to salvation. This in turn leads her to 
consider the prospect that her love for her daughter is not what she thought: 'The 
more I love you, the more I ought to love him. The less I love him, the less, perhaps, I 
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love you' (125). But it leads to a more shameful admission still, a desire for her 
daughter: 'Come, says this letter: do not cut yourself off from me. My third word' 
(127). 
The final example of the overtly confessional occurs after the death of John, 
as she lies in the open air with Verceuil. Her disclosure is that she had calculated 
endless shame to be the cost of living in South Africa, that she is a good person who 
has not shirked the dishonour of her circumstances, and is willing to admit this. "'It is 
a confession I am making here this morning, Mr. Verceuil, ' I said, 'as full a 
confession as I know how. I withhold no secrets. I have been a good person, I freely 
confess to it. I am a good person still. What times these are when to be a good person 
is not enough! "' (150) But she is now forced to revise this position: 'What I had not 
calculated on was that more might be called for than to be good. For there are plenty 
of good people in this country. We are two a penny, we good and nearly-good. What 
the times call for is quite different from goodness. The times call for heroism' (151). 
But after making this admission she finds that Verceuil is asleep. Suddenly the 
weighty concepts of goodness and heroism fall rather flat and she questions the 
validity of the sentiments - of the confession - when they appear not to have been 
received: 'Is a true confession still true if it is not heardT (151) Significantly, she 
does not question the truth of the confession, the sincerity of the confession one 
might even say, but she questions the extent to which it can count as a true confession 
in the absence of one of its key performative conditions. To use Austin's terms, she is 
concerned that it might be a misfire rather than an abuse. 
The seriousness of the confession is undermined further by her subsequent 
actions - going to the toilet behind a bush in the open air. Indeed, if her narrative at 
this stage is informed by a principle of disclosure, it is functioning even more 
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rigorously in the staging of the narrative: 'On our flattened out box in the vacant lot 
we must have been visible to every passer-by. That is how we must be in the eyes of 
the angels:. people living in houses of glass, our every act naked' (151). One is 
conscious, at this point, that Mrs Curren is a speaking body, uttering her confession to 
another body. If the confession is undermined by Verceuil's failure to listen, it is at 
the same time strengthened by the extreme physical circumstances in which she finds 
herself. 
Early in the novel, having just received the news that the cancer she is 
suffering from is terminal, Mrs Curren imagines two competing views of the afterlife. 
The first she calls heaven: 'a hotel lobby with a high ceiling and the Art of Fugue 
coming softly over the public address system' (22). This is prompted by her 
rcalisation, playing Bach on the piano, that she has an audience in Verceuil. In the 
course of her performance, Mrs Curren finds that occasionally 'the real thing 
emerged, the real music, the music that does not die, confident, serene' and that Bach 
himself represents 'pure spirit' (21). She wonders if the unchanging, essential quality 
of the music, is embodied, however briefly and imperfectly, in her and Verccuil: 
'Where does that spirit find itself now? In the echoes of my fumbling performance 
receding through the ether? [ ... ] Have our two 
hearts, our organs of love, been tied 
for this brief while by a cord of soundT (22). 
After some pages in which her attention is taken to the historical realities of 
Cape Town in the late 1980s through the seclusion of her barricaded home and the 
obscene news that makes its way through the television, music once more turns her 
thoughts to Verceuil and the afterlife. Listening to a recording of Bach's Goldberg 
Variations she again imagines sharing the experience with Verceuil: 'Against the 
garage wall the man was squatting, smoking, the point of his cigarette glowing. 
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Perhaps he saw me, perhaps not. Together we listened. At this moment, I thought, I 
know how he feels as surely as if he and I were making love' (27). This imagined but 
unconfirmed connection with Verceuil, now in the form of a physical union, leads her 
to rethink her idea of the afterlife: 
Though it came to me unbidden, though it filled me with distaste, I considered the 
thought without flinching. He and I pressed breast to breast, eyes closed, going down 
the old road together. Unlikely companions! Like travelling in a bus in Sicily, 
pressed face to face, body to body against a strange man. Perhaps that is what the 
afterlife will be like: not a lobby with armchairs and music but a great crowded bus 
on its way from nowhere to nowhere. Standing room only- on one's feet forever, 
crushed against strangers. The air thick, stale, full of sighs and murmurs: Sorry, 
sorry. Promiscuous contact. Forever under the gaze of others. An end to private life. 
(27) 
The sense of being crushed, the stale air, the apologies, the relentless exposure: 
everything in the second vision of the afterlife seems to fall well short of paradise. 
Indeed, Neill describes it as 'hell' (15). Yet the 'promiscuous contact' initiated first 
by Bach and intensified in Mrs Curren's imagination in a sense contrasts favourably 
with the anaesthetized hotel lobby of 'heaven. ' 
In the final pages of the novel Mrs Curren describes Verceuil as her 'shadow 
husband, ' this time in the private space of her bedroom rather than exposed to the 
public eye: 'We share a bed, folded one upon the other like a page folded in two, like 
two wings folded: old mates, bunkmates, conjoined, conjugal. Lectus genialls, lectus 
adversus' (174). The key difference between her earlier vision of the afIcrlife and 
these intimate scenes is that the latter bear no trace of the hellish, forced intimacy of 
the bus, nor the atmosphere of apology and regret. They undoubtedly bear witness to 
a compelled contact of a sort, and indeed to a loss of privacy that is imposed by 
circumstance, but under these circumstances this is no bad thing. That is to say, Mrs 
Curren's proximity to death not only provides the limit against which her confession 
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might be articulated but it also creates the conditions in which intimacy with the other 
can be achieved: as much as death is singular and hers alone, the loss of the private 
that its approach brings also occasions new forms of intimacy. 
IV 
In Ambiguities of Witnessing Sanders draws attention to the way in which the TRC 
played host to the words of the other; it was a forum that opened itself to a 
multiplicity of stories, voices and languages and it - the individuals involved and 
those who watched, or listened, or read- was altered, modified and stretched beyond 
its limits in the process. To my mind there are two kinds of critique of the TRC: those 
that focus on what it did not and could not do and those that focus on how it went 
about its task -a political one in the first instance, but also much more than this - of 
national unity and reconciliation. In their introduction to a journal special issue on 
post-apartheid literature, Attwell and Harlow point out that the TRC: 
makes no provision for natural justice; forgiveness in the name of peace has been 
elevated above justice in the name of principle. For the good of the nation, victims 
have often been obliged to accept a moral and material settlement that is less than 
satisfactory. [ ... ] by emphasizing individual acts of abuse, it has tended to obscure the systematically abusive social engineering that was apartheid. (2) 
In a similar vein, Mahmood Mamdani's critique focuses on the TRC's interpretation 
of its own remit and consequently the diminished truth that it produced. Ile finds that 
'reduced to "the context" or "the background" of gross human rights violations, 
apartheid was effectively written out of the report' (38). Sanders' book is unique in 
managing to focus on the actual workings of the commission while inscribing this 
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within a critique of the limits under which it operated, focusing on the way in which 
the commission's limited remit was subject to change by the testimony that came 
before it. 
As I have noted, the TRC might be seen as an institutional embodiment of the 
desired transformations that characterise confessional encounters in Coctzee's earlier 
novels, ostensibly providing a confessor, a democratic community to be rehabilitated 
into, and specific conditions to be observed in order to achieve 'the end of the 
episode' of apartheid. But if the desired transformations in these earlier examples are 
fraught with problems of bad faith and self-interestedness, then, as the critiques that I 
mention above indicate, the institutional working-out of this desire falls far short of 
'the idea of the truth' or the idea of justice that animates Coetzee's engagement with 
confession. And as those critics also point out, there is much at stake in the 'idea' of 
the TRC; Attwell and Harlow noted in 2000 that 'apartheid's legacy remains evident 
in extensive poverty, educational deprivation, and a warped criminal justice system 
which, because it was developed as an instrument of oppression, seems incapable of 
dealing with ordinary crime' (2). 
Published in 1999, Disgrace stages the desire and need for transformation 
with great urgency, but it also treats the attempted institutional solution to this with 
scepticism. For this reason, my discussion of the TRC and the novel will focus on the 
limitations of the commission or, specifically, on the limited conception ofjustice and 
limited application of the law that underpinned its formation, and which resulted in a 
diminished kind of resolution to the confessions it invited. I will argue that this is 
worked out in the novel in David's resistance to the quasi-judicial setting of the 
university inquiry and Lucy's rejection of legal avenues of redress for the rape. 
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An integral part of the negotiated settlement that would eventually see a 
transfer of power in South Africa from the National Party to the African National 
Congress, the TRC was mandated with the 'investigation and the establishment of as 
complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of 
human rights' in the period from 1960 to 1993 (Sanders 1). In addition to this fact- 
finding dimension of its remit it would also be responsible for granting amnesty to 
perpetrators who offered full disclosure and could demonstrate political motives for 
their actions, and reparation to victims of gross human rights' violations. Emerging 
from the negotiated settlement and enshrined in law, the TRC has been described as a 
$quasi-judicial' body, perfon-ning a legal function but also inflected by Christian and 
psychoanalytic discourses of reconciliation and healing (Sanders 2). The terms of its 
juridical function were defined so that, in the case of the amnesty hearings, if the 
conditions laid out were met, amnesty from prosecution could be granted. 
The TRC was part of a historic compromise and as the literature across a 
range of disciplines attests it was not a perfect institution. I have already indicated the 
basis of some critiques of the commission, but in order to address the idea of its 
limited conception of justice, I will turn briefly to its limited conception of the law 
itself, in the form of international law. 
John Dugard describes how the legislation governing the TRC cmergcd from 
the negotiations on the Interim Constitution, appearing belatedly as a 'postambic' that 
was later described in a Constitutional Court judgement as constituting a 'bridge from 
apartheid to democracy' (90). Dugard finds that great cfforts have been made to bring 
South African law into step with international law thus restoring South Africa's 
position in the international community after the isolation of the apartheid years. 
However, he points to three key weaknesses which all relate to the problematic 
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'postamble' and its coming into law as the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act of 1995. Firstly, he notes the failure to take into account the fact 
that apartheid itself is a crime under international law meaning that 'no attempt is 
made to criminalize with retrospective effect acts relating to the planning and 
execution of the policy of apartheid' (89). For this reason, the focus of the 
commission was limited to gross violations of human rights; in other words, crimes 
that were already illegal under apartheid law. Related to this is the question of 
amnesty where Dugard locates the other weakness of the act. fie points out that the 
provision for amnesty inserted in the 'postamble' was out of step with international 
law, which tends to demand prosecution of those responsible for gross violations of 
human rights under an old regime (88). This is compounded by the third weakness 
which relates to the Constitutional Court's failure to take customary international law 
into account in its judgement on the case taken by victims against the TRC, who 
claimed that the provision for amnesty violated their right to have their cases settled 
in a court of law (89-90). The TRC was therefore not just 'quasi-judicial' in its 
incorporation of discourses other than the law, but in its limited application of the 
laws available to it, for political reasons (as Dugard acknowledges). Pointing out that 
Disgrace 'takes up historical matters that predate and outlive the thirty- four-year 
period encompassed by the commission's investigations, ' Sanders points to the 
novel's critique of these limits (though he also points out that the novel goes much 
further than this). 65 
From the perspective of confessional discourse, the architects of the TRC 
attempted to create the conditions in which confession could be brought to an end, 
65 As I will discuss in the next chapter, I believe this willingness to exceed the limits of the TRC is also 
important for a reading of Boyhood as confession. 
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not by absolution but by the much less ideal concept of amnesty. It succeeded in 
doing this by placing conditions and limits on what was expected of those that came 
before it, thereby making it possible to satisfy these requirements (amnesty applicants 
had to be able to demonstrate political motivation for their crimes). To this extent, it 
presumed to measure and quantify confessional narrative in the name of political 
expediency. 
In relation to the main hearings, Sanders notes that while the commission 
distinguishes between the 'factual or forensic truth' typical of the legal sphere and the 
$personal or narrative truth' more characteristic of psychoanalytic discourse, its 
'quasi-judicial' space brought the two into an uneasy proximity. In this context, he 
finds that 'Although it [the commission] declares itself hospitable to storytelling, it 
proves more at ease with statements that can be forensically verified or falsified' 
(153). 66 
As I suggested earlier in the chapter, David Lurie's refusal to provide 
anything but the most cursory explanation for his relationship with Melanie Isaacs to 
the university committee is a rejection of the quasi-judicial model of the TRC that the 
hearing invokes, refusing to submit to its procedures and adhering to a strictly legal 
understanding of the language available to him before the committee. Noting his 
failure to 'perform well, ' his ex-wife Rosalind articulates his refusal to testify in the 
terms of his objection to the committee's quasi-judicial status. 
In the case of the hearing, the flaws in Lurie's performance arc twofold: his 
failure to put on a convincing show of remorse for his actions and his failure to acccpt 
and submit to the conventions governing university hearings. These failures represent 
66 In terms of speech act theory, these could be described as constative and performative statements, 
respectively, though as I have noted the distinction between these is problematic. 
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two different conceptions of performance, one theatrical and the other 
philosophical/linguistic, 67 though the conflation of these categories, or to be speciric, 
the incorporation of the former into the latter, is the basis of Lurie's objection. The 
entire hearing is characterised by Lurie's failure to accept the performative conditions 
laid down by the committee; his strict adherence to a legal register in which he enters 
a 'plea' but declines to provide evidence in mitigation means that he will never 
satisfy the new institutional demands to confess and demonstrate remorse sincerely. 
The word plea is generally associated with making a defence or arguing a particular 
case and this is the sense adopted by the committee. David, however, is adhering to 
the narrowest possible legal interpretation of the term: 'The formal answer to a 
criminal charge' (OED). The word 'plea' - marked in the former sense by Austin's 
'A Plea for Excuses' - occurs in one form or other six times during the hearing, 
underlining the distinction between David's strictly legal understanding of the term 
and the committee's performative requirements: 'Frankly, what you want from me is 
not a response but a confession. Well, I make no confession. I put forward a plea, as 
is my right. Guilty as charged. That is my plea. That is as far as I am prepared to go' 
(51). 
Explaining to his daughter Lucy the events in Cape Town that have driven 
him into exile, Lurie paints himself as a defender of private life: 'T*hcsc are 
puritanical times. Private life is public business. Prurience is respectable, prurience 
and Sentiment. They wanted a spectacle: breast-bcating, remorse, tcars if possible. A 
TV show, in fact. I wouldn't oblige' (66). Lurie exaggerates only slightly. Like the 
TRC, the university committee he faces in Disgrace draws for its procedures and 
67 The distinction between these different notions of performance is the subject of II illis Mi I ler's 
'Performativity as Performance / PerformativitY as Speech Act'. 
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conventions on a number of different discourses - legal, religious, and psychoanalytic 
- without being defined by any one: 'Our rules of procedure are not those of a law 
court' (48). While it is recommended to Lurie that he enlist the services of someone 
familiar with the procedures of university hearings, he declines, choosing to engage 
only with the legal aspect of the committee, 'playing it by the book' (55), and even 
then engaging only minimally by adhering to the narrowest possible definition of 
plea. What he resolutely refuses to do in any of the registers available to him, is make 
a case for his actions in regard to Melanie Isaacs. His explanation that he became 'a 
servant of eros' is not presented as evidence in mitigation, as an excuse, or as a sin, 
Simply a statement of fact about what occurred, as if being 'a servant of cros' were a 
constative, verifiable fact. His actions can be interpreted as an explicit refusal of 
performative speech on the one hand (to make a case for his actions) and refusal to 
give a public performance (to put on a show of remorse) on the other. His refusal to 
submit to the procedures of the committee is a principled objection to the conflation 
of different discourses and specifically the demand for public performance and 
underlines the inability of the law (or its variants) to function in the absence of a 
shared and accepted set of procedures and beliefs. Again explaining himself to Lucy, 
David is adamant that any plea he might have made before the university committee 
would not be understood: 'The case you want me to make is a case that can no longer 
be made, basta. Not in our day. If I tried to make it I would not be heard' (89). 
In spite of David's comprehensive rqJection of the availability of confession 
as a speech act at the university inquiry, the urgent need for speech acts is driven 
home by the violent events that take place in the novel. This eventually leads David 
to search for a forum and shared procedures with which to address what hippcncd 
with Melanie Isaacs. He settles on a plan to visit her family, addressing them 
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privately, in person, as a way to unburden himself of lingering guilt over the episode. 
His attempt at a personal apology represents a fundamental shift in his approach to 
confession as he submits himself to a language and set of gestures that seem more 
theatrical than performative in the Austinian sense. While his desire to 'make good' 
seems thought out in advance, he cannot find a common language with which to 
share this with Mr Isaacs, who equally reverts to clich6s about learning from one's 
mistakes and intervening on one's behalf without reference to the language of 
forgiveness that his Christian faith might provide. David leaves the Isaacs home 
harbouring resentment towards Melanie's father and desire for her younger sistcr, 
having been reminded that the 'disgrace' he finds himself in is 'without term' (172). 
While David's refusal to confess and failed confession arc to a significant 
extent in sympathy with the scepticism about confession in 'Double Thoughts', as 
Vcrmculcn points out, we should not accept his position as heroic ('Doggcd Silences' 
2). Indeed Lucy responds to his situation in just these terms: 'It isn't heroic to be 
unbending' (66). Neither should we accept the equivalence that the novel ofTers 
between David's refusal to confess and Lucy's refusal to report the fact that she was 
raped to the police. Lucy's assertion that the rope is a 'private matter' might seem to 
echo David's defence of 'private life, ' but like other examples where her speech 
echoes or repeats David's, her struggle to articulate the singularity of her actions in 
the context of the narrative's relentless focalization through David gives us every 
reason to doubt this easy paral ICI. 68 711C 'private matter' of rope is not the same as the 
$private lirc' of sexual desire of which David sees himself as guardian. 
61 Spivak suggests that Disgrace invites the reader to 'counterfocalize' through Lucy (Tthics and 
Politics' 23). 
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Bochmer considers that Lucy completely withholds testimony of the rape, but 
this does not seem to be the case (344): she sees a doctor in the aftermath of the 
attack and we have every reason to believe that she confides in Bev Shaw. To my 
mind, her insistence on the 'private' nature of the attack does not mean that it must 
remain a secret but that it is not available for circulation and judgement in the sphere 
of law. 69 Indeed, the sphere of the law is a space in which confession and testimony 
are subjected to a similar forensic analysis, so her unwillingness to report the crime 
might be a refusal to submit to this space. The only right she lays claim to for tile 
duration of the novel is her 'right not to be put on trial ... not to have to justify 
myself' (133). 70 In addition, while both Lucy and David arc aware that her rape has a 
performativc force beyond the violence directed at her 'in the act' (156), her 
insistence that the attack is 'a private matter' could be seen as an attempt to limit its 
symbolic potential (115,158). 
David's recourse to criminal law in the aftermath of the attack is another 
dimension of his 'unbending' character (66). While it seems to contrast with his 
refusal to confess before the university committee, it is in fact consistent with his 
adherence to the letter of the law on that occasion, highlighting his objection to the 
demands for a performance of remorse. Instead, he wishes to abdicate personal 
involvement by recourse to the impersonal nature of the law. Attempting to resolve 
the issue of Pollux's presence with Pctrus, he says: 'You will not be involved, I will 
69 In South Africa and globally rape is a notoriously under-reported crime and even when reported 
prosecution rates are appallingly low. pointing to inadequacies in how the law administers the crime of 
rape and perhaps to a culture of shame for rape victims (see 'Sexual violence increasing' for an 
indication of these trends in an Irish context). Anya makes a strong challenge to both of these problems 
ýDiary 96-119). 
0 Sanders notes a certain unease with different kinds of testimony at the TRC (153) but the subjection 
of confession and testimony to the same procedures of vcrification is a serious problem with the 
reception of testimony more generally as Is evident in the work of Butler, Dcnida, Spivak and 
Gilmore. 
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not be involved, it will be a matter for the law' (137). But by setting him in 
opposition to Petrus, the novel points to the bifurcated system of justice that obtained 
under apartheid which allowed for the separate administration of law and custom on 
racial grounds (Mamdani 34, Sanders). David himself only pages earlier registered 
the colonial origins of this system, commenting on a tribal medal worn by a man at 
Petrus' party: 'Symbols struck by the boxful in a foundry in Coventry or 
Birmingham; stamped on the one side with the head of sour Victoria, regina et 
imperatrix, on the other with gnus or ibises rampant' (135). David's adherence to the 
letter of the law does not just reflect his unwillingness to adapt to the new conditions 
in which he finds himself, but points to the way in which the law has been shaped and 
implemented to serve particular interests, and this persists even in the post-apartheid 
context. 
V 
Both Age ofIron and Disgrace offer examples of actions that have lost their capacity 
to symbolise, rituals that have lost their collective meaning. In Age of Iron Mrs 
Curren's proposed public suicide is such an action. Intended to symbolise the 
intensity of her objection to the apartheid state, she comes to realise that the public 
burning of a terminally ill old white woman outside government buildings would 
mean nothing, either to the ruling elite whose actions she opposes or to those people 
suffering in the townships with whom she wishes to act in solidarity. In Disgrace 
Lucy's suggestion that David has been made into a scapegoat elicits from him a 
similar frustration at the unavailability of shared symbolic values. Ile notes that the 
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concept of the scapegoat 'worked because everyone knew how to read the ritual, 
including the gods. Then the gods died, and all of a sudden you had to cleanse the 
city without divine help. Real actions were demanded instead of symbolism' (9 1). 
In Diary of a Bad Year, among the 'Strong Opinions' held by jC71 is a short 
meditation on the possible meaning of apology in the absence of material restitution, 
ostensibly for the Aboriginal population of Australia but he also draws parallels with 
the issue of the ownership of land in South Africa. This is prompted by an 
advertisement for a lawyer who advises clients on how to word apologies without 
admitting liability but expands to examine the general tendency toward the 
performance of remorse or apology being equated with the sincerity of the apology. 
The objection is not to apology as such, 'which used to have the highest symbolic 
status, ' but to apology conceived as an alternative to material restitution, or worse, 
calculated entirely to avoid the risk of material loss. This 'new' conception of 
apology, emptied of all symbolic meaning, becomes quantiflable only by the 
perceived sincerity of the performance: 'To the dubious question ... Is this true 
sincerity? one receives only a blank look. Sincerity? Of course I'm sincere - didn't I 
say soT To the lawyer, apology is not a question of sincerity or insincerity, but of 
liability: 'In his eyes and in the eyes of his clients, an unscripted, unrehearsed 
apology will likely be an excessive, inappropriate, ill-calculated, and therefore false 
apology, that is to say, one that costs money, money being the measure of all things' 
(109). The implication of the piece is that apology and remorse are no longer 
understood as symbolising the kind of loss that might come with an admission of 
liability, and consequently are susceptible to quantification either in terms of material 
restitution or the equally literal performance of sincerity. I am not claiming that for 
71 The protagonist signs himself UCI (Diary 123). 
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Coetzee apology must be underwritten by an economic imperative, but there is a 
suggestion that true sincerity might require restitution. 72 
The solution offered by the TRC to the problem of providing reparation to 
victims is an amalgamation of material reparation with symbolic reparation, partly in 
acknowledgement that adequate material restitution cannot and will not take place. 
According to Sanders: 'Once the nebulous concept of making the victim whole is 
added to the agenda, we have, as is consistent with the rest of the report, a course of 
action unevenly conjoining monetary and "symbolic" elements. If the former will 
never be enough, the latter are, by definition, always inadequate to their object' (120). 
In the context of two novels where power invariably resides in the capacity of 
real actions to impose themselves, even the performative force of speech acts seems 
to be underwritten by terrible material consequences. The authority of Mrs Curren's 
confession lies in the terror brought on by her imminent death. In Disgrace the 
resolution that is reached involves a performative speech act of sorts: Lucy's 
'marriage' to Petrus. Given Lucy's proven vulnerability to violent attack, and her 
sense of being marked by the rapists as part of their territory, Petrus suggests that 
marriage will solve Lucy's problems. As Pollux, the youngest of the rapists and a 
relative of Petrus, is too young to marry (thereby not meeting the required 
conditions), she should marry Petrus. Successfully - felicitously - completed it will 
bring an end to the fallout from the attack: 'It is finish' (210). The transaction is 
described by Lucy in terms of the conditions governing performative speech acts: 'It 
is not a joke, not a threat. At some level he is serious' (203). And the transaction is 
completed in the transfer of land, title deeds and all - Lucy's dowry. 
72 This is also the subject of Wole Soyinka's The Burden ofMemory, The Muse ofForgiveness. 
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In a sense this is a private solution, but it is public insofar as it will bring Lucy 
public recognition as being under Petrus's protection; that is to say, it will be received 
as a felicitous performative speech act, granting recognition to Lucy and to her child. 
The solution continues the critique of legal avenues of redress as David insists that it 
is not legally workable. But it also occurs in the shadow of an alternative legal model 
- the recognition of African customary law under the South African Constitution. 
Polygamous marriage was granted full recognition by the Customary Marriages Act 
120 in 1998 (Himonga and Bosch 311). Lucy's willingness to submit to an 
arrangement that looks remarkably like a polygamous marriage - at least superficially 
- is therefore in one sense a deeply symbolic submission to the law of the other. 
But as I have already noted in relation to David's adherence to the law, 
custom and customary law were tools of colonial control. For this reason, customary 
law has proven controversial in the post-apartheid context, as disagreement persists 
about the authority of official customary law (first codified by colonial administrators 
in Natal in the late nineteenth century) and its subordination under the Constitution to 
the South African Bill of Rights (in response to the demands of women's groups 
during negotiations in 1993). 
In this light it is worth returning to the circumstances of Lucy's 
accommodation with Petrus (negotiated on her behalf by her father, though as 
Sanders points out, the deal does not seem to be formalised by the end of the novel). 
Lucy articulates her submission to these new circumstances in terms of an abdication 
of rights, starting again at ground level, 'With nothing, Not with nothing but. With 
nothing. No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no dignity' (205). So in terms 
of the tension between customary law and the Bill of Rights, Lucy seems to waive her 
rights in order to reach an accommodation with Petrus. This could be seen as the final 
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stage of her rejection of legal avenues of redress, a final renunciation of the limits on 
the kind ofjustice available in post-apartheid South Africa. But as I have pointed out, 
in the context of the violent acts that unfold in the novel, Disgrace seems to me to be 
less eager to suspend the limits and conditions which allow speech acts to influence 
events. To this end, the significance of Lucy's accommodation with Pctrus is as a 
speech act, which in responding to a new set of conditions, lays down some 
conditions of its own: 'No one enters this house without my permission' (204). 
Spivak has pointed to the false equivalence between Lucy's apparent 
agreement with David that she is, in her current situation, 'like a dog' (205, 'Ethics 
and Politics' 22). Like her assertion that the rape is a 'private matter, ' we have every 
reason to question the element of agreement in Lucy's echo of David. Denise Riley 
suggests that the figure of Echo is the 'initiator of the ironic' (The Words of Selves 
157). According to Riley, 'Echo is unsparingly condemned to passivity - and yet her 
very passivity possesses its own strong agency' (157). Writing about the challenge 
presented to the TRC by the testimony of women making demands on behalf of 
deceased relatives, Sanders compares one such woman (Lephina Zondo) to Antigone 
(via Hegel and Derrida) as the 'eiron, the dissembler, the one who feigns ignorance in 
order to make the law speak' (74). 1 suggest that we read Lucy as a similar figure of 
irony. In a context in which, as I have shown, legal avenues of justice have been 
subordinated to political expediency, Lucy's abdication of rights puts her at the mercy 
of another set of laws, equally calculated to serve particular interests. This is, in one 
sense, a radical rejection of legal avenues of redress and a willingness to submit 
herself to the law of the other. But if we read her echo of David as an indication of 
her status as 'eiron, ' we could also say that she disowns and disavows the law to this 
extreme in order that she might finally make it speak. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
I ... two worlds tightly sealed'?: Autobiography and Fiction In Boyhood and 
Youth 
As Boyhood draws to a close, we have the impression that the protagonist, John, is 
assuming a certain burden of responsibility from Aunt Annie, his mother's aunt. The 
copious volumes of Ewige Genesing stored in her house give him an insight into the 
enormity of the task she set herself in translating, publishing and disseminating this 
arcane work by her father. Her sense of duty toward her father's book dies with her, 
but John has absorbed a lesson about the connection between books, duty and 
remembering: 'He alone is left to do the thinking. How will he keep them all in his 
head, all the books, all the people, all the stories? And if he does not remember them, 
who willT (166) As an account of the task of the historian, biographer or 
autobiographer it is na*fve; in the opening interview in Doubling the Point Coetzee 
points out that 'All the facts are too many facts' (18). As autobiographical texts, 
Boyhood and Youth certainly do not provide us with all the stories, or all the facts. 
But what they do, in addition to providing an account of some of the facts, is stage 
different principles of selection. 73 
In Boyhood selection takes the form of the duty to remember that John 
inherits from Aunt Annie, but remembering also occurs in the connections and 
73 For ease of reference I refer to both volumes as memoirs. 
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affiliations established at the level of form and language. The memoir unfolds in the 
language of confessional narrative, revealing shameful secrets and emphasising the 
uniqueness and singularity of the protagonist. But this same language of uniqueness 
also repeats the language of separation and apartness that characterised the political 
climate of the period described, thereby establishing key points of continuity between 
the protagonist and a community that he outwardly rejects. In this way, the 
protagonist comes to seem more representative than singular. I will argue that the 
memoir, published in 1997, is part of the trend toward confession and testimony that 
characterised this period of South African history. But focusing as it does on the 
mundane details of life lived distant from but complicit with the discourse of 
apartheid, it pushes at the limits of the national narrative (of confession) produced by 
the TRC, expanding the range of experience included within this narrative and the 
range of experience subject to confession. 
In Youth the protagonist is distinguished by being an aspiring writer and is 
eager to construct a story or stories of his life that will smooth over the discontinuities 
and ignominies that he has accumulated in Cape Town and London. He holds to a 
view of writing as transforming life experience into art, so the question of selection 
comes to be identified with writing: 'The question of what should be permitted to go 
into his diary and what kept forever shrouded goes to the heart of all his writing' (9). 
This view of the writing process as rigorously controlled and carefully 
compartmentalizing aspects of experience leads to an emphasis on concealment and a 
desire to bring certain narratives to a close by limiting their circulation. The 'end of 
the episode' that structures Coetzee's engagement with confession elsewhere as 
tending towards absolution is here a question of concealing. But precisely those 
events that the protagonist is anxious to forget are articulated by the narrator in a 
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language of abjection that evokes the unguarded, uncensored, compulsive disclosures 
of 'heart-speech, ' a kind of confessional language that effaces double thought and 
calculation in its figuration as the language of compulsive and unmediated 
expression. This is not only contrary to the idea of writing as selecting, but in its 
apparent absence of control or agency suggests a potential endlessness. 
Carefully described as 'fictionalized autobiography, ' Boyhood and Youth 
unfold within the limits and conditions of autobiography and confession and in their 
preoccupation with selection self-consciously stage the negotiation of these limits. I 
will claim that their authority as autobiography resides partly in their proximity to the 
discourses of confession but that this authority is also subject to certain fictional 
strategies. 
My claim that Boyhood and Youth can be read as confessional texts relies on 
their status as autobiography, on their proximity to the discourse of confession, on the 
manner in which they unfold within the register of apartheid and of abjection, and on 
their part in a body of South African narrative produced in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries that directed its attention to shameful aspects of its history. 
While my focus is on the confessional dimensions of both texts, in their tendency to 
document the specificities of a childhood and youth in a particular place and at a 
particular time - intensified in the preoccupation with remembering in Boyhood and 
the apparently inadvertent testimony of Youth - both texts could also be described as 
autobiography in the mode of memoir. Indeed, according to the taxonomy of Francis 
R. Hart invoked in 'Double Thoughts, ' Boyhood and Youth are both confession and 
memoir, personal histories that seek both to 'communicate or express the essential 
nature, the truth, of the self and 'articulate or repossess the historicity of the self' 
(Hart, 227). While the emphasis on the essential truth of the self would place 
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Boyhood and Youth in dialogue with the history of confessional narrative, it is the 
historicity of that self - both the writing subject and autobiographical subject - that 
allows us to understand them as confession. 
I 
As I outline in the introduction, in 'Retrospect, ' the closing interview in Doubling, 
Coetzee reflects on the question of 'truth in autobiography' and particularly on the 
4pivotal' role of 'Double Thoughts' in his intellectual (auto)biography. As part of the 
quasi-conversion narrative that emerges in the interview, he opts to tell the story of 
his life in the third person and present tense, carefully marking the occasion of the 
interview and reflection on this particular essay as 'the instance of discourse': 
'Standing on the hillock or island created by our present dialogue, let me tell you, in 
the retrospect it provides, what the story of the past twenty years looks like when I 
make that story pivot on the essay on confession, written in 1982-83' (392). The short 
autobiographical piece that results covers by and large the same material as Boyhood 
and Youth and finds Coetzee trying out a voice or voices in which to recount the story 
of his early life. He settles on the third person pronoun, but he flirts with different 
descriptions of his subject: 'a man-who-writes'; 'this person, this subject, the subject 
of this story, this 1' (392-93). Significantly, just as he carefully sets out the context of 
his comments in the interview, his recourse to the third person does not entirely 
efface the first person. To this extent the piece differs from Boyhood and Youth in 
allowing a space for reflection and comment on his younger self. Of his career in 
mathematics he comments: 'I say: he is trying to find a capsule in which he can live, 
a capsule in which he need not breathe the air of the world' (393). And on his 
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isolation in Britain and the US: 'He merely feels alien. Let me ("me') trace this 
feeling (of alienness, not alienation) further back in time. A sense of being alien goes 
back far in his memories. But to certain intensifications of that sense I, writing in 
1991, can put a date' (393). Eventually, as the story ends with a description of his 
doctoral studies in Texas, the third person collapses back into the first person: 'The 
discipline within which he (and he now begins to feel closer to I. autrebiography 
shades back into autobiography) had trained himself/myself to think brought 
illuminations that I can't imagine him or me reaching by any other route' (394). In its 
meticulous attention to the conventions of autobiographical writing and to the 
relationship between writing self and autobiographical subject, the piece signals the 
care with which Coetzee would later construct his autobiographical narratives. 
While 'autrebiography' has been used to describe the particular kind of 
autobiographical effect created in Boyhood and Youth, 74 the differences between the 
memoirs and this early autobiographical fragment indicate that the memoirs rely on 
more than third person present tense narration for their force. 75 The key difference 
between the memoirs and 'Retrospect' is that the latter is focalized through the 
writing subject, the 'I', whereas the former are focalized unfailingly through the third 
person. This creates the effect of a discrete fictional world in both memoirs, 
renouncing the obvious connection to the author and even to the protagonist of the 
other volume. The reluctance to break the fictional frame of the discrete worlds 
created in both texts - in a writer whose other projects in this period included the 
74 See Sheila Collingwood-Whittick, 'Autobiography as Autrebiography' and Margaret Lenta. 
75 In a 2002 interview with David Attwell, conducted shortly before the publication of Youth, Coetzce 
says: 'Yes, all autobiography is autre-biography, but what is more important is where one goes from 
there' ('All Autobiography is Autre-biography' 216). So, autobiography needn't be written in the third 
person to be autre-biography. Coetzee upholds Attwell's distinction between autobiography as autre- 
biography (historical, self-detached, ironic) and autobiography as confession (anguished), but this 
chapter is an attempt to complicate these categories. 
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remarkably thin fictions of Elizabeth Costello - inadvertently draws attention to the 
conditions which create these closed worlds. 76 In addition, invoking the 
autobiographical pact further troubles the fictional world created in each text and 
introduces a different set of conditions within which to consider the texts. 
The autobiographical pact is invoked explicitly and implicitly in both works. 
First published in 1997 with the subtitle Scenes from Provincial Life, Boyhood was 
described as autobiography/memoir; indeed, my 1998 paperback is also subtitled A 
Memoir. In the course of the narrative the reader discovers that the protagonist is 
called John and insofar as there is biographical information about J. M. Coetzee in the 
. 
77 yU public domain it does not diverge from the childhood described in Boyhood lo th 
was published in the UK in May 2002 and appeared without its connection to the 
earlier Boyhood or to the biography of J. M. Coetzee being flagged either on the dust 
jacket or in the promotional material to reviewers; it was released into the world as 
fiction. Attridge attributes the puzzled response of reviewers at the time to their 
failure to appreciate the autobiographical qualities of the work and the US edition 
which appeared some months later sought to avoid the same confusion, 
overcompensating with the subtitle Scenesfrom Provincial Life H. In the biographical 
material on the Nobel Prize website, both Boyhood and Youth are described as 
'fictionalized memoir. ' There are obvious continuities between the two volumes that 
reinforce its status as autobiography: the titles echo Tolstoy's autobiographical trilogy 
Childhood, Boyhood, Youth, the protagonist of both works is called John, and the 
76 The various 'lessons' of Elizabeth Costello (2003) appeared in other forms over the previous six 
years, the first in 1997. Thus the autobiographical project of Boyhood and Youth and the writing of the 
Elizabeth Costello pieces were virtually contemporaneous. 
77 The most reliable source of biographical information appears to be the Nobel Prize website, which 
describes the material listed under biography as 'autobiography/biography, ' suggesting that Coetzee 
had some hand in its selection. hIIp: //nobelI2rize, orP-/nobcl 12rizes/literattire4aureates/2003/coelzrL- 
bio. btm] 
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setting in time and place is consistent with the life of the author. However, the most 
obvious similarity between the volumes is stylistic: the closed world of the third- 
person, present tense narration in both. As Attridge points out, this is Coetzee's 
chosen narrative mode for most of his recent fiction; it only becomes an issue 
therefore when one attempts to reconcile it with those qualities that seem to 
distinguish Boyhood and Youth as autobiography (140). 
Coetzee comments in Doubling the Point that 'all writing is autobiography, 
everything that you write, including criticism and fiction, writes you as you write it' 
(17). While this emphasises autobiography's capacity for self-construction in the 
present as much as in the past, his choice of the third-person and present tense as the 
narrative mode for Boyhood and Youth immerses the reader in the world of the young 
Coetzee and closes off explicit reference to the writing self According to Attridge, 
this produces 'a singular immediacy, one might almost say a depthlessness, in the 
recounting of events, but not the sense of intimacy we gain from confessional 
autobiography of a more orthodox sort' (140). In addition, what is lost in this choice 
of person and tense is the space for reflection and revaluation that one associates with 
confessional narrative, particularly in Coetzee's model of double thought. Attridge 
notes that this has the effect of 'avoiding the self-reflexivity that produces the 
problem, but in so doing he makes any attempt to relate the work to the genre of 
confession more difficult' (143). 
Distance in Boyhood and Youth is established more by person than tense, as 
'I' becomes 'he, ' which accounts for the immediacy but lack of intimacy that 
Attridge describes. Philippe Lejeune anticipates such a reconfiguring of the rules in 
'Autobiography in the Third Person, ' but he describes the use of the third person 
under these circumstances as a figure and notes the risk to the autobiographer of 
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deploying such fictional strategies: 'The autobiographer finds himself confronted 
with the limitations and constraints of a real situation, and can neither deny the unity 
of his "I, " nor go beyond his limitations. He can only pretend' (37). Coetzee's 1977 
essay on Achterberg illustrates the attention he has devoted to the linguistic 
dimension of address and specifically to the ethics of first person address. According 
to Benveniste, whose writings inform Coetzee's position in the essay, the pronoun I 
(like You) is identifiable only 'by the instance of discourse that contains it and by that 
alone. It has no value except in the instance in which it is produced' (218). One of the 
distinguishing features of the third person according to Benveniste is its 'never being 
reflective of the instance of discourse' (222). Given the significance of address to 
Coetzee's engagement with confession, his choice of third person makes it more 
difficult to pinpoint the confessional form of the text. But he in Achterberg's poem is 
always 'watched over by a murderous warden-F (85). If we are to read Boyhood and 
Youth as confessional texts, it might be necessary to counterfocalize through this 
6 warden-F. 78 
11 
As I outlined in chapter one, confession for Coetzee is motivated by 'the idea of the 
truth' and his writings on confession circle around the issue of 'how to tell the truth in 
autobiography. ' So it is hardly surprising that his assertion in Doubling that 'all 
writing is autobiography' allows him to reframe Attwell's question about 
autobiography as a question about telling the truth: 'The real question is: This 
massive autobiographical writing-enterprise that fills a life, this enterprise of self- 
78 1 use the term counterfocalize here after Spivak's reading of Disgrace ('Ethics and Politics'). 
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construction (shades of Tristram Shandy! ) - does it yield only fictions? Or rather, 
among the fictions of the self, the versions of the self, that it yields, are there any that 
are truer than others? How do I know when I have the truth about myselff (17) So, if 
all writing is autobiography, it would appear that within this category there is a kind 
of writing that is not just part of the 'enterprise of self-construction' but true; it is this 
kind of writing that will be called confession in this chapter. 
Instead of focusing on the verifiability of the facts recounted in autobiography 
to produce 'truth', Coetzee turns his attention to the process that shapes these facts: 
'Truth is something that comes in the process of writing, or comes from the process 
of writing' (18). And part of this process in the case of autobiography is the matter of 
balancing the requirement 'to respect the facts of your history' with the reality that 
$all the facts are too many facts' (18). So, adherence to the facts is eventually 
subordinated to other (fictional) strategies: 'You choose the facts insofar as they fall 
in with your evolving purpose' (18). 
In the closing interview of the volume, which as I note above rehearses some 
of the material covered by Boyhood and Youth, this 'evolving purpose' is subject to 
greater scrutiny as autobiography is distinguished by the writer's 'privileged access' 
to the facts and the deeply self-interested nature of the enterprise: 'because tracing the 
line from past to present is such a self-interested enterprise (self-interested in every 
sense), selective vision, even a degree of blindness, become inevitable - blindness to 
what may be obvious to any passing observer' (3 9 1). But while Coetzee accepts that a 
degree of blindness is inevitable, it does not seem to diminish the desire for truth. As 
Attridge points out: 'the impossibility of the project of telling the truth to and for 
oneself is not a reason for its not being desirable; on the contrary, desire is at its most 
powerful in the face of the impossible' (146). So, whatever truth we might expect 
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from the memoirs is both produced by the process of writing and impossible (because 
impeded by blindness and self-interest). 
Coetzee's commitment to the idea of 'truth in autobiography' clearly emerges 
from his writings on confession and as I have argued from the outset, the 
impossibility or unavailability of the truth that structures his interest in confession 
does not deflect his pursuit of that truth nor should it allow his readers to set aside the 
form this takes as a critical dead end. In 'Double Thoughts' he makes it clear that he 
is unwilling to accept an infinitely deferred truth: 'the point I wish to argue is that the 
possibility of reading the truth 'behind' a true confession has implications peculiar to 
the genre of confession' (273). In fact, it seems to me that Coetzee's pursuit of 'truth 
in autobiography' (in his own work and in the writings of others) is a result of his 
identification of confession with autobiography. All writing may be autobiography, 
but the stakes are raised considerably when this writing is not just autobiography but 
confession. In this regard he has something in common with Lejeune, who as I note 
in chapter 4, admits that his strict adherence to the necessary identity of author and 
protagonist in autobiography emerged from his conflation of autobiography and 
confession. Lejeune's apparent softening of his definition of autobiography occurs by 
co-opting its more dogmatic elements to a definition of confession, allowing his 
policing of generic limits to persist. 
Leigh Gilmore's work on autobiography across a range of books and essays 
provides a subtle twist on this idea, allowing for the power of confessional discourse 
within the field of autobiography but refusing the strict adherence to factual truth that 
usually accompanies it. In 'Policing Truth' she suggests that autobiography relies for 
its authority on its relation to the truth claim of confessional discourse rather than the 
verifiability of factual truth: 
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Authority in autobiography springs from its proximity to the truth claim of the 
confession, a discourse that insists upon the possibility of telling the whole truth 
while paradoxically fiustrating that goal through the structural demands placed on 
how one confesses. 'Telling the truth' so totalizes the confession that it denotes the 
imperative to confess, the structure of that performance, and the grounds for its 
judgement. (55) 
Gilmore goes on to argue for the significance of the border/limit case to the 
possibility of autobiographical agency, pointing to the productive constraints of 
inherited generic conventions and in particular the significance of the fictional to the 
autobiographical project of a writer like Jamaica Kincaid . 
79 But understanding 
autobiography in terms of its narrative or fictional properties does not preclude the 
use of confessional motifs. Rather 'we can interpret autobiography as a re- 
presentation, that is, a structuring of events, motives, and so on in an effort to position 
one's story within a discourse of truth and identity - in short, as an attempt to 
authorize the autobiography' (69). 
It would appear that Coetzee sees no contradiction between his adherence to 
'truth in autobiography' and his admission that one selects and orders the facts of 
one's life 'as they fall in with your evolving purpose' - this purpose being, 
Presumably, to tell the truth. Nor does he find an irresolvable inconsistency in the 
d escription of Boyhood and Youth as 'fictionalized memoir. ' The notion of selecting 
according to one's 'evolving purpose' sounds like a fictional strategy, but if one's 
evolving purpose is to construct a confessional narrative (or to confess) then this 
challenges the category of the fictional as much as the autobiographical. 
79 Gilmore's position hem is comparable to Derrida's writing on testimony in Demeure, where the 
fictional becomes the condition of possibility of the testimonial. This has been taken up by Sanders 
in 
his understanding of the ambiguity of testimony before the TRC as a literary quality, which can 
in turn 
act on and expand the limits of the quasi-judicial setting that seems to structure it (see chapter 
5 for a 
discussion of the refusal to provide testimony in DiWace). 
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In Boyhood and Youth the facts that emerge about the young Coetzee's life are 
those that the young protagonist experienced as humiliating and shameful. They are 
therefore deeply held secrets, and while subject to the ironies that invariably insert 
themselves between the child/youth protagonist and the adult author, they are selected 
both for the confessional value they once held and in many cases for their enduring 
confessional value. In Coctzee's assessment of confessional texts he frequently finds 
that the desire behind the narrative is not a desire for truth but a desire to appear 
worse than one really is, or a desire to be a particular way, in Rousseau's words, 'if I 
am not better, at least I am different. ' Insofar as Boyhood and Youth succeed in 
Providing this version of Coetzee's life, they are examples of the highly self- 
conscious confessions that he analyses clsewherc. NVe might name this a fictional 
strategy, a plotting device as Brooks might describe it, but who is to say that there 
isn't some truth in the unflatteiing portrait he paints? Yet, it also seems to me that this 
is not the only version of the truth that emerges in the memoirs, or the only kind of 
confessional truth. 
In the opening interview in Doubling, as he attempts to refine his ideas about 
autobiographical writing, Coetzee attempts to describe how truth is produced in the 
process of writing- 
Writing reveals to you %hat you %%-anted to say in the first place. In fact, it sometimes 
constructs what you want or %%-anted to say. What it reveals (or asserts) may be quite 
different from what you thought (or half-thought) you wanted to say in the first place. 
I ... I Writing, then, involves an interplay between the push into the future that takes you to 
the blank page in the first place, and a resistance. Part of that resistance is psychic, 
but part is also an automatism built into language: the tendency of words to call up 
other words, to fall into patterns that keep propagating themselves. Out of that 
interplay there emerges, if you am lucky, what you recognize or hope to recognize as 
the true. (18) 
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Selecting with one's evolving purpose does not tell the full story about how an 
autobiographical (or any) narrative is shaped, but the terms that Coetzee uses in this 
description seem to have particular implications for confessional narrative, which in 
its potential endlessness, constantly challenges the self-consciousness of selection 
with a kind of automatism, whether that is the automatism of the highly self- 
conscious double thought or automatism conceived in more pathological terms as a 
traumatic repetition (Sanders 184). This echoes the notorious machine-like operation 
of the confession that I discussed in relation to de Man and Derrida in chapter 1. 
While I have so far emphasised the process of selection in the confessional dimension 
of Boyhood and Youth, reading them with these comments in mind, there is a 
competing narrative at work that could also be termed confessional. This dimension 
of the Boyhood draws compulsively - whether consciously or unconsciously - on the 
discourse of apartheid and Coetzee's proximity to it. In the case of Youth, the most 
intensely confessional dimensions of the text unfold in a language of abjection. To 
contrast with the highly self-conscious deployment of confessional motifs generally 
in Coetzee's work, I will refer to this apparent automatism as 'heart-speech, ' after his 
analysis of apartheid theorist Geoffrey CronJ6 in 'The Mind of Apartheid'. Michael 
Neill finds a similar impulse at work in . 4ge of Iron: 'The space where the truth is 
conventionally hidden is to be found deep within - in the region of the heart, as we 
like to say - and confession, supposedly the utterance of a contrite heart, is meant to 
reveal it' (16). Coetzee's writing on confession, with its consistent scepticism about 
language as a transparent window on the world, makes this view of confession as 
heart-speech seem naTve at best; at worst, it is yet another attempt to guarantee the 
truthfulness of confession through a kind of authentic, unmediated language, another 
embodiment of its self-interestedness. Yet, no more than Attridge's comment about 
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the desire for truth, the impossibility of achieving unmediated expression does not 
diminish the desire for it: 'the longing to achieve unqualified self-expression - to 
utter ("outer") oneself, as it were, utterly (to the outermost limit of utterance) - 
emerges as a recurrent motif in Coetzee's confessional writing; and it is no less 
intense for being recognised as chimerical' (Neill 24). Yet staging 'heart speech' in 
memoirs is particularly risky. 
Given Coetzee's repeated engagement with confessional narrative, it is also 
this dimension of confession that lends itself to interpretation as the kind of traumatic 
repetition to which Sanders points in his reading of Disgrace. As I pointed out in the 
introduction, Coetzee's writings on confession self-consciously engage these 
apparently irreconcilable dimensions of confession, but in staging these tensions in 
the memoirs Coetzee is knowingly running the risk of acting out this traumatic 
repetition. 
In what follows, I will propose that insofar as Boyhood and Youth stage the 
process of selecting the facts of Coetzee's life, 80 this process emerges as an echo of 
his comments on writing: an interplay between a highly self-conscious version of 
confessional narrative on the model of Rousseau and the persistent tendency of 
writing to resist and exceed this, an automatism that poses a particular threat to 
confessional narrative. I should emphasise that there is no reason to believe that the 
latter is any less self-consciously or artfully constructed than the former, even as it 
runs the risk of seeming otherwise. Rather, this struggle is staged through writing as 
the means of concealing and revealing, sealing off and exposing, separating and 
mixing. 
'0 This process is staged within the texts but is also evident when the texts are compared with the 
historical record; my emphasis will generally be on the former, though not exclusively. 
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III 
Boyhood is structured around a series of revelations of shameful childhood 
experiences: he betrays his mother's love, he is an 'irascible despot' at home, a 
Roman Catholic at school, he has never been beaten and will do anything to avoid 
physical punishment, at this remote frontier of the Cold War he prefers the Russians 
to the Americans, he is the only boy who experiences crotic desires and he belongs to 
the farm of his father's family. Each new chapter in the memoir recounts a different 
source of shame for John, the young protagonist, who as a result feels that he is 
distinguished from the other boys, from his family, and from the wider community by 
his habits and characteristics. His sense of being different extends across a whole 
range of experience, from the shame of being beaten at school - 'it will set him apart, 
and set the other boys against him too' (6) - to the lies that allow him to escape 
assembly - 'the separation of sheep from goats' (19) - to the ostracism that would 
result if his preference for the Russians were to be exposed: 'His loyalty to the Red 
Star sets him absolutely apart' (27). His fear of exposure leads him to devote his 
considerable resources to disguising his 'unnatural dispositions' beneath a veil of 
conformity. To this end, home life must be carefully separated from school life, and 
the inner life with its shameful desires and allegiances must be protected above all 
else. He resolves never to allow his mother access to his school life: 'He shares 
nothing with his mother. His life at school is kept a tight secret from her. She shall 
know nothing, he resolves, but what appears on his quarterly report, which shall be 
impeccable' (5). And in a relentless pattern, desire is inevitably followed by 
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concealment: 'Whatever he wants, whatever he likes, has sooner or later to be turned 
into a secret' (28). 
But while secrecy is undoubtedly a survival strategy for young John, the sheer 
relentlessness of the pattern of disguising shameful truths suggests something more. 
That his wishes and desires must be kept secret confirms his suspicion that he is an 
unnatural and special boy, set apart from his peers by his very nature, but he does not 
consider that his desire is for secrecy and concealment first and foremost, such that he 
wants and likes 'whatever' ought to be concealed, nor that his desire might be for the 
effect of such secrecy and concealment: being set apart, being different. Such doubts 
do not occur to the protagonist of Boyhood, a child whose experiences of shame and 
being different are rather more typical than he would have imagined. 
But one must imagine that the author's perspective is rather different, 
particularly if we consider the book's invitation to identify author and protagonist, 
albeit across a distance of some fifty years. The tightly sealed world of Boyhood 
leaves no space for the doubts of the author, an effect of the third-person, present 
tense narration focalized through the consciousness of the young boy. The kind of 
self-conscious reflection that he does not engage in is what Coetzee describes as 
'double thought' and, as Attridge argues, the most significant effect of Coetzee's 
chosen narrative mode in Boyhood (and Youth) is to close off the space for such 
reflection, thus preventing the potentially endless double thought. But the sceptical 
reading of the protagonist's motives that I engage in above - suggesting that John's 
secrecy is somehow self-interested, and therefore itself a source of shame - is a 
characteristic of Coetzee's readings of confessional literature. In 'Double Thoughts' 
he describes the hyperconsciousness of Dostoevsky's Underground Man not as the 
desire for truth that he claims, but as 'a desire to be a particular way' (Doubling 280) 
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and in 'A Fiction of the Truth' he suggests that truth in Rousseau's Confessions 'is 
mere difference'. His earlier writings on Rousseau also indicate that shameful secrets, 
the markers of 'difference, ' are an essential ingredient of Rousseau's narrative, a 
confessional narrative, as they constitute confessional currency: 'A desire whose 
value is kept secret increases in fascination and therefore in value... It is retained as a 
resource which, to the degree that it is mysterious, fascinating, illicit, shameful, can 
be exchanged for words in the economy of confession' ('Truth in Autobiography, 3). 
The singularity that the protagonist of Boyhood experiences with profound shame and 
alienation is, in fact, a requirement of the confessional genre. 
As I have already indicated, the airtight fiction that the reader is invited to 
accept in Boyhood, not only forestalls double thought but renders the sceptical 
reading problematic. The memoir, after all, recreates the world of a child, and the 
shame and anxiety that he describes is vividly portrayed. So it is in this context that 
we must read the protagonist's sense of the weight of the secrets he keeps: 'So that is 
what is at stake' (7). Likewise, his insistence on his awareness of wrong-doing and 
culpability for certain actions: 'He is well aware of what a betrayal this is' (3); '[he] 
knows that he must bear part of the blame' (4). While the adult author may well feel 
that a young boy is less than culpable in the power struggle between his parents, and 
the reader may come away with the impression that the sentiments expressed seem 
subject to a gentle but unspoken irony, the narrative is explicitly structured as a 
confession. As Michiel Heyns points out in his analysis of Boyhood, Toetzee knows 
that the child is never innocent' (55). Indeed, such is the intensity of the boy's 
secrecy, shame and responsibility that Boyhood could well be characterised as 
'anguished' - the word that Attwell and Coetzee agree on to describe autobiography 
in the mode of confession ('All Autobiography is Autre-biography' 216-17). At the 
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same time, explicit as the engagement with confession is, the narrative is structured in 
this way by the adult author and not by the protagonist who presumably bears the 
greatest burden of shame. It is, therefore, an ironic confession. 
In spite of its relentless cataloguing of John's secrets, there are few moments 
of exposure or disclosure actually staged within the narrative and therefore few 
opportunities for reflection, revision or analysis by the young protagonist. But three 
notable moments of retrospection within the text point to the protagonist's growing 
awareness of the pitfalls of confession. (Though he wouldn't use this term; like 
catechism and communion, the other elements of Roman Catholicism, 'he does not 
even know what the words mean' [20]! ). In the first example he recalls an incident 
shortly after moving to Worcester when he 'replied unthinkingly' to a boy who asked 
what he was doing (29). His reply - that he was 'thinking' - brought ridicule: 'From 
that mistake he has learned to be more prudent. Part of being prudent is always to tell 
less rather than more' (29). In other words, one must always retain confessional 
currency. 
In the second example, after giving an account of a cricket game that he 
invents to entertain himself, he recounts a game of 'reckless intimacy' that he 
engineers with his school friends Greenberg and Goldstein, in which they must 
recount their earliest memories. He listens impatiently to one of them (the other 
refuses to take part) before disclosing his own story, 'For the point of the game is, of 
course, to allow him to recount his own first memory' (30). In his story he witnesses 
a dog being hit by a car from the window of their apartment in Johannesburg. It is 'a 
magnificent first memory, ' but he doubts its veracity. Instead, he admits that there is 
another first memory, 'one that he trusts more fully but would never repeat' for fear 
of ridicule: dropping a sweet-wrapper out the window on a bus journey through the 
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Swartberg Pass (30-31). Recounted in the present tense like the rest of the memoir, 
this is a rare moment of reflection on the process that drives Boyhood. It is as if the 
three friends represent the totality of options available to the would-be confessant: 
recount the 'full, dull truth' (Petersburg 152), lie but tell a good story (John's 
choice), or remain silent. It emphasises that the process of recounting the past taking 
place in Boyhood might as easily be called memory selection or production as 
disclosure. 
The final example is John's account of another incident that occurred in their 
early months in Worcester: he crushed his brother's hand in a mealie-grinder causing 
him to lose part of a finger. But this example is unusual in that the narrative clearly 
recounts the memory as a memory. The memory is triggered by a visit to Aunt 
Annie's house during which he and his brother play with a book press, taking turns to 
pin one another's arms in the bed of the press. Speculating on why they both stop 
short of actually crushing the other, he recounts the incident in Worcester in which he 
hurt his brother. Unusually, the episode is recounted in the past tense, thus allowing 
some space for reflection in a text that generally allows none: 'He has never 
apologized to his brother, nor has he ever been reproached with what he did. 
Nevertheless, the memory lies like a weight upon him, the memory of the soft 
resistance of flesh and bone, and then the grinding' (119). Given the opportunity for 
reflection and the avowed weight of the memory, the episode is a rare moment of 
confession staged within the text. In addition, it is framed by considerations of the 
book press and the memorializing activities of Aunt Annie, pointing to its status as a 
'memory' and as confessional currency. But it also suggests that remembering is not 
a disinterested activity: the episode is recounted at the expense of his brother, 
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specifically a dismembering of his brother. 81 This also positions the events in the 
history of writing about confessional literature, as de Man's 'Excuses (Confessions)' 
is preoccupied with the machine-like operation of the excuse/confession which 
always carries the threat of textual mutilation. Coetzee's chosen narrative mode 
foregoes the possibility of excuse, but the entire episode is carefully staged within 
this specifically confessional context. 
So, while Boyhood operates within the discourse of autobiographical 
signification, and the discourse of confession in particular -a discourse of shame, 
secrets, concealment, disclosure and memory that is described in considerable detail 
in Coetzee's critical writings on the subject - it marks and yet resists the self- 
reflection and doubt that usually characterise this discourse. In other words, it draws 
on the signifying power and authority of the confession, and even marks out the 
dangers and threats posed by the confession, without taking an overtly confessional 
form. The result, as Attridge describes, is that the reader experiences Boyhood as a 
confessional text. But, as Gilmore notes, autobiography owes this power to its 
proximity to confessional discourse rather than a strict observation of the form. 
Published five years later, Youth, opens at a later stage in the process of 
John's setting himself apart that had begun in Boyhood. Now a student, John is 
financially independent, working conscientiously to maintain his autonomy: 'Ile is 
proving something: that each man is an island; that you don't need parents' (3). 
Having removed himself from the day to day demands of family life, and eventually 
from the not inconsiderable demands of life in South Africa, he is in the process of 
reinventing himself as an artist, a move that demands the selection of a new set of 
parents and origins, literary mentors that he looks to initially for aesthetic guidance 
a' For Irlam, the scene 'suggests that remembering and dismembering are uncannily analogous' (5). 
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but finally for some indication of the life one must lead in order to become an artist. 
If the protagonist of Boyhood is distinguished by harbouring unnatural and shameful 
desires, it is the distinction of the artist that is to set apart the protagonist of Youth and 
it would appear that anything and everything can be co-opted to this end. Although 
John's artistic ambitions remain largely untested and unfulfilled for the duration of 
the memoir, he has deduced from his chosen mentors that what is required to become 
an artist is experience, which he interprets as sexual experience, and so embarks on a 
series of affairs. 
But while he awaits the transformative experience that he can in turn 
transform into great art, he once more seeks refuge in a life of outward conformity, 
each day donning a suit and making the journey to his desk at IBM with millions of 
other London workers. The separation of work life from inner life, the artistic life that 
he covets, is protected as fiercely in Youth as that between school life and home life 
in Boyhood. In addition, the passionate relationships that are to deliver him to the 
artistic life are inevitably humiliating encounters that bear more of the qualities of the 
unnatural and shameful secrets of Boyhood than the dark sensuality of Lawrence. 
Rather than capitalising on these experiences to transform them into poetry, as his 
mentors lead him to believe is the appropriate procedure, John instinctively wishes to 
minimise their circulation, hoping to 'close the book' or 'end the chapter' of one 
relationship after another. Nonetheless, the problem remains of 'how to fit it into the 
story of his life that he tells himself' (131). In Youth, as in Boyhood, this story 
becomes a confessional narrative even if its formal properties initially seem to resist 
this description. John's wish to 'close the book' or 'end the chapter' of various stories 
echoes the desire for absolution in 'Double Thoughts' but is more accurately seen as 
completion achieved through forgetting. Moreover, if the narrative focalization of 
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Youth is equally resistant to the intrusion of the older, wiser author, the fiction itself 
can accommodate the kind of self-reflection and self-deception that would have been 
out of place in Boyhood and consequently invites the sceptical reading typically 
directed at confessional texts - without allowing it to be directed at the author. 
Accordingly, the question of responsibility and agency acquires a sharper 
focus in a narrative recounting the actions and behaviour of a twenty-something year 
old man. In one early episode John's relationship with a troubled, moody nurse 
named Jacqueline comes to an end after she reads some unflattering comments about 
herself in his diary. John admits to feeling bad about the circumstances of the break- 
up, but the real subject of the episode is his writing, as evidenced in his defensive 
comments when confronted by Jacqueline: "'You are not going to stop me from 
writing! " he vows. It is a non sequitur, and he knows it' (8). What follows is typical 
of the memoir's preoccupation with the interdependence of life and art, specifically, 
the protagonist's sense that life is in the service of art, which becomes the subject of 
confession: 'But the real question is, what was his motive for writing what he wrote? 
Did he perhaps write it in order that she should read itT (9) 
Of all the shameful secrets that circulate in Youth - and there are many - 
writing is exemplary. In the form of a diary entry the secret of writing takes on a 
conventional enough form: a diary is considered a private document, by definition a 
repository of secrets. But perhaps the most shameful secret of writing is the desire of 
the author for a reader -a desire that is fundamentally at odds with the instinctive 
secrecy and privacy we find in John. In this sense, a diary may be no different to any 
other kind of writing: 'The question of what should be permitted to go into his diary 
and what kept forever shrouded goes to the heart of all his writing' (9). This 
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underlines the unreliability and self-interestedness of the diary format, 82 or any 
autobiographical space, while also pointing to John's failure to acknowledge the 
power specific to an autobiographical space like the diary where the pact that operates 
between author and reader means that artistic truth is not the only issue at stake. 
Nonetheless, while John courts experience to write about, be still clings to the 
possibility of holding things back, keeping part of his life 'shrouded'. In the 
immediate context of the memoir one might speculate that it signals a limited 
commitment to truth-telling and paradoxically a belief that the line between life and 
art can be drawn at will. While John speculates that the truth of the episode may be 
that he was simply too cowardly to explain himself to Jacqueline directly, he is 
finally reluctant to accept the diary entry, and the motives behind it, as true. Instead 
he insists that it is simply a fiction about himself, 'one of many possible fictions, true 
only in the sense that a work of art is true - true to itself, true to its own immanent 
aims' (10). Throughout Youth John attempts to use writing and art to justify his 
actions - though he seems to be as little convinced by this excuse as the reader (once 
more turning writing into a source of shame). Indeed, much of the irony of Youth is 
directed at John's conception of himself as a writer and artist. But his intimation that 
truth in autobiography, no more than truth in art, is subject to the fictional will 
eventually proceed beyond the realm of excuse, as his encounters with the writings of 
William Burchell in the British Museum lead him to speculate about creating a future 
work with the aura of truth. 
While Youth describes the young Coetzee's pursuit of experience in the name 
of art, and the secrecy about the humiliating encounters this leads to, it cannot be said 
82 Made explicit in the way the episode echoes accounts of diary-keeping in the Tolstoy household, as 
described in 'Double Thoughts' (419-20n 10). 
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to vindicate these actions. Instead, in the face of the young writer's attempts to 
construct and live-out a specific narrative, there is a constant slippage between 'what 
should be permitted to go into his diary and what kept forever shrouded' (9). In its 
catalogue of humiliation, shame and culpability Youth adheres strongly to the 
confessional paradigm of disclosing shameful truths, unflattering self-examination 
and avowing wrong-doing. The problem for the reader is that the evidence of J. M. 
Coetzee's biography shows that this is no less an attempt to construct a specific 
narrative, in this case a confessional narrative, by omitting biographical inforination 
(like his marriage in 1963, listed on the Nobel Prize webpage) that does not fit into 
this version of his life. 
So without adopting an overtly confessional style, that is, without staging a 
first person address to a confessor avowing past wrongs, both Boyhood and Youth 
make a direct claim to be read as autobiographical texts and explicitly invoke the 
language and motifs of confessional discourse. Because the texts do not take an 
overtly confessional form, they avoid the double thought that Coetzee finds 
characteristic of confessional narrative and the perverse relish with which famous 
confessants recount their misdemeanours. And while the potentially endless self- 
examination of the confession is staged as a possibility, the narratives themselves 
contain and limit the disclosures. The respective protagonists of both texts - their 
fictional frames demand that we respond differently to both - often recognise their 
actions and desires as shameful or wrong, attempt to conceal them to avoid the shame 
of exposure and sometimes express regret or the intention to amend their behaviour. 
Their responses to other actions and desires go unremarked, though if one attempts to 
counter-focalize through the author one must imagine that the cost of revealing 
seemingly shameful details of his early life is very high indeed. Both texts' 
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preoccupation with the singularity of the protagonist - as an 'unnatural' boy or as an 
artist - invokes the confessional paradigm established by Rousseau's claim that 'if I 
am not better, at least I am different. ' This, together with their insistent dwelling on 
shameful actions and desires, means that they run the risk of appearing to privilege 
shame and difference to enhance their confessional currency and hence the value of 
the narrative. 
But the emergence of these texts in the immediate post-apartheid period 
suggests that there is more at stake in asserting one's difference and the shame of 
one's actions and desires than fascinating the reader with a series of disclosures. In 
their tendency to document the specificities of a childhood and youth in a particular 
place and at a particular time - intensified in the preoccupation with remembering in 
Boyhood and the almost inadvertent testimony of Youth - both texts could also be 
described as autobiography in the mode of memoir. I will demonstrate how the 
elements of confession and memoir act together in these texts; the memoir creates the 
context in which these texts can be understood as confessional. The memoir 
dimension of these texts is an act of affiliation with a history and a community that 
facilitates the confessional dimension of the text; this act of affiliation, however, 
could only take place in the context of the greater project of confession and 
reconciliation that was taking place in South Affica in this period. 
IV 
Although the preoccupation with the singular status of the protagonist in Boyhood is 
in obvious dialogue with Rousseau, it is also articulated within the metapborics of the 
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unfolding political doctrine of apartheid. This has the effect of bringing the claim of 
the autobiographical subject to singularity into direct dialogue with his 
representativeness, and in a sense, bringing the confessional and the memoir-like 
aspects of the autobiography into dialogue. The abiding impression created in 
Boyhood is of a young boy attempting to lead a private and rigidly compartmental ised 
life, his consciousness taking us through the apparently discrete spaces of home, 
school and farm. By the same token, there is an inescapably public dimension to the 
protagonist's insistence on discrete spaces: the separation of family life and school 
life means that he can continue to be part of the English-language stream at school, 
even though he has an Afrikaans name and family. His family's choices not to speak 
Afrikaans or belong to a Reformed Church mark them as 'unnatural' in the eyes of 
their son: 'He comes from an unnatural and shameful family in which not only are 
children not beaten but older people are addressed by their first names and no one 
9 93 goes to church and shoes are wom every day (6) . Such habits set them apart from 
their contemporaries in Worcester at precisely the moment in South African history 
when the state sought to identify its interests with those of the Afrikaner volk and 
attempted to complete this identification by pursuing policies of racial and cultural 
separation or apartheid. Boyhood opens with a description of the suburban planning 
of which the Coetzee's home at Poplar Avenue is part: 
All the houses on the estate are new and identical. They are set in large plots of red 
clay earth where nothing grows, separated by wire fences. In each back yard stands a 
small block consisting of a room and a lavatory. Though they have no servant, they 
refer to these as 'the servant's room' and the 'servant's lavatory. ' They use the 
servant's room to store things in: newspapers, empty bottles, a broken chair, an old 
coir mattress. (1) 
13 In the final interview in Doubling (a precursor to the memoirs) Coctzee describes his parents' place 
in society: 'People of his parents' kind are thundered at from the pulpit as volksverraaiers, traitors to 
the people. The truth is, his parents aren't traitors, they aren't even particularly deracinated; they are 
merely, to their etemal credit, indifferent to the volk and its fate' (Doubling 393). 
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That 'the servant's room' is integral to South African suburban architecture of this 
period is hardly surprising; the fact that the Coetzee's don't have a servant (no doubt 
for economic reasons) is an interesting early indication of the way the family could 
inhabit the space of the apartheid system without acting out all of its practices. 
Young John's lies at school similarly take on a public significance, as his 
claim to be a Catholic removes him from the religious and nationalist fervour of 
assembly. He experiences this separation as tenuous, based on a lie, and therefore 
vulnerable to exposure. He feels that he constantly runs the risk of being transferred 
into the Afrikaans stream at school and thereby assimilated into the volk, a prospect 
that fills him with horror. In this way the desire of the protagonist to be different, to 
distinguish himself from his peers - particularly those who speak Afrikaans - comes 
to take on the stance both of an unwitting political oppositionality and perhaps an 
equally unwitting participation in the dominant political discourse of the period. 
As I have shown, each of John's actions and desires leads to his sense of 
himself as different from his peers. This ranges from being set apart by shameful 
actions and secrets - his aversion to being beaten, his unnatural family, the red 
mattress that he takes on the scouting trip - to the distinction of his preference for the 
Russians ('It can have you ostracized' [28]) and the stirrings of erotic desire: 'Of all 
the secrets that set him apart, this may in the end be the worst. Among all these boys 
he is the only one in whom this dark erotic current runs; among all this innocence and 
normality, he is the only one who desires' (57). This is all deeply ironic, of course, 
John's sense of his own difference marks him out as typical. But as his sense of being 
set apart is intensified in his impression of being singled out and selected for an 
important task, one becomes conscious of Boyhood as Kunslterroman which after all 
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operates on the basis of being different and exceptional. After the drowning incident 
at the scout camp, he thinks he has been saved for a reason: 'From that day onward he 
knows there is something special about him. He should have died but he did not. 
Despite his unworthiness, he has been given a second life. He was dead but is alive' 
(17). Because of his frequent colds 'He is convinced that he is different, special' 
(108) and this is encouraged by his grandaunt's assertions that he is a special boy: 
'But what kind of special? No one ever says' (165). His apparent election by Aunt 
Annie, who had after all assumed the burden of publishing and disseminating her 
father's book, leads to the enormous sense of responsibility described in the closing 
lines: 'He alone is left to do the thinking. How will he keep it all in his head, all the 
books, all the people, all the stories? And if he does not remember them, who will? ' 
(166) But this onerous responsibility represents a subtle shift in the kind of 
'difference' that is at stake: he is distinguished by the responsibility, but the essence 
of the responsibility to remember is about forming links and establishing continuities 
between people, places and things that he had previously thought distant from 
himself. 
A similar dynamic is evident in his discussion of the family farms. lie 
describes the farms in the same terms of separation that he uses for all desired places 
and goods: 'That is what sets him apart: the two farms behind him, his mother's farm, 
his father's farm, and the stories of those farms. Through the farms he is rooted in the 
past; through the farms he has substance' (22). The gentle irony that is frequently 
directed at young John's self-importance is evident in this passage, but it is also 
suggestive of the cultural work that we might say Boyhood is doing. John is 
attempting to negotiate his ties to the world around him, mediated through the thing 
that he feels most strongly about - the farm: 'there is no place on earth he loves more 
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or can imagine loving more' (79). The intensity and singularity of this attachment 
distinguishes him from his peers and links him not just with the farm but, through it, 
with the past and with the land. It also, somewhat inconveniently, connects him to his 
father's family and their Afrikaans-speaking, servant-kecping, school-beating ways, 
all of which is a source of discomfort and embarrassment to him but which he can by 
and large accommodate while he is on the farm. He wonders if there is a way of 
living in the Karoo 'without belonging to a family' (91) - the kind of fantasy that 
would not be out of place in Heart or Michael K. But it is precisely this concept of 
belonging that the farm provides, as he confides that 'I belong on the farm' and, 
indeed, 'to thefarm' (though the farm never belongs to him) (96). So desire for the 
farm is a way of being different, of asserting his agency, but his connection to the 
farm is, finally, something that he has not in fact chosen and that he cannot control: 
'Belonging to the farm is his secret fate, a fate he was bom into but embraces gladly' 
(96). 
But just as the farm brings with it the inconvenience of a family, the narrative 
of belonging-to-the-farm signals an affiliation to the wider family of the Afrikaner 
volk, precisely the group that he is at pains to assert his distance from. Like belonging 
to the farm or the family, it is not something he has chosen, but neither is it 
something he wishes to embrace, or even tolerate. In "ite Writing Coetzee explores 
the ideological baggage of the South African farm novel, the plaasroman, particularly 
the farm as the space through which attachment to the land and to South Africa is 
mediated. In her essay on Boyhood, Jennifer Wenzel illustrates how this ideological 
baggage also has some currency in the context of post-apartheid anxieties about land 
reform. She argues that Coetzee appropriates 'for his own life story some of the 
tropes of Afrikaner relationships to land that he has criticized in his earlier work' 
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(92), but that he deploys these tropes to a particular end: 'During his yearly enactment 
of the pastoral promise, the return to the land, the boy also begins to recognize the 
political imperative of the return of the land' (108). While Wenzel does not explicitly 
invoke the confessional dimension of Boyhood, her efforts to situate this post- 
apartheid memoir in the context of the tradition of the plaasroman and Coetzce's 
critical engagement with it leads her to describe the memoir as 'beginning a complex 
process of "reconciliation" with his personal, professional, and national history' 
(I 11). 
Wenzel's reading of the pastoral dimension of Boyhood's treatment of the 
farm and the land allows us to see the protagonist as embedded in the culture rather 
than separate from it, in spite of his insistence to the contrary. This embeddcdness is 
also evident in the memoir's treatment of Afrikaans. The boy rejects the language, 
relieved that he is 'saved from having to talk like that, like a whipped slave' (49) and 
he lives in fear of being co-opted into the Afrikaans stream at school. Yet, his time on 
the farm has equipped him to speak the language effortlessly: 'When he speaks 
Afrikaans all the complications of life seem suddenly to fall away. Afrikaans is like a 
ghostly envelope that accompanies him everywhere, that he is free to slip into, 
becoming at once another person, simpler, gayer, lighter in his tread' (125). 84 Butjust 
as he longs for the connection to the Karoo without the familial ties, the Afdkaans 
language is too closely identified with 'Afrikaners'. If speaking the language is 
characterised as an enabling disguise, he experiences the company of Afdkaans- 
speakers and his association with them as a loss of privacy. lie finds in Afrikaner 
84 Earlier he describes it in terms of transparency that one rarely associates with language in Coetzee; 
language in this case has the kind of immediacy that is usually the subject of fantasr. 'As he spoke, he 
forgot what language he was speaking: thoughts simply turned to words within him, transparent words' 
(94). 
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boys 'an animal indifference to privacy'; their company 'is like being sent to prison, 
to a life without privacy. He cannot live without privacy. If he were Afrikaans he 
would have to live every minute of every day and night in the company of others. It is 
a prospect he cannot bear' (126). While this is in keeping with the boy's 
squeamishness about physical impropriety elsewhere in the memoir (being beaten, 
not wearing shoes, going naked), it also suggests that loss of privacy is more than a 
physical violation; collective identity itself is experienced by the boy as a loss of 
privacy. 
Of course, the very form that Coetzee is operating in in Boyhood necessitates 
a certain loss of privacy. Indeed, as I have shown, one of the ways in which it 
conforms most closely to the confessional model of autobiography is its privileging 
of the secret and the private, thus enhancing the value and power of the narrative that 
appears to violate them. In its legal or religious guise confession is public insofar as it 
presupposes a community in which to be rehabilitated. But what is less clear is how 
the confessional dimension of Boyhood functions alongside its preoccupations with 
the boy's aversion to and immersion in collective identity, also conceived of as a loss 
of privacy, and determined by the immediate context of post-apartheid South Africa. I 
would like to suggest that the loss of privacy implicit in the confessional narrative 
and the loss of privacy evident in collective identity can both be seen as acts of 
strategic affiliation. In Complicities, Sanders helps us to understand the ethics of such 
an act of affiliation: 
What makes apartheid exemplary for a study of the intellectual and complicity is the 
paradox that, while supporters disavowed or sought to limit foldedncss with the 
other, opponents, though striving to minimize acting-in-complicity with the agents of 
apartheid and its policies, tended to acknowledge, affIrm, and generalize 
responsibility-in-complicity. (12) 
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Later, emphasising the extent to which apartheid 'decreed apartness' and 'disavowed 
relation' (189,190), he notes that: 
If such a disavowal of relation is what tends toward support for apartheid, it is an 
acknowledgement of this complicity and its disavowal at the heart of apartheid that is 
the essential starting point of any opposition to apartheid. Without it there would be 
no desire, no freeing of desire, for things to be any different. (190) 
In 'Subjectivities of Whiteness' Sarah Nuttall finds that the emphasis in Boyhood on 
secrecy, lying, privacy and setting apart is continuous with the way in which white 
identity is figured in terms of visibility and invisibility across a range of 
autobiographical texts, during and after the apartheid period. For Nuttall, 'the 
exaltation of the self's singularity is in part a shielding of the self from a collective 
culture of conformity, the culture of whiteness' (132). Nuttall sees the privileging of 
privacy as a renunciation of collective identity. Irlarn too finds in the memoir a 
shuddering away from 'the odious collective embrace of South African racism' (10). 
But I believe that at the level of form (confession) and language (the language of 
apartheid) there is a tacit and strategic acknowledgement of collective identity that 
coexists with this shuddering away from familial and community relations. 
While the emphasis on the singularity of the protagonist tics Boyhood to 
confessional narrative and distances him from the collective culture of whiteness 
described by Nuttall, it also partakes of the language of separation and apartness 
characteristic of apartheid discourse and apartheid thinking. For Irlam, Boyhood is 
'saturated by the poetics of apartheid, and the protocols of selling apart' (10). Wenzel 
seems to read this as continuous with Coetzee's appropriation of the tropes of the 
plaasroman; she describes his use of the language of apartheid discourse as 
'scandalous' and notes that it could only have been published after 1994. But, 
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Coetzee's 1991 essay on Geoffrey CroqJ6 sets out the terms of this discussion very 
clearly. In it Coetzee describes the language of apartness - 'the word anders 
(different), eie (own/unique), apart (apart)' (16) - as forming one of the semantic 
poles of Cronj6's thought (the other pole being the language of mixture) ('The Mind 
of Apartheid'). By tracing the language and metaphors of apartness and mixture in 
'the heart speech and autobiography' of one of the most notorious advocates of a 
policy of separation, Coetzee hopes to come close to the essence of what he calls 
'apartheid thinking' - that aspect of apartheid that is not reducible to economic and 
political self-interest, a kind of pathological racism for which historians struggle to 
account. Coetzee's subject is not autobiography or confession conceived as the highly 
self-conscious art in 'Double Thoughts'; his conception of autobiography and 
confession in this essay is of an uncensored, blind, delirious and mad discourse where 
the pathology of Crorj6's racism can be read. And his reading of the obsessive 
meditation on blood-mixing does indeed allow the madness to emerge. Needless to 
say, I do not propose that Coetzee's text is susceptible to a similar reading but the 
CroqJ6 essay reminds us, if it were necessary, that Coetzee uses words 'with the full 
freight of their history behind them' (Coetzee, 'Speaking in Tongues'). There is no 
doubt that the author intends to invoke the full history of the word apart in South 
Africa, but to what end? 85 
Coetzee's essay on CroqJ6 is fascinating for many reasons, among them his 
description of apartheid as a counterattack on desire, specifically the desire for mixed 
race relations, his attempt to supplement historical accounts of apartheid as motivated 
solely by rational self-interest by focusing on the irrationality and madness evident in 
85 Irlam invokes this history with reference to Derrida's 'Racism's Last Word' and the response by 
Anne McClintock and Rob Nixon which emphasises the disavowal of the term apartheid within 
official discourse as early as the 1950s. 
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the work of Cronj6, and his efforts to describe how the madness of Cronj6, what he 
calls 'apartheid thinking, ' is transmitted through the social body and comes to act 
with the undeniable economic self-interest that sustained the system. In a sense, it is a 
version of the latter question that is posed in Boyhood (and to some extent in Youth): 
given the social and political climate in South Africa in the 1950s, how did he come 
to act the way he did? Were he and his family somehow immune to the madness or 
does it manifest itself in other ways? 
Boyhood describes the young Coetzee's anxiety and revulsion at the policies 
of separation that were taking place around him, but it is also an attempt to 
understand his position with regard to the public world around him. In its revelation 
of his (shameful) erotic response to other boys, especially coloured boys, it suggests 
that he escaped some indoctrination; in his repetition of racist attitudes towards the 
'natives', it is, as Attridge says, 'a confession of having been, without realizing it, all 
too "normal... (150). What I am claiming here is a particular ethical significance for 
this assertion of unexceptional normality - representativeness - particularly as it 
emerges in the language of apartheid discourse. I would suggest that Coetzee's 
repeated use of the term apart and the motif of separation in Boyhood describes his 
attempt to assert his distance from the policies of apartheid as they were taking shape 
in those years but, more importantly, it is an indication of the potency and virulence 
of the language and concept of setting apart itself. As Sanders has demonstrated in his 
analysis of South African intellectuals, it was not sufficient to assert distance from a 
policy of enforced separation; what was necessary was a refusal of the logic of 
separation. This is what emerges in Boyhood. 
What I am calling a strategic affiliation and refusal of the logic of separation 
acquires its ethical significance in the context in which Boyhood was written - the 
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years immediately following the first democratic elections in South Africa. As I 
pointed out chapter 5, the TRC operated under very specific restrictions and 
guidelines. The period covered by Boyhood and the world it describes would not have 
fallen within its remit. As Attridge notes, Coetzee's confession in the third person and 
the present tense would not have been a satisfactory confession under the rules of the 
commission (142-43). But the climate created by the TRC nonetheless allows us to 
read Boyhood as a confession of sorts. The logic of the fiction of Boyhood, focalized 
exclusively through the consciousness of the young Coetzee, effaces this context. By 
demonstrating a way to restore this context, I hope to have made the overall 
confessional dimension of the text more apparent. 
V 
To a greater extent than its predecessor Youth points to the successful writing career 
to come. The period covered by the memoir could be described as a period of waiting, 
what Coetzee has described in an interview as 'a youth treading water, ' and at its 
gloomy conclusion the protagonist has no indication of the imminent changes of 
continent and career that would deliver him from the misery of life in London as a 
computer programmer ('All Autobiography' 216). In spite of his perceived artistic 
failures, the informed reader sees the seeds of Dusklands in his enthusiasm for South 
African travel narratives in the British Library and his stated intention to write a book 
in the style of William Burchell's Travels in Southern Africa. What he has in mind is 
not a history, or a forgery, but a book with the 'aura of truth. ' Writing such a book he 
decides is not a question of remembering facts, but of forgetting them: 'he will need 
to know less than he knows now; he will need to forget things. Yet before he can 
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forget he will have to know what to forget; before he can know less he will have to 
know more. Where will he find what he needs to knowT (13 9) 
So, as in Boyhood, selection is a central preoccupation of Youth. Forgetting as 
a principle of selection is the end point of John's aesthetic education, pointing as it 
does beyond the period covered by the memoir to his imminent success as a novelist. 
As an indication of the process that has lent 'the aura of truth' to the memoir itself, 
the notion of forgetting is also instructive in reading Youth as a highly selective 
account of these years in the young Coetzce's life. I have already shown that the 
events recounted in the memoir have been selected on the basis of their shamefulness 
- 'a shameful desire is a valuable desire' in the economy of confession ('Double 
Thoughts' 272) - suggesting that much has been 'forgotten' (selected, shaped, 
omitted) to craft this confessional narrative. The notion that a confessional narrative 
can be constructed by omission rather than by inclusion is perhaps counter-intuitivc, 
contradicting the idea of confession as full disclosure. But the dynamic of disclosure 
and concealment is central to the memoir's concern with the relationship between life 
and art, specifically the power available to the artist or writer to transform one into 
the other, or rather to control the transformation of one into the other. While there is 
an undeniable confessional dimension to Youth, the question that is posed throughout 
is to what extent the narrator and the author are confessing freely? 
This question emerges from the tension in Youth between competing ideas of 
the relationship between life and art, and specifically writing as something that 
mediates between the two. The discussion is constructed between two extreme and 
mutually exclusive notions of autobiography and autobiographical writing. On the 
one hand, these are the highly self-conscious, self-interested fictions-of-the-self that 
are the subject of 'Double Thoughts' and most of Coetzee's writings on and 
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engagement with confessional narrative. And on the other, there is what I have 
referred to as 'heart-speech'; this is confession conceived as unmediated and 
unformed access to the 'true' thoughts of the confessant. 86 For the purpose of the 
chapter, I will attempt to describe this debate in terms of confessional agency. In 
these terms, the former, being highly self-conscious and self-aware, demonstrates the 
qualities that we associate with a free agent, and can be seen in the protagonist's 
strategic self-invention and highly selective disclosure. The seemingly unguarded and 
uncensored nature of the latter, however, implies a compulsive and unconscious 
degree of disclosure that hints at an absence of agency. Coetzee's writings on 
confessional narrative bring this opposition into question: in his discussion of 
Dostoevsky's Underground Man, for example, self-consciousness itself becomes a 
kind of pathology, and it is a short step from this to de Man's notion of the machine- 
like production of confessions, excuses and guilt, that I discuss in chapter 1. 
Similarly, the apparently unmediated compulsiveness of 'heart-speech, ' of madness, 
is potentially another way of staging sincerity and authenticity, the guarantee of a 
truthful confession. 
In the course of the memoir John suggests that self-writing of the kind that 
might go into a diary produces fiction, 'one of many possible fictions, true only in the 
sense that a work of art is true, true to itself, true to its own immanent aims' (10). fie 
claims throughout the memoir to pursue experience in order to write, eschewing 
moral criteria in favour of aesthetic criteria in judging his actions. Writing above all 
else is bound up with that dimension of Youth that we associate with the long 
86 The term heart-speech comes from the essay on Cronj6 (Giving Offense 164). On Cronj6's writings, 
Coetzee notes: 'I treat them as a confession: not as a repentant confession - far from it - but as a 
confession of belief all the more revealing for being full of ignorance and madness' (3). T'his indicates 
an understanding of confession as declaration of belief, but the terms in which Coetzee goes on to 
describe Cronj6's writings suggest a kind of uncensored expression that Neill and Vermeulen 
(Togged Silences'), for example, associate with confession. 
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tradition of confessional literature that Coetzee engages elsewhere. Writing is that 
part of his life that singles him out from other people and that is conducted in secret. 
His job as a computer programmer is merely a disguise: 'surely behind so eminently 
respectable a shield, in private, in secrecy, he will be able to go on with the work of 
transmuting experience into art, the work for which he was brought into the world' 
(44). Writing leads to dubious actions and 'ignoble emotions' and, in the final 
analysis of the memoir, his great failure. But eventually, the pursuit of experience in 
order to write comes to seem like an excuse and he finds this to be an intolerable 
position: 
It is ajustification that does not for a moment convince him. It is sophistry, that is all, 
contemptible sophistry. And if he is further going to claim that, just as sleeping with 
Astrid and her teddy-bear was getting to know moral squalor, so telling self- 
justifying lies to oneself is getting to know intellectual squalor at first hand, then the 
sophistry will only become more contemptible. There is nothing to be said for it; nor, 
to be ruthlessly honest, is there anything to be said for its having nothing to be said 
for it. As for ruthless honesty, ruthless honesty is not a hard trick to learn. On the 
contrary, it is the easiest thing in the world. As a poisonous toad is not poison to 
itself, so one soon develops a hard skin against one's own honesty. Death to reason, 
death to talk! All that matters is doing the right thing, whether for the right reason or 
the wrong reason or no reason at all. (164-65) 
He reiterates this point a couple of lines later: 'So he is at an impasse: he would rather 
be bad than boring, has no respect for a person that would rather be bad than boring, 
and no respect either for the cleverness of being able to put his dilemma neatly into 
words' (165). Such self-cancelling logic is almost a parody of the spiralling self. 
consciousness of double thought that Coetzee finds in confessional narratives: it is 
unproductive, potentially endless, self-deceived and, ultimately, only serves the 
interests of the confessional narrative itself. In this dead end of self-consciousness 
one hears echoes of Dostoevsky's Underground Man, though Coetzce's translation of 
Emants' A Posthumous Confession (1975), which I discussed in chapter 2, brings us 
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closer to the world of Youth in time and, I believe, in spirit. While none of John's 
actions in Youth compare with the unsympathetic Termeer, similarities emerge in the 
both books' adherence to a Rousseauean confessionalism evident in the desire of the 
protagonists to 'be a particular way' and to transform this into writing. Like John, 
Termeer claims to be an exceptional individual, willing to undergo some kind of 
transformative experience, and his own most pitiless judge. And this is all qualified 
by acute self-awareness: 'Under the illusion that all the peculiarities setting me apart 
from the great multitude, and everything inexpressible which I felt so painfully within 
me, would eventually be revealed as the finer impressionability of an artist, I had 
made my hero a faithful counterfeit of myself. The story had become an unadorned 
revelation of my most secret feelings' (54-55). But all of this is the stuff of Termcer's 
first confession; his second confession - that he murdered his wife - is figured as a 
burning secret that cannot be concealed, and it is in this regard that his narrative 
comes to seem quite mad, what Coctzee refers to in the introduction as 'Termeer's 
gabble. ' Termeer's 'white hot writing, ' as Coetzee calls it, resembles the idea of heart 
speech, even if it is finally part of the narrative performance. 
While Termeer obsessively identifies with the books and plays he encounters, 
John frequently dwells on the likelihood that aspects of works he admires originated 
in incidents in the lives of their authors, leading him to conclude that he must live a 
life worthy of being transformed into art. In the case of Pound and Eliot he describes 
this connection as one of sacrificing life for the sake of art (20) and, quoting Eliot, 
notes that 'Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion but an escape from emotion' 
(Youth 61). His thoughts on Eliot elicit the admission that he 'has a horror of spilling 
mere emotion onto the page. Once it has begun to spill out he would not know how to 
stop it. It would be like severing an artery and watching one's lifeblood gush out' 
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(61). This image of writing as spilling brings to mind the 'heart-speech' that leaks 
and flows in Cronj6's writings. Instead, what John has to aim for is something much 
more controlled. His single account of daring to show his writing in public describes 
a Poetry Society meeting where he reads a poem ending with the words 'the furious 
waves of my incontinence(73). This is hilariously appraised an 'unfortunate' word- 
choice by a fellow poet but it stages his struggle to accommodate life and experience 
in his writing in a manner which is restrained, controlled and disinterested in the way 
that Pound and Eliot advocate. 
The overstatement of the first example and the comedy of the second 
reinforce the impression that John's writing is an object of ridicule in Youth, but in 
the abject terms on which they draw, they invite comparison with those episodes in 
the memoir which use similar language to utterly different ends: John's affairs with 
Sarah and Marianne. Sarah is a girlfriend in Cape Town who becomes pregnant and 
arranges to have an abortion, asking only that John accompany her and provide a 
place to stay in the days immediately afterwards. Ile feels utterly incompetent 
throughout the episode, merely following the arrangements she has made and proving 
to be quite useless as a nurse: 'It is merely a penance, a stupid and incffectual 
penance' (35). But even though he doesn't witness it, he is fascinated by the physical 
details of the abortion. The entire scene is elaborated in a language of 'spillage'. His 
imagination is filled with ideas of 'bloody pads and whatever else there is' (34) and 
'the bloody towels and sheets' (35). The images of flow and spillage continue 
afterwards as he imagines 'that pod of flesh, that rubbery manikin' being disposed of 
through the sewers and currents of the city. 'Ile is out of his depth, ' he tells us, as the 
foetus blends with the image of a drowning cabin-boy (36). 
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The unfortunate deflowering of Marianne occurs within a similar lexicon of 
abjection as she bleeds profusely, to John's horror: 'There is blood on the sheets, 
blood all over his body. They have been - the image comes to him distastefully - 
wallowing in blood like pigs' (129). His humiliation is intensifited when she seeks the 
help of the Malawian babysitter who also lives in the house, as he has the impression 
of being judged and found wanting by a community of women. 
In a forthcoming essay Elleke Boehmer attributes John's squeamishness about 
women and their bodies, as evidenced in the abject language in which these scenes 
are described, to an underlying misogyny in Coetzee's recent work. The 
squeamishness and discomfort are undeniable, but it seems to me that the charge of 
misogyny does not take into account the context of Coetzce's engagement with 
confessional discourse in general and the terms of the confessional dimension of 
Youth in particular. 
The self-laceration of John aside, these scenes are among the most overtly 
confessional in Youth. They reveal deeply private and intimate details of sexual 
relationships which consistently reflect badly on the protagonist, demonstrating his 
immaturity in the world of adult sexual relations. But immaturity is no excuse; the 
incidents are also examples of his casual and selfish treatment of women which, 
however inadvertently, lead to pain and suffering on their part. In formal terms, these 
episodes are also quintessentially confessional. Insofar as they have to do with sex, 
they contribute to Foucault's discourse of sexuality. They are presented to the reader 
as deeply shameful secrets, therefore intensifying the difficulty of the obstacles that 
must be overcome in revealing them, thus enhancing their status as confessional 
currency. 
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But the confessional currency of the encounters is also increased by the 
protagonist's apparent resistance to sharing the stories. While these episodes are 
among the most powerful confessional passages in the memoir, they are marked by a 
particular anxiety about story-telling. This is in keeping with the rhetoric of the 
confessional form, which is structured around enhancing the confessional value of the 
revelation, but it seems to me that in these episodes John's anxiety coincides with 
those moments in the memoir when we find his control over how stories circulate 
begin to slip. In all of the encounters with women in the novel, we find John 
expressing some anxiety about how the particular episode can be assimilated to the 
story of his life he would like to tell - this is true of his relationship with Jacqueline, 
Sarah, Astrid and Marianne. In the case of Jacqueline, the story of their relationship 
that he records in his diary is shown not only to be untrustworthy but to have far- 
reaching consequences for the relationship itself. In other words, the story is not the 
innocent fiction he would like to believe. The encounter with Astrid and her teddy- 
bear may have been 'getting to know moral squalor' but he dismisses the value of this 
narrative or any narrative that attempts to excuse or justify it (164). 
His ineffective role in helping Sarah through the trauma of an abortion in 
Cape Town is particularly humiliating given her apparent cool-headed approach: 'As 
for him, he has emerged ignominiously, he cannot deny it. What help he has given 
her has been faint-hearted and, worse, incompetent. He prays she will never tell the 
story to anyone' (35). But in a more general sense the episode demonstrates how little 
control he exercises over the events he describes. Ile does not presume to speak for 
Sarah, but wonders about how she experiences the events: 'Is it like a sickness, he 
wonders to himself, from which she is now in the process of recuperating, or is it like 
an amputation, from which one never recovers' (36). The language he uses to 
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describe the events seems to be bound up with its potential endlessness. Ile accurately 
raises the prospect that what both he and Sarah experience is a form of mourning, but 
it appears that it is not in their power to control: 'Weep, weep! cries the cabin-boy, 
who will not sink and will not be stilled' (36). 
If mourning defeats his control of the story of Sarah's abortion, it is guilt and 
shame that prevent him from putting the awkward sexual encounter with Marianne 
behind him. He focuses initially on the abject detail of the scene: 'The unsettling 
lovemaking, the whispering women, the bloody sheets, the stained mattress: he would 
like to put the whole shameful business behind him, close the book on it' (130). But 
he has a two-pronged strategy for dealing with the story, 'what to make of the 
episode, how to fit it into the story of his life that he tells himself' (130) - to turn his 
attention inward thereby minimising its circulation: 'In the absence of anyone to 
administer the slap, he has no doubt that he will gnaw away at himself Agenbyle of 
inwit. Let that be his contract then, with the gods: he will punish himself, and in 
return will hope that the story of his caddish behaviour will not get out' (130). In this 
version, guilt is a way of controlling the events, a way of experiencing them that he 
can accommodate to the story he tells himself, meanwhile limiting the circulation of 
that story. The allusion to Stephen Dedalus' self-reproach in Ulysses drives this 
home. But he thinks that it matters little if the story does get out as South Affica - 
where Marianne and his cousin might recount the tale - and London are worlds apart: 
'He belongs to two worlds tightly sealed from each other' (130). But just as the story 
cannot easily be concealed within himself, it is not in his power to maintain the 
separate spheres of London and South Africa. His cousin writes a letter admonishing 
him for his bad treatment of her friend, thus collapsing the psychic and physical 
separation he tries to enforce. His assurance to himself that 'At least the episode is 
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closed, closed off, consigned to the past, sealed away in memory' must be qualified: 
'But that is not true, not quite' (13 1). His story is unsettled by the intrusion of a 
counter-narrative that defeats his efforts at 'closing off' and 'sealing away'. 
In these phrases one can detect echoes of David Lurie's obsessive use of the 
perfective aspect in Disgrace. Sanders points to the perfective as a grammatical 
undermining of the desire for completion and transformation, a marker of the novel's 
failed attempts at 'coming to terms with the past in ways that render it simply past' 
(Ambiguities 180-181). Instead Sanders emphasises traumatic repetition as a way of 
living with the past. 
But the language that is used to describe John's failure of control and psychic 
separation also echoes Coetzee's comments about writing in his 1977 essay on 
Achterberg's 'Ballade van de gasfitter. ' Coetzee points out that the significance of the 
occupation of 'gasfitter' in the poem relies on a pun on the Dutch dichten, which 
means both to seal a hole and to compose a poem: 'Around the familiar dichlen pun 
the whole poem revolves: the gasfitter sealing off leaks is also the poet at work' 
87 (73). The gasfitter's role in the poem involves maintaining the distinct hemispheres 
of underground gas and overworld city: 'The craft of the gasfitter is the craft of 
dichten' (73). 
The connection between Coetzee's repeated use of the motif of sealing in 
Youth with the concerns of Achterberg's gasfitter becomes more apparent when one 
considers that the same pun exists in Afrikaans: the verb dig means to seal or seal off 
and also to write poetry. 88 Of course, it also exists in German, so at a stretch one 
87 Coetzee tells us that the word gas comes via Dutch from the Greek chaos. This is a pun that he also 
points out in his analysis of Beckett's Murphy in his doctoral thesis (28). 
38 As an adjective it means closed, shut, tight, dense; and from the same root the verb dighou means to 
keep secret. 
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might even extend the pun to include the memoir's epigraph from Goethe's West- 
östlicher Divan: 'Wer den Dichter will verstehen, muß in Dichters Lande gehen. ' But 
my purpose is not to trivialise the memoir's preoccupation with writing or Coctzce's 
carefully selected epigraph from Goethe. My intention is rather to place the subtext of 
abjection - the language of flowing, regulating, sealing, leaking - within the context 
of a particular concept of writing, specifically autobiographical writing, and to extend 
this to the form and subject of the confessional dimension of the text. Writing in 
Youth is about control; writing is a way of maintaining distinct spheres, whether 
between work and other interests, private life and writing life, South Africa and 
London. Yet in the instances when there seems to be most at stake in maintaining 
these distinctions, the protagonist of Youth loses control of the narrative, allows the 
story to seep away. Of course, these are the deliberate revelations of the author, 
whose strategic choice of register allows the story to appear to be beyond the control 
and agency of the protagonist. 
While John's encounters with women are notable for the abject imagery they 
invoke, the other topic that is articulated in similar terms is his relationship to South 
Africa. Early in the memoir, before he leaves South Africa in the wake of Sharpeville 
and the fallout from it, John describes the 'gulf' that is fixed between the races: 'from 
Afficans in general, even from Coloured people, he feels a curious, amused 
tenderness emanating: a sense that he must be a simpleton, in need of protection, if he 
imagines he can get by on the basis of straight looks and honourable dealings when 
the ground beneath his feet is soaked with blood and the vast backward depth of 
history rings with shouts of anger' (17). In London he attempts to distance himself 
from South Affica, resisting his mother's letters and demonstrating no desire to 
return, but (perhaps to vindicate these positions) he pursues the worst news he can 
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find about the political situation there: 'Horror upon horror, atrocity upon atrocity, 
without relief (100). Another aspect of the attempt to situate himself at a distance 
from South Africa might be the curious silence about the journey between Cape 
Town and England that Kai Easton points to in her essay on Youth. 
Yet, as he finds on receiving his cousin's letter of reproach, the two worlds he 
'belongs to' are not as tightly sealed as he would like. His first foray into prose- 
writing is set in South Africa, which 'disquiets him' (62). Later, as he is drawn to 
William Burchell's writings on South Africa he worries that he has become afflicted 
by patriotism. His cousin's visit prompts fond memories of time spent at the family 
farm and occasions a degree of comfort that is utterly out of character for John: 'the 
promise of ease, of easiness: two people with a history in common, a country, a 
family, a blood intimacy from before the first word was spoken. No introductions 
needed, no fumbling around' (126). Although he compares speaking Afrikaans to 
'speaking Nazi' in the current political climate, it too is a comforting experience: 
'Though it is years since he has spoken Afrikaans, he can feel himself relax at once as 
though sliding into a warm bath' (127). 
But the pull of his connection to South Africa is more often articulated in 
much stronger terms. South Africa, he claims, 'is like an albatross around his neck. 
He wants it removed, he does not care how, so that he can begin to breathe' (101). 
And later, thinking of himself as heir to a gloomy history from his ancestors in the 
Karoo, he comments that 'South Africa is a wound within him. How much longer 
before the wound stops bleeding? ' (116)89 
89 Zoe Wicomb describes Coetzee's use of the word 'wound' in Youth as 'youthful histrionic mode. ' 
She admits: 'While I squeamishly wince at the word "wound" and cannot identify with the narrator, 
the formulation of the problem as a bodily act of uttering an unspeakable sentence is a suggestive one' 
('Setting, Intertextuality' 145). She also notes that Ezekiel Mphahlele and Lewis Nkosi describe South 
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90 The language of abjection that is evident in these examples seems to stage a 
certain absence of control on the part of the protagonist though it seems to me that in 
these varied examples the resort to this language cannot be reduced to any one simple 
explanation. Boehmer is correct to point out John's physical discomfort with 
women's bodies (though I would stop short of labelling this misogyny); the ease and 
comfort that he expresses in the company of his cousin points to a persistent, if 
slightly unwilling, affiliation with his home and upbringing; the more pathological 
terms in which he describes South Africa suggest that there is a deeply anguished 
(and confessional) dimension to this affiliation. What they have in common, is the 
notion that the absence of control in a psychic sense - we might call it the presence of 
unconscious forces - finds expression in a particular kind of writing, writing that is 
figured in Youth as compulsive and unmediated expression. This is at odds with 
John's stated ambitions as a writer and with the ideas of writing that he expresses in 
the course of the memoir. It is also contrary to ideas about writing that we find 
elsewhere in the Coetzee oeuvre, both fiction and nonfiction. So what is the purpose 
of this staged heartspeech? 
vi 
Towards the end ofAge ofIron Mrs Currcn lies on a bed of cardboard in the open air 
beside Verceuil, uttering a three-page confession that attempts to explain her actions 
and attitudes towards the country in which she lives - South Africa in the late 1980s. 
Central to the confession is the question of her right to such an explanation: 'Yet who 
Africa in terms of a wound. Of Nkosi she writes that he: 'speaks of the South African writer as being 
constructed out of an historical wound (private communication)' (I 54n2). 
90 In chapter II note the centrality of confessional discourse to Kristeva's Powers ofHorror, her book 
on abjection. 
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am 1, who am Ito have a voice at allT (149) She confesses that she has lived her life 
in a state of unremitting shame: 'My shame, my own. Ashes in my mouth day after 
day after day, which never ceased to taste like ashes' (150). She accepted this, she 
tells Verceuil, as the price to be paid for her inheritance as a white South African, an 
inheritance to which she is enslaved: 'I was bom a slave and I will most certainly die 
a slave. A life in fetters, a death in fetters: that is part of the price, not to be quibbled 
at, not to be whined about' (150). But shame, she says, was not enough; what was 
demanded by the times was heroism, and in this regard, as her confession implies, she 
has failed. In his acceptance speech for the Jerusalem Prize in 1987 Coetzee describes 
the 'unfreedom' of South African society in similar terms: 'In a society of masters 
and slaves, no one is free. The slave is not free, because he is not his own master; the 
master is not free, because he cannot do without the slave' (96). There is no way of 
resigning from South Africa's racially defined caste, 'short of shaking the dust of the 
country off your feet' (96). 
Yet Youth, which recounts the period Coctzee spent in London in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, illustrates that even this symbolic resignation was not 
sufficient to remove oneself from the 'unfreedom' of the master caste. As we have 
seen, the young Coetzee describes his relationship to his home country in precisely 
these terms of enslavement: 'South Africa is like an albatross around his neck. He 
wants it removed, he does not care how, so that he can begin to breathe' (101). Of 
course, the particular kind of enslavement invoked in this image is that of the 
storyteller, Coleridge's Ancient Mariner. For this reason the attention of the reader 
must turn away from the protagonist struggling to assert his freedom from South 
Africa in London in the early 1960s and towards the author, writing in the early 
twenty-first century. He can stage the relationship of his protagonist, his younger self, 
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to South Affica as one of enslavement to the story of his origins in 'the master caste, ' 
positioning it ironically - or histrionically, in Wicomb's view - in a language of 
abjection, but repeating this story, staging these revelations, making these 
confessions, can he entirely seal himset(off from this compulsive self-reflection? 
In the Doubling the Point interview immediately preceding a collection of his 
essays on South African literature, Coetzee discusses his affiliation with 
Afrikanerdom, describing the ways in which he is and is not part of the group. lie 
concludes ultimately, 'that I am not in a position to make an answer. Is it in my 
power to withdraw from the gang? I think not. [ ... ] More important, is it my heart's 
desire to be counted apart? Not really. Further-more - and this is an afterthought -I 
would regard it as morally dubious to write something like the second part of 
Dusklands - afiction, note - from a position that is not historically complicit' (342- 
43). 
Surveying the autobiographical and fictional confessions that appeared in 
South Africa in the immediate post-apartheid period, Boyhood among them, Michiel 
Heyns concludes that 'the problem for the white South African writer is how to find a 
perspective on South Africa that is not merely abject' (63). Boyhood and Youth 
respond to this demand in several ways. They stage the structural problem of 
confession without repeating either the structure or the problem: the potentially 
endless and self-interested spiral of double thought. The narratives develop within a 
confessional framework of shame, secrets and humiliation, but this comes to seem 
like a highly selective account calculated to maximise the confessional dimension of 
the texts. The preoccupation with writing as remembering, selecting, concealing, 
fascinating and sealing off is counterpointed with an abject subtext of flowing, 
leaking and seeping that replicates the idea of writing as an interplay of desire and 
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resistance. Because this is staged in a specifically confessional context, it stages this 
dimension of writing in terms of the machine-like, automated quality of the 
confessional narrative that constantly threatens the agency of the confessing subject. 
Finally, in the various affiliations and pathologies suggested by the deployment of the 
discourse of apartheid, the South African plaasroman, and the language of abjection, 
both memoirs enact a retrospective affiliation with a familial, societal and linguistic 
grouping that challenges an easy delineation of the limits of that group as well as 
implicitly addressing the historical demands made of that group. This affiliation is the 
basis for any serious confession but also an assertion of complicity that allows us to 
move from this early period of artistic frustration to the successful career that would 




In exploring the topic of confessional narrative in Coetzee's fiction from his earliest 
professional activities as a novelist, translator and professor of literature, via his 
extensive non-fiction writings on the subject, to his 'fictionalized memoirs, ' I hope to 
have extended understanding of the scope of his engagement with the form. The 
scope of this engagement is notjust its reach across his writing career, though this is 
important, but his relationship to the literary history within which he self-consciously 
positions himself, the extent to which his relationship to the context in which he was 
writing is mediated through confessional narrative, and the intimate connection 
between the dynamics of confession and the writing process itself. 
Underpinned by the teleology of transgression, confession, penitence and 
absolution that he rehearses in 'Double Thoughts, ' confession for Coetzee is a future- 
directed agent of transformation. But the limits and conventions through which 
confession must proceed - in terms of form and context, and which I compare with 
the conditions governing performative speech acts - means that this transformation is 
never quite achieved. Rather, his conception of absolution as grace suggests that 
confession is more like the event of Derrida's aneconomic gift: neutralized by 
calculation, exchange and teleology, it is by definition gratuitous, excessive, 
unforeseeable. In revisiting the structures and conventions of confessional narrative in 
his fiction, Coetzee allows for the possibility of this event; negotiating the limits and 
conditions governing confession (metaphorically and, in terms of the law, literally) he 
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allows these conventions to become visible as limits and frequently restores the 
horizon of the idea of the tr uth that I associate with Dostoevsky's Tikhon in my 
introduction. I have attempted to describe the constraining and enabling force of these 
limits across the full range of Coetzee's work, up to and including his memoirs: the 
determining force of genre in a discursive form whose main conceit is liberation, the 
power of physical suffering to dwarf the desire for transformation represented by 
confession, the immense personal risk undertaken by the writer in sacrificing private 
life for the public field of authorship, the need to adapt to terms and conditions not of 
one's choosing - physically and legally - in order to restore the horizon of the idea of 
the truth or the idea ofjustice, and finally, in the memoirs, the self-conscious staging 
of confession as 'heart-speech' that, never being able to bring its motives fully into 
focus, runs the risk of enacting rather than staging a confession. 
The repeated nature of Coetzee's engagement with confession across his 
entire body of work is in a sense related to the failure of confession to produce 
closure, the failure to render the past simply past (Sanders 180-8 1). But I hope that in 
pointing to the reiterated nature of his repeated staging of confession, this failure 
comes to look rather more like a space in which the event of successful confession 
might be possible. In other words, while confession in itself is fraught by problems of 
blindness and self-interestedness, I am making an ethical claim for Coctzcc's 
repeated, 'dogged', - engagement with it. As I have pointed out from the outset, the 
scepticism with which he approaches confession does not diminish the desire for 
confession or the urgency of the need for confession. 
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It is in this spirit that I suggest we approach the confessional elements of Coetzee's 
most recent novel, Diary of a Bad Year. While not overtly confessional, the novel's 
unusual form explicitly engages the structural problems and conditions of confession 
that Coetzee has been negotiating since his earliest work: the question of speaking in 
one's own voice in the first person, the problem of reconciling the need for an 
interlocutor with the compromising presence of an audience, the risk of transgressing 
the boundary between private and public life in autobiography, and writing in general 
as a way of positioning oneself between the private and the public. In addition, as I 
noted in chapters 2 and 5, the subject of many of these opinions relates to Coetzee's 
ongoing interest in the public dimension of confession. 
The idiosyncratic and often irrational spirit of the 'Strong Opinions' that 
initially seems to be the structuring principle behind the novel evokes the later 
Tolstoy that Coetzee discusses in 'Double Thoughts, ' noting with some envy 
Tolstoy's '(rash? ) decision to set down the truth, finally, as though after a lifetime of 
exploring one had acquired the credentials, amassed the authority, to do so' (293). In 
'On the writing life, ' one of the 'Second Opinions, ' JC describes the same quality in 
Tolstoy (Diary 193). In other words, the 'Strong Opinions' might be a way of laying 
down the law, imposing 'the end of the episode' by virtue of the authority of the 
celebrated, aging writer. But the authority of the 'Strong Opinions' - opinions that 
the reader cannot entirely distance from J. M. Coetzee - is undermined by the 
demands of the body and soul that are recorded in JC's private diary and more 
comprehensively still by the challenging presence of Anya and the complications of 
her private life, eventually giving rise to the even more idiosyncratic 'Second Diary. 
286 
The novel affects a discontinuity between these different elements in its unusual 
format, but the experience of reading the novel is to reintegrate these different 
elements and bridge the discontinuity of the different registers and voices. In 
addition, the novel stages both direct confessional and testimonial encounters 
between Anya and JC, and indirect encounters mediated through the sinister presence 
of Anya's partner Alan. JC's private diary in this sense becomes a confession 
unknowingly addressed to another, who is - beyond the control of the confessant - 
both devious (Alan) and sympathetic (Anya). That JC's call reaches its addressee is 
verified in Anya's private diary, which, without providing the ultimate closure of 
death, at least signals her intention to respond to JC's call and to witness the moment 
of the end. This might not be absolution, but it does restore a horizon of possibility 
for the operation of grace, or the gift - gratitude for which is the subject of JC's 
closing remarks. 
III 
The teleological tendency of Coetzee's thinking on confession - and the avowed 
inadequacy of it - invites comparison with the temporality implicit in the idea of the 
postcolonial itself. If, as Sanders suggests, the TRC embodied a 'decolonizing logic, ' 
does the confessional narrative as it is staged and enacted in Coetzee's work represent 
a specifically postcolonial form of confession? Situated in the context of the South 
African interregnum, Coetzee's model of confession and the novels in which it was 
played out undoubtedly reflect a desire for liberation into an 'ethical community, ' as 
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Attwell proposes (Doubling 340). Indeed, Coetzee's fictional confessions are 
concerned to stage the conditions in which this kind of confession can successfully 
take place. The post-apartheid context does not diminish the desire for confession, but 
it does make the conditions in which it can successfully take place seem increasingly 
limiting and compromising. Sanders' rejection of confession as a kind of language 
that attempts to render the past simply past seems to acknowledge that the 
postcolonial context requires something more. He suggests that this might be a kind 
of traumatic repetition. But for all their desire for closure, the repeated failures of 
Coetzee's confessions are closer to the notion of traumatic repetition than rendering 
the past simply past. Coetzee's might be a specifically postcolonial form of 
confession precisely to the extent that it fails to reach 'the end of the episode, the 
closing of the chapter, liberation from the oppression of the memory' (252). Or at 
least it demonstrates that this can be achieved only in a highly qualified fashion or at 
immense personal cost. But if his thinking and writing on confession exposes its 
limits, they also constitute a space in which the idea of truth and the idea of justice 
give meaning, and a form through which to approach it. 
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